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Abstract
Societal dependence on electricity has rapidly increased as technological advancement
has occurred, thus requiring electric utilities to advance their emergency response and repair
procedures. Disaster management and response is a relatively new field for electric utilities, and
despite the adoption of the Incident Command System created by FEMA, there are still
opportunities for all utilities to improve. This project aims to assess the disaster response and
management procedures of National Grid U.S. and NYSEG and identify opportunities for
improvement. This study interviewed emergency management professionals experienced with
electric utilities and found both National Grid U.S. and NYSEG can improve in areas such as
communicating with customers and government officials, decreasing response times, and
increasing grid resiliency.
Key words: Disaster response, disaster management, electric emergency management, Incident
Command System, electric utility
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Chapter I: Introduction
Statement of Problem
Since 1980, the United States has endured 218 storms that created a monetary loss of $1
billion or more, with 15 of those storms occurring as recently as October 6, 2017 (NOAA
National Centers for Environmental Information, 2017). In sum, these 218 storms cost
approximately $1.2 trillion, a burden that is shared by federal, state, and local governments, as
well as private companies and individual citizens (NOAA National Centers for Environmental
Information, 2017). Although climate experts are hesitant to link these recent natural disasters to
climate change, in the future “global warming could affect storm formation by decreasing the
temperature difference between the poles and the equator”, which ultimately increases the
probability of weather-related natural disasters (The Earth Observatory, 2017, p. 1). Experts at
NASA state that while global warming may decrease the number of overall storms, changes in
temperature could result in more “intense storms”, which will increase the amount of damage the
United States will face (The Earth Observatory, 2017).
As the U.S. population has increased, infrastructure has expanded to more disaster-prone
locations, such as low-lying coastal areas, mountain slopes, fire-prone forests, and riverbanks,
which has significantly increased the amount and cost of damage per disaster (The Earth
Observatory, 2017). Due to the increased cost of natural disasters in recent years, it is crucial that
public service organizations improve their disaster response and management plans to deal with
the severity and cost of the damage these storms can potentially inflict, as well as ensure critical
services are restored as quickly as possible.
Electric power systems are integral to the functioning of society, as each component of
critical infrastructure, such as water treatment and supply, gas delivery systems, transportation,
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telecommunications, public health, financial and security services is dependent on electricity
(Castillo, 2014). Electrical failure due to a disaster not only immediately leaves customers
without power, but also stops many basic services and can cause severe losses, including food,
data, infrastructure, and potentially life (Castillo, 2014; Liua, Davidsona, & Apanasovichb,
2008). Therefore, electric utilities must devise emergency response processes and plans to
mitigate the losses disasters can inflict and efficiently restore power to their customers.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to analyze the disaster management and response plans of
National Grid and NYSEG as case studies to examine different response and management
methods and identify their effectiveness. This study will highlight the challenges National Grid
and New York State Electric & Gas face in responding to and managing natural disasters within
the utilities’ electric systems, as well as evaluate the performance of these utilities based on the
standards set by the federal and New York State governments. Utilizing theoretical response
models, established contemporary models, and best practices, this study will recommend areas of
improvement for both utilities if applicable.
This study review will first discuss the definitions of disaster and disaster management to
comprehensively introduce the subject of emergency response. Then, this paper will cover
pertinent governmental laws and regulations that dictate the processes utilities must include to
effectively restore power, including those suggested by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and mandated by New York State. Following this section, the author will
discuss background of the two public utilities evaluated in this study, National Grid, U.S., New
York State Electric and Gas (NYSEG), and their historical response to major storms.
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Definitions of Disaster
Identifying the definitions of the various components of disaster management is crucial to
understanding emergency response plans and practices. Unfortunately, it is often difficult for
researchers to come to a consensus on a single definition of disaster, especially when “mandated
definitions”, or those “that are generated as a matter of social or governmental policy” are
excluded (Perry, 2007, p. 4). Due to this, often it is difficult to translate the academic definitions
of disaster and apply them to real situations, creating a disparity between the tactics academics
recommend to address certain situations and what first responders and public servants may
implement. Modern researchers of disaster management do agree on a few facets of the
definition, however; one such source of agreement is the idea that disasters are inherently social
(Perry, 2007). A disaster does not exist outside of the pretense that it causes a disruption in social
structure or leads to a significant social change; this is because they disturb structured human
interaction. Author Ronald Perry posits “disasters stem not from the agent that causes the
disruption, but from the social structure of norms and values” (2007, pp. 12-13). This facet of the
definition of disaster is akin to the saying ‘if a tree falls in the woods and no one was there to
hear it, did it make a sound?’; if an event occurred but did not interrupt anyone’s daily lives,
whether through the destruction of property, interruption of electric service, or mass chaos, was
it truly a disaster?
Within the realm of disaster management, a consensus also exists that a crisis is
considered fundamentally different than a disaster. According to Kumar Mukhopadhyay, a crisis
is man-made, such as an economic or political event, while a disaster is natural, such as a
hurricane or ice storm (Mukhopadhyay, 2005). However, Mukhopadhyay’s definition is arguably
too narrow, and fails to account for the multiple types of hazards that could trigger a disaster.
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While he does allude to atmospheric hazards, which are naturally occurring, he does not mention
hazards such as environmental, nuclear, or structural collapses, which can inflict an equal
amount of damage as a natural hazard (McEntire, 2015). FEMA, on the other hand, defines a
crisis as a “short period of extreme danger, acute emergency” or and encompasses “the concepts
of natural disasters, man-made/technological disasters, and social disasters” (Blanchard, 2006,
pp. 10-11). Thus, a broader definition of disaster is necessary.
David A. McEntire defines disaster as “deadly, destructive, and disruptive events that
occur when a hazard interacts with human vulnerability” (McEntire, 2015). Therefore, disaster
management is a response to a destructive event and is an attempt to mitigate its effects. FEMA
has compiled a multitude of definitions of disaster, but the common theme throughout them is
the idea that a disaster as an event associated with a “natural hazard” that is “considered severe
enough by local government to warrant the response and dedication beyond the normal scope of
a single jurisdictional branch of local government” (Blanchard, 2006, p. 15). Therefore, disaster
management is the “entire process of planning and intervention to reduce disasters as well as the
response and recovery measures” (Blanchard, 2006, p. 23). Similarly, on an international scale,
the Red Cross defines disaster management as the “organization and management of resources
and responsibilities for dealing with all humanitarian aspects of emergencies, in
particular preparedness, response and recovery in order to lessen the impact of disasters”
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2017). Disaster preparedness
involves the creation of plans, processes and procedures that dictate the steps taken when a
disaster occurs. It also involves the allocation of resources to the correct organizations and
categories, such as labor, equipment, and materials. Preparedness may also involve the creation
of predictor models to determine when the next disaster may occur. Disaster response requires
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the mobilization of the previously stated resources to effectively respond to the immediate needs
of citizens. Typically, an organization will have a disaster response plan that has established
processes in place for disaster relief and restoration. These restoration efforts expand past
immediate relief efforts and often involve a long-term plan to rebuild affected infrastructure
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2017).

Laws and Regulations
The federal government, by way of FEMA, mandates that state governments create a
State Mitigation Plan, which is “FEMA’s official policy on the natural hazard mitigation
planning requirements at Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 201, and FEMA’s
interpretation of federal regulations for state hazard mitigation plans” (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2015b). This State Mitigation Plan is one of the many criteria FEMA
requires in order for states to receive federal assistance through programs such as Hazard
Mitigation Assistance grants and Public Assistance Categories C-G (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2015b). FEMA requires that the plan is updated every five years to keep
up with changing population demographics, development of infrastructure, and weather patterns
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015b). It is also mandatory that the state works with
a “cross‐section of stakeholders” to create a plan that integrates an agreement between all parties
on financial, technological, and labor-related aspects of said plan (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2015a, p. 11). These stakeholders include organizations responsible for
critical infrastructure and social services, such as power utilities (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2015a).
In compliance with the components of FEMA’s State Mitigation Plan, New York State,
through its Public Service Commission (PSC) and law NYCRR16 §105.3, mandates all electric
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utilities submit an annual disaster management and response plan on or by April first (New York
State, 2011). The PSC reviews and revises the plan as necessary to ensure that the plan is
compliant with the law and proves the organization “[maintains] a high level of preparedness”
(New York State, 2011). The organization must also submit a report that provides evidence that
both internal and external phone numbers are updated and at least one emergency response drill
was held that included key response personnel (New York State, 2011). The parameters of the
emergency response plan are established by the PSC’s section on electric utilities emergency
response plans, regulation 16 CRR-NY §105.4. This regulation requires that in the organization’s
emergency response plan the organization includes a section on emergency classifications, which
comprises the estimated scope of the disaster or emergency, the time it would take to repair any
damage and restore power, the type of damage inflicted, and the amount of labor necessary to
conduct said repairs (New York State, 2017).
The utility must include a section on its emergency response training program, which
includes detailed procedures and evidence that the organization conducts emergency response
drills (New York State, 2017). The report should contain an updated list of all internal and
external personnel essential to emergency response with specifications as to how they update this
list throughout the year, as well as the necessary resources they need to be successful in their
restoration efforts. This list includes utility employees and outside resources such as media,
medical services, mutual aid companies, special needs customers, and lodging resources, as well
as elected officials, law enforcement, and emergency managers (New York State, 2017). The
utility’s report is obligated to include its emergency anticipation processes, which determine the
aforementioned emergency classifications, as well as all service restoration procedures (New
York State, 2017). These procedures generally include mobilization of personnel and equipment,
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identification of critical customers and other restoration priorities (New York State, 2017).
Lastly, the utility must make itself available for public inspection following the issuance of the
report so the PSC may verify compliance with 16 CRR-NY §105.4 and NYCRR16 §105.3 (New
York State, 2017).
The relationship between governments and utilities
The rules and regulations created by New York State and FEMA are considered
“reflexive modernization”, which describes the process of creating disaster response plans and
procedures following an increase in technological advancement and the accompanying
knowledge of risk it provides (Lakoff, 2010). Following major natural disasters such as
Hurricane Katrina, the focus on creating comprehensive disaster plans increased in an attempt to
prevent similar damage and loss of life in the future. This is known as risk governance, which
emphasizes quantitative modeling, prediction, and technological response (Lakoff, 2010). These
qualities are emphasized in New York State and FEMA’s management models, as well as the
premise of distribution, which includes multiple actors into the process of emergency
management (Lakoff, 2010). The accumulation of knowledge is also an important aspect of
reflexive modernization, which is integrated into the response process when utilities’ plans are
reviewed by the state.
It is important that a utility’s disaster management plans, as well as the State Mitigation
Plan, are up-to-date in the event of an emergency; as previously mentioned, the existence of a
State Mitigation Plan makes a state eligible to receive federal funding from FEMA. States must
follow a process in order to apply for FEMA financial aid, which involves a declaration process
created from a damage assessment made by the federal, state, and local governments, as well as
the involved organizations on the ground (Lindsay & Murray, 2011). The governor then submits
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a declaration request to the president while FEMA creates a needs assessment and provides it to
the president for background information on the state’s ability to handle the emergency (Lindsay
& Murray, 2011). If the president approves the request, funds are released from the Disaster
Relief Fund and may be allocated to any of the three forms of assistance programs: individual
assistance, public assistance, or hazard mitigation (Lindsay & Murray, 2011). As distributed by
the state, electric utilities such as National Grid and the NYSEG might receive funds through
FEMA’s public assistance program, which aids communities in rebuilding and restoring
infrastructure (Lindsay & Murray, 2011). The utilities previously could also receive funds
through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, which serves to provide resources for
organizations to improve structures to lessen future damage; however, recently county access has
been severely restricted, as individual municipalities are no longer part of the approved plan
(Lindsay & Murray, 2011).
The National Response Framework (NRF), updated in 2016, created a nationalpreparedness system that coordinates disaster response on federal, state, and local levels
(Lindsay, 2011). It also focuses on integrating all sectors of organizations that provide basic
services in response and short-term recovery by providing a flexible framework that can be
tailored to the disaster (Lindsay, 2011). The framework incorporates a whole community
approach with the goal of creating “a secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required
across the whole community to prevent, protect again, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the
threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2016,
pp. 2-3). The framework provides a breakdown of the roles and responsibilities of governmental,
non-profit, and private actors, preparation and response actions, the organizational structure of
said response actions, as well as the planning process for disasters (Lindsay, 2011). This
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framework creates a relationship between the government and the electric utilities that exists
outside of the State Mitigation Plan and state-imposed regulations.
As Hurricane Katrina was a benchmark for improvements to the NRF, so was superstorm Sandy in 2012. This event triggered electric utilities in the Northeast to improve their
response frameworks and increase governmental coordination. Focus within utilities has shifted
to increase communication with the U.S. Department of Energy and coordination with the U.S.
Department of Transportation, as well as state transportation agencies to expedite the movement
of power utility personnel and equipment (Edison Electric Institute, 2016). Power utilities are
also exploring opportunities with the U.S. Department of Defense for logistical support in terms
of security, access to restricted areas and roadways through the National Guard, as well as access
to critical supplies and equipment from the Army Corps of Engineers (Edison Electric Institute,
2016).
Emergency Response Processes
As established by state-imposed regulations, following a needs-assessment, generally, an
electric utility’s first step within the restoration process following a disaster is to turn off the
power to all downed utility lines, which prevents injury and fires (Edison Electric Institute,
2016). The main source of power, which are power plants, are assessed and restored, along with
any high-voltage transmission lines in the areas without power (Edison Electric Institute, 2016).
Transmission lines, which are often the large metal poles that conduct electrical wires and are
what enable power to reach across large distances, are also assessed and repaired. However, this
is often a much more intensive process, as new holes may have to be dug, and new equipment
brought in. On a more local level, substations are then assessed and brought on-line, which
allows power to reach local distribution lines (Edison Electric Institute, 2016).
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Based on the needs assessment and response processes already established, the
substations that provide power to critical services such as hospitals, law enforcement, fire
stations, water reclamation infrastructure, communication systems, and special-needs customers,
such as individuals who require respirators, are restored first, as well as those substations that
will restore power to the most individuals (Edison Electric Institute, 2016). Following these
restorations, scheduling analysts at the power utility dispatch line crews to the largest service
areas to repair lines that will restore power to the most customers in the shortest period of time
(Edison Electric Institute, 2016). These large service areas typically include neighborhoods,
businesses, and industries; following this, crews will work to restore power to individual homes
and small neighborhoods that have been affected (Edison Electric Institute, 2016).
The power utility creates a command center that controls all aspects of the response
process until power has been completely restored and any damaged infrastructure has been
repaired. The command center is comprised of personnel who assess damage and determines
what needs to be repaired, dispatchers or scheduling analysts who direct field personnel, and
field personnel who repair substations, power lines, and power plants (Singer, 2016). Damage
assessment processes are typically automated with the employment of a smart grid, which is the
“computer-automated version of the traditional electric utility grid, with the ability to
communicate with all devices associated with the grid” (Singer, 2016). The smart grid enables
utilities to monitor all substations, electrical lines, transformers, and power plants with sensors
that provide information on meters, electricity levels, and fault detectors, which report if a device
is damaged (Singer, 2016).
The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) is also an important resource in
the process of power restoration. The NYISO is a non-profit organization that runs the entire
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state’s power market and grid, and ensures fair practices by all power utilities (Edison Electric
Institute, 2016). The organization is located in Albany, New York and is staffed twenty-four
hours a day. NYISO is one of 36 electrical operating organizations in the Eastern
Interconnection, which is one of the United States’ three main electrical grids (Edison Electric
Institute, 2016). The organization measures and calculates inputs and outputs to ensure the
electrical grid remains balanced and directs each power plant on how much electricity they may
produce at a time (Edison Electric Institute, 2016). This institution helps to predict weather
patterns to prepare for disasters and storms and maintains a grid balance when equipment is
flooded, frozen, overheated, or otherwise negatively impacted by weather (Edison Electric
Institute, 2016). NYISO precedes any formal governmental involvement when addressing an
emergency, which coordinates recovery efforts within its own operations or in conjunction with
an individual utility (New York State, 2016).
Emergency Response Plans
As mandated by New York State and the federal government, both National Grid and
NYSEG have published emergency response plans. National Grid’s plan is extremely
comprehensive and is approximately 626 pages long. The plan states that it is intended to
manage “electric outages caused by storms and other natural disasters, civil unrest, major
equipment failure, or other emergency events. It is intended to be simple, flexible, and easily
adapted to specific emergencies” (National Grid, 2016). Within National Grid exists an
Emergency Response Organization that is comprised by strategic, tactical, and operational levels,
which all contribute to the execution of the emergency response plan (National Grid, 2016).
National Grid’s plan also includes a process for classifying emergencies, which dictates
the approach utilized, processes for determining restoration priorities, coordinating personnel and
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equipment, damage assessment, internal and external communications, and liaison interactions
with multiple levels of government, among others (National Grid, 2016). NYSEG also has an
emergency response plan, which is approximately 136 pages long. The plan provides emergency
classifications, a brief explanation on damage assessment, and an extensive process for
restoration activities (New York State Electric & Gas Corporation & Rochester Gas and Electric
Corporation, 2016). At the end of the document is a section on communication with customers,
emergency managers, and public officials (New York State Electric & Gas Corporation &
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, 2016).
New York State Electricity
In New York State, natural gas and nuclear power are the primary sources of electricity
generation, each accounting for approximately 30 percent of the electricity produced in 2010
(New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, 2012). The rest of the state’s
electrical energy is produced through hydroelectric power and coal, which made-up another 30
percent of total energy created in 2010 (New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority, 2012). In 2018, the total share of utility-scale net electricity generation for natural gas
at 29 percent and nuclear power at 34 percent has remained consistent; however, the state has
expanded its renewable energy initiatives, which has decreased the amount of coal-powered
electricity created to two percent and increased the amount of renewable resources to
approximately 24 percent of electricity generation (U.S. Energy Information Administration,
2018).
New York’s flow of electrical power within the state is unique due to the location of its
natural resources and its “supply and demand dynamics” (New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority, 2012, pp. IV-10). Electricity flows from the Niagara Falls area
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southward to New York City and Long Island, which are the most heavily populated areas of the
state (New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, 2012). The area
surrounding New York City generates approximately 40 percent of the state’s electricity, due to
the abundance of natural gas deposits and nuclear plants south of Albany (New York State
Energy Research and Development Authority, 2012). However, the area also consumes 50
percent of the electricity produced in the state, which requires the Western New York region to
fill a substantial portion of the gap (New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority, 2012). Due to the recent push to increase renewable electricity, Western New York
has become progressively more interested in the production of hydroelectricity due to its
proximity to the Niagara River. The natural flow of the water, especially at the base of the
Niagara Falls, provides the power necessary for a turbine to turn a generator, creating electricity
and powering a motor, offering an essentially infinite source of electric power (United States
Geological Survey, 2016). The Robert Moses Niagara hydroelectric plant was established in
1961 in Niagara Falls, and at the time of creation was the “largest hydroelectric generation
facility in the world” (New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, 2012, pp.
IV-10). While this is no longer true, New York State still produces the most hydroelectric power
of any state east of the Rocky Mountains, and the Robert Moses plant is still the largest generator
of electricity in the state, with a capacity of 2.4 gigawatts (New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority, 2012; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018). The energy
generation of the Robert Moses plant is comparable to that of the Hoover Dam, and can provide
over 700,000 homes with electricity at a time, depending on the water levels and water current
(Climate Central, 2011).
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Figure 1. United States and Canadian Interconnections
(New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, 2012)

The United States and Canada are divided into four major interconnections for the
transfer of electrical power: The Western Interconnection, the Eastern Interconnection, the
ERCOT Interconnection, and the Quebec Interconnection (see Figure 1). These interconnections
are then subdivided into control areas to closely monitor the flow of electricity and service (New
York State Energy Research and Development Authority, 2012). New York state is unique in
that it controls its own area but is broken down into 11 interfaces that are divided geographically
and are monitored by the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) (Horton, 2017; New
York State Energy Research and Development Authority, 2012). The NYISO “monitors the
reliability of the state’s power system and coordinates the daily operations to distribute
electricity supply”, as well as determines and enforces the rates utility companies may charge for
electricity to ensure a “transparent market system” (New York State Department of Public
Service, 2018). It is integral to the integrity of New York state’s electric grid that it has its own
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control area due to its transmission constraints; due to the large population of New York City, as
previously mentioned, the area cannot completely fulfill the electric demand with just the electric
plants in its immediate area. Thus, NYISO must regulate the transmission of electrical power
from the western and central areas of the state into the city without overloading the system (U.S.
Energy Information Administration, 2011).
National Grid: A Company Overview

Figure 2. National Grid U.S. Service Territories
(National Grid, 2018)
National Grid is the largest of the nine public electric utilities in New York, followed
closely by the Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., as measured by the number of
customers served (Consolidated Edison, 2016; National Grid, 2010; New York State Department
of Public Service, 2017). It is important to note that National Grid is a multinational company
headquartered in the United Kingdom that delivers gas and electrical services to customers in
18

England and Wales. It also has service territories in New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
New Hampshire, and Vermont, and thus has a much broader base and larger pool of customers
than Consolidated Edison (National Grid, 2010). National Grid also manages, but does not own,
the Long Island Power Authority (National Grid, 2010). As of 2010, National Grid had
approximately 28,000 employees, with 68 percent of its workforce in the United States (National
Grid, 2010).
National Grid currently serves 3.4 million customers through electricity distribution
networks and transmission facilities, and maintains “8,835 miles of overhead line, 377
transmission substations and 763 distribution substations” in the United States (National Grid,
2017a, p. 3). The company also serves 3.5 million natural gas customers and 1.1 million
electricity customers through the Long Island Power Authority (National Grid, 2017a). In 2017,
National Grid USA and its subsidiaries had an income of $614 million after taxes, while National
Grid, PLC, which includes US and UK assets, earned $10.7 billion after taxes (National Grid,
2017a, 2017b).
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NYSEG: A Company Overview

Figure 3. NYSEG Service Territory
(NYSEG, 2018)
New York State Electric and Gas (NYSEG) is a subsidiary of AVANGRID, Inc., which
owns and operates natural gas and electric utilities in 27 states (AVANGRID, 2017). NYSEG
serves approximately 40 percent of upstate New York, extending from Lancaster in Western
New York, to Brewster in downstate, and up to Plattsburgh in Northern New York, which in
total is approximately 20,000 square miles (Bloomberg, 2018; New York State Electric & Gas,
2018). Within NYSEG’s service area, its operations are primarily limited to electricity; however,
in central New York, between Hornell, Geneva, and Oneonta, it provides both electricity and
natural gas to its customers (New York State Electric & Gas, 2018). In total, it serves
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approximately 881,000 electric customers and 263,000 natural gas customers (New York State
Electric & Gas, 2018).
According to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), NYSEG
owns and operates approximately 238 miles of overhead and underground electric cables with
230 kilovolt capabilities, and 531 miles of overhead and underground with 354 kilovolt
capabilities (North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2016). NYSEG also owns 32,400
miles of distribution facilities that have the capabilities of operating at kilovolt levels ranging
from 4.8 to 34.5, as well as 435 substations and 7 electric generating stations (Nilsen, 2015;
North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2016). In 2015, NYSEG estimated that it
delivered approximately 15,409 gigawatt-hours to its customers (Nilsen, 2015). Following the
end of the fourth quarter, ending on December 31, 2017, NYSEG reported approximately $2.5
million in revenue from the year, prior to tax withholdings (Syta, 2018).
Historical Responses to Storms
To understand the effectiveness and efficiency of National Grid and NYSEG’s
emergency response plans, it is important to analyze their responses to the largest four major
storms that affected New York state over the past 12 years. The section below discusses the
utilities’ responses to the 2006 October Storm, Hurricanes Irene and Sandy, and Tropical Storm
Lee.
October 2006 Snow Storm
On October 12, 2006, an unseasonal snow storm extended from Lake Erie through Erie,
Genesee, Orleans, and Niagara counties, leaving anywhere from 6 to 24 inches of snow (New
York State Department of Public Service, 2007). Due to the time of year, most of the trees in the
area still had foliage. As a result, the branches were too heavy to hold the precipitation, resulting
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in extreme damage to both public and private property, as well as electrical and
telecommunication lines (New York State Department of Public Service, 2007). By October 13,
approximately 261,000 National Grid customers and 135,000 NYSEG customers experienced
interrupted electric service in the Western New York region (New York State Department of
Public Service, 2007). These interruptions were caused by damaged circuits, poles, and
transformers, of which numbered approximately 10,000 for National Grid and 1,432 for NYSEG
(New York State Department of Public Service, 2007).
In response to the storm and number of customers effected, National Grid requested 851
line crews for restoration of services from other utilities engaged in their mutual assistance
program. A mutual assistance program is a “voluntary partnership of investor-owned electric
companies across the country committed to helping restore power whenever and wherever
assistance is needed” (Edison Electric Institute, 2016). Involvement in this network is considered
essential as it provides utilities the ability to request assistance in the form of crews and
machinery to expedite the restoration and recovery processes (Edison Electric Institute, 2016).
Due to the amount of snow on the roads and number of downed wires following the storm, 105
miles of road between Rochester and Buffalo was closed, which prevented many of the crews
from Syracuse and Albany from reaching Buffalo quickly (New York State Department of
Public Service, 2007). National Grid, with the assistance from line crews obtained through the
mutual assistance program, completed electrical restoration within ten days of the onset of the
storm, which the New York State Department of Public Services (NYSDPS) noted was
“adequately conducted under difficult conditions” (New York State Department of Public
Service, 2007, p. 12). The company submitted a self-assessment to the NYSDPS, which
highlighted the need for improvement in working with the NYS Thruway Authority to decrease
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the time in which it takes to bring in mutual aid crews and continue to review and implement
best practices to increase response time (New York State Department of Public Service, 2007).
Outside of this recommendation, the NYSDPS identified three other major areas for
improvement. First, it stated that damage surveyors should be sent out to assess the electrical
infrastructure earlier. Second, damage surveyors should be trained to safely secure downed wires
so municipalities can send out plows, which would in turn allow for a faster response time from
the mutual assistance line crews (New York State Department of Public Service, 2007). Third, it
was recommended that National Grid improve methods to estimate total crew requirements by
using historical data on similar storms so that they may have the capability to immediately begin
restoration work (New York State Department of Public Service, 2007). Overall, the Department
determined that National Grid handled the matter effectively, considering the limited line crews
available and storm conditions (New York State Department of Public Service, 2007).
NYSEG, in response to the storm, worked in conjunction with the Public Service
Commission to utilize state resources and coordinate with local municipalities, following its
Electric Utility Emergency Plan (New York State Department of Public Service, 2007).
Although NYSEG immediately called in 47 damage surveyors and 159 line crews, which the
NYSDPS praised, it raised concern at the large disparity between the number of crews utilized
by National Grid and NYSEG. The NYSDPS claimed this disparity highlighted NYSEG’s
reluctance “in requesting non-company line crews for assistance”, as it requested the majority of
its additional crews from its sister company Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E) (New York State
Department of Public Service, 2007, p. 21). Despite this perceived misstep, NYSEG restored all
effected customers within nine days of the start of the storm (New York State Department of
Public Service, 2007). The self-assessment submitted to the NYSDPS by NYSEG was found to
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be incomplete, as it was only six pages long and did not answer multiple questions; the
incompleteness of the assessment was one of the recommendations for improvement identified
(New York State Department of Public Service, 2007). The NYSDPS also recommended that
NYSEG should improve the training of its outage management system operators and increase
reporting on system enhancements to the state due to communication issues between the line
crews and system operators (New York State Department of Public Service, 2007). Despite these
problems, the NYSDPS stated that like National Grid, NYSEG was both effective and efficient
in responding to storm outages and responding to customers (New York State Department of
Public Service, 2007).
Hurricane Irene
Hurricane Irene made landfall in Brooklyn, New York on August 28, 2011, and
continued through the state into Manhattan, where the strongest winds reached approximately 63
miles per hour (Avila & Cangialosi, 2011). The storm caused extreme rainfall in New York and
Vermont, which resulted in flash flooding and approximately 3 million residents losing power
for up to a week (Avila & Cangialosi, 2011). In New York State, the number of customers to
lose power was approximately 1.1 million, with most of those individuals residing in Long Island
(New York State Department of Public Service, 2012). National Grid reported that most of the
damage was due to high winds that downed power lines and utility poles, which were made
difficult to restore, as much of the transportation infrastructure was flooded or washed away
(National Grid, 2011). The winds also caused the uprooting of trees, due to the instability of the
soil caused by intense ground saturation (New York State Public Service Comission, 2011). In
total, the hurricane caused outages for 156,000 of National Grid’s direct customers in
approximately 18,650 square miles of the company’s territory and required the replacement of
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“399 utility poles, 196 transformers, 4.35 miles of primary wire, and 1.34 miles of secondary
wire” (National Grid, 2011; New York State Department of Public Service, 2012, p. 4). Prior to
the onset of the storm, National Grid “pre-staged over 400 distribution line crews and 172
forestry crews in central and Eastern New York”, which were in place and ready to respond
when Irene made landfall (National Grid, 2011, p. 3). Within four days of landfall, National Grid
successfully restored power to 99 percent of its customers while utilizing 811 crews (National
Grid, 2011). While the company did promptly respond to the storm, the New York State Public
Service Commission (PSC) still had a few recommendations to further improve its response. One
recommendation made by PSC was that National Grid should research the use of mobile data
collection for damage assessment to further streamline response services (New York State
Department of Public Service, 2012; New York State Public Service Comission, 2011).
While NYSEG’s territory in Western New York was not affected by Hurricane Irene,
outages for their customers peaked at 131,000 (New York State Department of Public Service,
2012). An estimated 5,500 square miles of NYSEG’s territory was damaged, including 2,500
downed wires and 200 transmission and distribution poles (New York State Public Service
Comission, 2011). Prior to and during the storm, NYSEG had approximately 650 linemen,
damage assessors, and general staff engaged in preparation and restoration efforts, which
increased to over 1,400 after the storm passed (New York State Public Service Comission,
2011). Initially, the only crews utilized in restoration efforts were employed by NYSEG or its
sister company RG&E, which once again highlighted the company’s trepidation at securing
mutual assistance crews. As recovery efforts continued, NYSEG hired additional contract crews;
however, it is unclear if these crews were sourced from a mutual assistance network (New York
State Public Service Comission, 2011). Within one week of the storm, NYSEG had most of its
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customers reconnected, but still had failed to restore 1,150 outages in Oneonta, which affected
200 customers, due to closures as a byproduct of flooding and debris (New York State Public
Service Comission, 2011). The Department of Public Service recommended NYSEG increase
the number of contracted damage assessors it employs, as “the faster the damage assessment
takes place, the better prepared the utility is to restore power in an efficient manner” (State of
New York Public Service Commission, 2012, p. 41). The state assessment stated that all utilities
efficiently assigned damage assessors to locations prior to the storm; however, the number of
damage assessors employed could have been increased (State of New York Public Service
Commission, 2012).
Tropical Storm Lee
Approximately a week after Hurricane Irene made landfall, Tropical Storm Lee produced
devastatingly heavy rains in Eastern and Central New York, which caused rivers to spill over
their banks and flood multiple transmission circuits, causing outages for 25,000 National Grid
customers in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (National Grid, 2011). Emergency restoration efforts
required National Grid to first work with the New York Canal Authority to rebuild levies and
stop the flooding to conduct repairs on the flooded substation (National Grid, 2011). Roughly
four days following the outage, all customers were restored; however, part of the Amsterdam
substation caved into the Mohawk River and was swept away, leaving the substation too
damaged to repair (National Grid, 2011). The Department of Public Service found all of National
Grid’s updates on its progress to be “timely and adequate,” and did not recommend any areas for
improvement (New York State Department of Public Service, 2012, p. 69). However, following
Irene and Lee, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo conducted an independent assessment of the
Long Island Power Authority (LIPA)’s response to the storms, which is managed by National
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Grid. The assessment concluded that LIPA and National Grid should increase communication
with local officials, as well as communication with the public, regarding restoration efforts and
estimated damages (New York State Department of Public Service, 2012).
Similarly, NYSEG experienced flooding in nine substations in Binghamton and one in
Oneonta, which resulted in the decision to shut down an additional six substations to prevent
further flooding (New York State Department of Public Service, 2012). It is estimated that
21,000 NYSEG customers experienced interruptions in their service due to flooding from Lee
(New York State Department of Public Service, 2012). Despite the extreme weather conditions,
the Department of Public Service stated that NYSEG improved its emergency response protocols
following lessons learned from the 2006 October Snow Storm. The PSC commended NYSEG
for its use of portable substations, which were necessary as many of its permanent structures
were flooded, and the use of helicopters to perform damage assessments, as many of the
roadways were flooded (New York State Department of Public Service, 2012). Approximately
1,000 customers were restored by September 10, and the remaining customers, initially
inaccessible due to floodwaters, were restored by September 16 (New York State Department of
Public Service, 2012; New York State Public Service Comission, 2011).
Hurricane Sandy
Hurricane Sandy made landfall on October 29, 2012 with sustained winds of 80 milesper-hour, torrential rain and storm surges (ESRI, 2015). The storm mainly impacted Long Island
and New York City, ultimately causing over $65 billion in damage, which, at the time, made it
the “second most destructive hurricane in US history, behind the Gulf Coast’s Hurricane Katrina
in 2005” (ESRI, 2015). Across the United States, over “8.5 million households and business
experienced power outages, which in some cases lasted for weeks” (Abi-Samra, McConnach,
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Mukhopadhyay, & Wojszczyk, 2014, p. 62). In territory served by LIPA, peak outages were
1,071,840, or 90 percent of LIPA’s customers (Cianflone, 2013). Approximately ten days after
Sandy, a Nor’easter, known as Winter Storm Athena, caused an additional 123,000 outages
among LIPA customers (Cianflone, 2013; New York State Electric & Gas Corporation &
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, 2016). Four days prior to the onset of the storm,
National Grid began to implement its emergency plan, which involved securing additional crews
from across the country, coordinating staffing, and working with state and local governments to
prepare for potential outages (Cianflone, 2013). Utilizing the mutual assistance network National
Grid is member to, the company assembled more than 15,000 employees to restore electric and
gas services to LIPA customers (Cianflone, 2013). This coordinated effort resulted in an 85
percent electric restoration within one week, and a 99 percent restoration in two weeks,
following the recession of flood waters (Cianflone, 2013).
Although NYSEG customers did not experience the same outage rates, Sandy caused the
interruption of service for approximately 117,000 customers (ESRI, 2015). The damage from the
storm required the replacement of over 1,000 distribution poles, 516 distribution transformers,
and over 80 miles of conductor wire (New York State Electric & Gas Corporation & Rochester
Gas and Electric Corporation, 2016). NYSEG successfully engaged in the New York Mutual
Assistance Group (NYMAG), and employed over 5,000 employees in the restoration efforts,
which included contractors and NYSEG staff (New York State Electric & Gas Corporation &
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, 2016). Most customers were restored by November 3
due to proactive storm recovery efforts; however, Brewster, which was the hardest hit in NYSEG
territory, was not fully restored until November 8 (New York State Electric & Gas Corporation
& Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, 2016). Despite the company’s overall successful
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restoration, NYSEG’s self-assessment, which was fully completed to the satisfaction of the
Department of Public Service, identified the need to harden the system, especially in its Brewster
Division, which is continuously hard hit by storms (New York State Electric & Gas Corporation
& Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, 2016). NYSEG also acknowledged the need to
increase its involvement with NYMAG and produce more accurate damage estimates so that it
may appropriately approximate the number of crews it will need to efficiently restore power
(New York State Electric & Gas Corporation & Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, 2016).
Conclusion
This section extensively and thoroughly discussed definitions pertinent to the field of
disaster management and the state and federal regulations surrounding disaster management,
which provides insight into the relationship between governments and public utility companies.
A brief background of the electrical grid in New York State, as well as of both National Grid and
NYSEG was provided, and an overview of their current disaster management plans, was also
provided. These disaster management plans were then discussed in the context of the companies’
historical response to four major storms, which will be evaluated later in the study. The next
chapter of this study will be a literature review of the current best practices for public utilities in
responding to and preemptively preparing for storms, which will be used to evaluate the
companies’ disaster management plans and provide recommendations for improvement.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
This section will discuss current models and best practices for disaster response based on
the current literature. The utilization of these models and practices will be considered when
evaluating the effectiveness of National Grid and NYSEG’s disaster response plans, as well as
serve as recommendations for improvement for these utilities.
Best Practices
While the restoration of power to customers, effective damage assessment and
communication with governmental officials are important aspects of an emergency response
plan, there are other equally as important practices electric utilities must consider employing. In
2011, Pacific Gas and Energy Company was honored by the Edison Electric Energy Institute for
their power restoration efforts in 2010 following a series of intense winter storms in a short press
release that highlighted the creative methods utilized to restore power to customers (Edison
Electric Institute, 2016). It is estimated that 1.1 million customers endured outages, however all
customers had their power restored within 12 days (Edison Electric Institute, 2016). The
company employed extreme measures including the use of Snow-Cats, snowmobiles,
helicopters, and snowshoes to gain access to transformers and poles in remote locations (Edison
Electric Institute, 2016). Although these methods are costly, utilities should consider the use of
all-terrain machinery to combat the damage caused by extreme storms to increase their efficiency
in restoring power. This is especially pertinent in an area like Western and Central New York,
where the majority of outages are caused by extreme wind, snow, rain, and ice storms.
When considering the impact of a disaster on electric service delivery, measurements
such as the frequency of power interruptions, the number of customers affected, and the duration
of the interruption are utilized (Zografos, Douligeris, & Tsoumpas, 1998). According to authors
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Zografos, Dougligeris and Tsoumpas, the first two measurements are contingent on the design of
the utility’s grid, as well as the utility’s maintenance operations (1998). The duration of the
interruption or outage, however, is reliant on the utility’s emergency response plan and the
deployment of emergency repair trucks (ERT’s) through tactical decisions regarding service call
assignment and routing of service restoration units (Zografos et al., 1998). This process can be
influenced by the magnitude of the disaster and the number of calls placed to a utility’s
dispatching center, where tickets for repair are created and routed (Zografos et al., 1998). High
call volume can lead to dispatcher unavailability through lack of sufficient staff or radio
channels; a high volume of calls can also lead to issues when attempting balance the assignment
of tickets and high-priority restoration activities, such as repair of transformers and substations
(Zografos et al., 1998). Often, ticket assignment may be slowed by information gathering, where
specialized cases may require up to 15 individual calls to ensure details such as location of the
problem, the type of problem, and the priority of the problem are accurate (Zografos et al.,
1998).
Upon assignment of the ticket, factors such as “type of incident, the severity of the
problem, the type of failing equipment, day versus night repair, weather conditions, and the
training and expertise of the repair personnel” all influence the interruption’s duration (Zografos
et al., 1998, p. 117). Zografos, et. al. suggests the implementation of a geographic information
system (GIS) in conjunction with an automatic vehicle location system (AVL) as a method to
reduce duration of an interruption, which would directly route ticket information from dispatch
to a repair crew and essentially eliminate any clarifying phone conversations that would typically
be held (1998). This system utilizes the geographic location of ERT’s and determines the closest
available crew to send to the repair, which may significantly decrease the dispatch and travel
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time and in turn decrease the overall restoration time of the incident (Zografos et al., 1998). The
GIS is also capable of identifying and capturing “natural and man-made barriers to the
movement of ERT’s, location and characteristics of the service restoration calls, and boundaries
of the service restoration districts”, which takes into account the complexities in which the
system must operate and further decreases the restoration time for the utility (Zografos et al.,
1998, p. 118). When large-scale disasters occur, systems such as these enable the efficient
implementation of emergency response plans and provide the opportunity for utilities to optimize
the division of service within their districts, accurately schedule crews to make repairs, and allow
for leadership to track real-time progress (Zografos et al., 1998). This data is then stored by the
system and can be used to report on damage and repairs following the storm, as well as
determine areas that may be at risk for failure in the future.
Utilities should also employ risk assessment and analysis to aid them in the prediction of
future power failures. Risk analysis studies accordingly should be comprehensive, evidencebased, logically sound, open to evaluation, practical, generalizable, learnable, and innovative
(Castillo, 2014). Power grids are interconnected, and therefore when one device within the
system fails, it can create a “cascading failure”, which leads to a “large-scale collapse” (Castillo,
2014). Consequently, when restoring power, a strategic approach must be taken to prevent
further damage to the system, as determined by a risk analysis study (Castillo, 2014). To prevent
the aforementioned cascading failure, utilities can construct their grids in such a way that
promotes “adaptive self-healing” (Heydt, Liu, Phadke, & Vittal, 2011, p. 27). A utility may
reconfigure the system “by breaking up the system into smaller parts and isolating the effect of
the disturbance”, which in the case of emergency response would be storm-inflicted damage
(Heydt et al., 2011, p. 27). Although it would be impossible for a utility to isolate a natural

32

disaster to only affect one part of the system, the part of the system that was determined to be the
most severely damaged, and thus the cause of the rest of the resulting failures, would be isolated
until repairs could be made. The rest of the system would continue “to operate at a slightly
degraded level” until the broken part was fixed and the rest of the grid could be restored (Heydt
et al., 2011, p. 27). Although the capacity to create or modify an electric grid to self-isolate a
damaged part may be beyond the capabilities of most utilities at this time, the method is still
generalizable to the utilities’ emergency response plans. The method of allowing the rest of the
system to continue operation while a broken part is fixed is an interesting process utilities should
research and potentially implement.
As a self-healing system would be used to serve in the interim between the storm and
when repairs could be made, so could the implementation of a microgrid. A microgrid is a
system that can provide electricity to a small group of users that detaches from the main power
grid and operates autonomously (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014). This system may be
powered by natural gas or diesel fuel, batteries, or solar panels and can be used to continue
electrical power if the main grid is damaged by a storm (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014). In a
case study analyzing the effect of storms on the power grid such as Hurricane Katrina and the
East Japan earthquake in 2011, the use of microgrids successfully continued power delivery
while the main grid was being repaired (Abbey et al., 2014). When compared to the outages
within the electric grid, “natural gas distribution networks did not have outages as severe as those
experienced by the electric power grids” and are typically more resilient to storms than electric
grids (Abbey et al., 2014). There are limitations to this method, however, as it would be difficult
and costly to establish microgrids and would require collaboration with municipal governments
and potentially other private sector entities such as local gas companies. Despite the potential
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detractors, this method would be extremely effective in maintaining electricity for critical
infrastructure such as hospitals, police stations, and other first responders. It may also be feasible
for both National Grid and NYSEG to do in certain areas of their service territories, as they both
already have systems in place to deliver natural gas to customers.
Like the idea of a microgrid, utilities may consider the use of a black-start power system.
This is utilized when an entire grid is off-line, such as the case of a blackout, and needs to be
restarted. With this scheme, a power utility can utilize a source that does not require electricity to
power on, such as a hydroelectric plant, which both NYSEG and National Grid have access to,
especially in Western New York (Liu, Fan, & Terzija, 2016). Once functional, this black-start
power system can be used to reactivate substations according to the utility’s network plans (Liu
et al., 2016). In the same way that the aforementioned adaptive self-healing system would work,
the grid must be divided into smaller sub-sections for effective parallel restoration of systems
with the objective to restore power to all network users (Liu et al., 2016). In the evaluation of the
utilities, the strategic restoration plan will be assessed, which will include identifying the use of a
black-start power system in the event that the entire grid fails.
Myriam Abramson, et. al. (2008) conducted a quantitative evaluation of coordination
algorithms to determine the best method to coordinating a multi-agent approach to disaster
management and response. Pertaining to the process of risk analysis, the authors noted that a
decrease in the number of individuals in consensus with a decision can also increase the
flexibility and response time of the utility; when determining the approach, allowing only a
handful of upper-level managers to agree may drastically increase the utility’s efficiency
(Abramson et al., 2008). Abramson found within the study that the effectiveness of decisionmaking and communication within the utility’s organizational structure can be assessed by the
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length of the chain of command and the response systems in place. If a utility does not have a
specific department or team in place to manage its emergency response, changes in
organizational structure and the adoption of this practice may be a point of consideration. This
type of hierarchical structure is very similar to the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) model already utilized by all levels of government through the Incident Command
System (ICS), and has proven to be effective in providing a designated structure for
communication and coordination in the event of an emergency.
Predictor models can also be implemented to calculate the likelihood of grid failure using
factors such as number of transformers in an area, projected wind speed, and data from past
storms (Arab, Khodaei, Han, & Khator, 2015). In their research, authors Arab et. al., utilizing
quantitative statistics, created coordinated models to help emergency managers and utilities
predict the potential damage of hurricanes and proactively respond to them (2015). Although the
authors only utilized hurricanes in their research, the models are applicable to multiple forms of
atmospheric, trackable storms, and are therefore generalizable. The authors assert that the
predictor model can effectively decrease the amount of time customers are without power if
crews are preemptively dispatched to the sites predicted to sustain the most damage, as they can
ensure all vegetation and other hazards that may damage power lines and transformers are
cleared (Arab et al., 2015).
Dispatched crews can also immediately begin repairing damage and restoring power
following any breaks in the storm, thus reducing travel time to the sites and preemptive
assessments of the grid (Arab et al., 2015). This preemptive method also eliminates the stall in
repairs often created by travel limitations due to flooding, snow, or downed trees (Arab et al.,
2015). Similar to the action taken by the Pacific Gas and Energy Company, the use of aerial
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equipment such as helicopters, satellites, and drones can accurately assess damage and determine
the most accessible route for field crews to take to repair the damage, which effectively increases
the utility’s response time (Arab et al., 2015). Although the use of these resources would be
initially costly, the financial burden could be shared across a mutual assistance network. The
increase in the utility’s response time would positively affect the amount of time required to
restore service, and thus save the utility money in the long-term.
In conjunction with a predictor model, an information management system is another
essential technological tool. Such a tool could be modeled after the Information Management
System for Hurricane disasters (IMASH), which is “an intelligent integrated information
management system based on an object-oriented database design, capable of providing
comprehensive data pertaining to hurricane disasters” (Iakovou & Douligeris, 2001, p. 245).
Essentially, this system can be utilized for preparedness activities by integrating and evaluating
historical data and predictor models, activities during the storm by providing a communication
platform accessible to all responders, including local, federal, and state governments, utilities,
and other private agencies, and “post-disaster response and restoration activities” through the use
of the two previously mentioned capabilities (Iakovou & Douligeris, 2001, p. 245).
Unlike the communication utilized within typical NIMS or ICS models utilized by the
government and other relevant organizations, IMASH provides an opportunity for real-time
updates and communication between all parties, versus the more common communication
through a telephone or radio passed through the chain of command. What is especially unique
about the IMASH system is that it is not software, but rather a web database that can be accessed
remotely, which provides universal capabilities, not only due to its accessibility, but due to its
holistic approach to disaster management. Much like the effects of a hurricane, disasters that
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could affect electric service delivery are often decentralized and spread over a wide geographic
area. They also may contribute to the “partial or total loss of…infrastructure”, such as
transformers and substations, which severely complicates response and restoration efforts
(Iakovou & Douligeris, 2001, p. 247). Software such as IMASH improve organizational and
operational capacity during a disaster as well as during future planning by gathering data from
previous storms and integrating them into a predictor model to highlight not only typical storm
patterns, but also where a utility could improve its system.
When considering ways utilities may improve their preparedness for a disaster, increasing
the resiliency of their power grids is often mentioned. This can be done most obviously by
transitioning the above ground electrical wiring to below ground. Although the cost of
undergrounding a wire may cost between $120,000 and $2.1 million per mile, it effectively
hardens the system and protects the wires from extreme wind, ice, snow, and fire by removing all
of the potential damaging elements (Short, 2016). John R. Short, in a case study analysis of a
wind storm that affected Washington D.C. and Maryland in 2012, found that during three major
storms between 2010 and 2012, all of the local power utility’s underground substations remained
fully operational, while only seven percent of the above-ground lines continued functioning
(Short, 2015). Unfortunately, undergrounding wires does not guarantee against power outages
during disasters. Underground wires may still be subject to chemical abrasion, flooding, and tree
roots, and are extremely expensive to repair (Short, 2016). A storm that causes flooding often
leads to the most damage to the electric grid, due to “the long-term damage that floodwater can
do to power substations and underground electrical systems” (Abi-Samra et al., 2014, p. 62).
When repairing damage from floods, crews must contend not only with the actual damage to the
system, but also with the physical barriers it leaves behind, such as water, mud, and rust,
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resulting in an extended repair time when compared to ice or wind storms (Abi-Samra et al.,
2014).
Despite these possible methods of corrosion, this technique is the most effective way for
a utility to limit damage imposed by storms. Ultimately, a cost-benefit analysis by the utility is
required to determine the perceived risk from disasters to these wires and if it would cost more to
underground them than it would to continuously repair them following a disaster. It is possible
that if the decision to underground the wires were to occur following a disaster, the project may
be eligible to receive supplemental funding through FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant.
Regardless of the financial burden, the amount of underground wiring versus above ground
wiring a utility has implemented is an integral component of the evaluation of a utility’s
preparedness and should be built into their emergency response plan. However, some researchers
argue that “hardening the grid to withstand all extreme weather is impossible and unaffordable”
(Abi-Samra et al., 2014, p. 62). Instead, as previously mentioned, electric utilities should focus
on increasing resiliency through a holistic method, integrating traditional maintenance
techniques such as tree trimming and upgrading power lines, as well as utilizing microgrids,
smart grids, and energy storage methods to decrease interruption time for all customers, but
especially critical sites such as hospitals, water-treatment plants, and telecommunications (AbiSamra et al., 2014).
Mutual assistance
Another beneficial practice to engage in is a mutual assistance agreement with other
electric utilities. Such an agreement is defined as “‘agreements between agencies, organizations,
and jurisdictions that provide a mechanism to quickly obtain emergency assistance in the form of
personnel, equipment, materials, and other associated services’” (Asgary, Pantin, Saiiar, & Wu,
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2017). Often these assistance agreements are formed due to geographic convenience, and in the
North Atlantic region the mutual assistance network is formally endorsed by the New York State
Department of Public Service (Asgary et al., 2017). Authors Asgary et. al. conducted a study to
determine criteria utilities should utilize when determining when to engage in mutual assistance;
the highest weighted conditions were “Extent of Damage”, “Emergency Conditions”, and “Size
of Disaster” (Asgary et al., 2017). The authors utilized a Delphi method, which is a forecasting
technique that questions a panel of experts individually and then allows them to restructure their
answers based on the answers of others in their group, as well as an analytical hierarchy process,
which is another method of allowing experts to collaboratively make a decision utilizing a
progressive set of criteria within a hierarchy (Asgary et al., 2017). Asgary et. al. found that
utilities determine their ability to provide aid through established criteria, such as monetary cost
and availability of resources, as restoring power is the priority of all electric utilities (Asgary et
al., 2017). These agreements can provide critical materials, labor, and equipment to utilities
during storm restoration processes, including “line-workers, tree trimmers, damage assessors,
and even call center support”, which all work to effectively increase the response time of utilities
(Edison Electric Institute, 2016).
Conclusion
All components of disaster management and response are critical to the process of
restoring electrical power to communities. The requirements established by different levels of
government, as well as the utilities themselves, are implemented to provide effective and
efficient restoration services to mitigate the effects of a disaster. While the practices currently in
place are effective, there is more that can be done to improve efficiency and lessen the losses
created by disasters.
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Table 1, below, highlights the necessary components of disaster response processes and
their corresponding best practices (if applicable), and will be among the factors used to measure
the effectiveness of National Grid and NYSEG.
Table 1 is a summary of disaster response processes and their corresponding best practices.
Disaster Response Process
Create emergency response plan

•
•

Establish command center

•

Needs/damage assessment

•
•

Shut off power to downed lines

•

Restore power to most people at lowest cost

•

•

Create predictor models/risk assessment for
future disasters

•

Harden the grid

•

Engage in mutual assistance

•

Best Practice
Have plan reviewed by experts to
ensure accuracy (Edison Electric
Institute, 2016)
Implement advanced information
management tool to communicate
with local government officials and
other utilities, as well as track repairs
(Iakovou & Douligeris, 2001;
Zografos et al., 1998)
Use established office if possible
(Edison Electric Institute, 2016)
Utilize aerial equipment to determine
damage (Edison Electric Institute,
2016)
Install a smart grid to gather most
accurate data regarding damage
(Edison Electric Institute, 2016)
Use predictor models to dispatch
crews to areas estimated to sustain
most damage
(Arab et al., 2015)
Target critical services such as
hospitals, water treatment plants,
communications, etc. first (Edison
Electric Institute, 2016)
Utilize aerial equipment to direct field
crews (Edison Electric Institute, 2016)
Use data from previous disasters, as
well as demographic and
infrastructure data
(Arab et al., 2015)
Underground power lines
(Short, 2015)
Join a regional mutual assistance
network
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(Asgary et al., 2017)

The next section of this study will describe the methods of research employed to conduct
the analysis of the disaster response and management plans of National Grid and NYSEG. This
chapter will discuss the benefits of the case study method used as well as the significance of the
interviews conducted.

41

Chapter III: Methods of Investigation
As previously discussed in Chapter II, there are multiple methods public utilities may
implement to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their disaster response plans. This
section will discuss the methods of investigation used to evaluate these utilities, including a case
study analysis and interviews with pertinent professionals within the field of emergency
response.
Case Study Analysis
A case study is often characterized as an “intensive approach” in which a researcher
analyzes an event, or sometimes multiple related events, in its specific context to understand the
details and history of a phenomenon (Swanborn, 2010, p. 2). Each party within a case study that
attributes to the overall phenomenon is considered a unit, which “connotes a spatially bounded
phenomenon-e.g., a nation-state, revolution, political party, election, or person-observed at a
single point in time or over some delimited period of time” (Gerring, 2004, p. 342). This case
study method was chosen due to the research objective of the study, which is to evaluate the
disaster response plans of National Grid and NYSEG. It is the best method to utilize as “the case
study offers a means of investigating complex…units consisting of multiple variables of
potential importance in understanding the phenomenon” (Merriam, 2009). Within this study, the
delimited period is 13 years, from 2006 to the 2019.
John Gerring defines a case study as an “intensive study of a single unit for the purpose
of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (2004, p. 342). Case studies, especially in
fields that value quantitative over qualitative methods, are often criticized for their perceived
lack of generalizability and bias towards verification (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Despite these criticisms,
researchers argue that when generalizing a case study, it is not necessarily about a statistical
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generalization but a logical generalization, which is the duty of the reader, not the researcher
(Erickson, 1986). Author Frederick Erickson argues that case studies are intended to add to the
existing literature and it is up to the reader to examine the circumstances in which the case study
was conducted and identify if it is generalizable to their own research or situation (1986).
Similarly, Bent Flyvbjerg argues that a case study that is purely phenomenological, which
is the study of a subjective experience, can still add to the existing literature and provide a basis
for future research (2006). As case studies are often theory independent, it is typically about the
process of learning something rather than proving a theory or hypothesis, which can increase the
generalizability of a case study as it is not limited to a single theory or context (Flyvbjerg, 2006).
This case study is a meso-level approach where there is more than one actor involved and the
actors are actually organizations where multiple variables will be evaluated (Swanborn, 2010).
As both National Grid and NYSEG are publicly regulated electric utilities, this study eliminates
the typical criticism of a lack of generalizability as the only objective of this study is to evaluate
the utilities’ disaster response plans, which can be generalized between the two companies as
well as against other public utilities. As this study is atheoretical, it also does not have a bias
toward verification; as previously stated, there is no hypothesis to prove or validate.
Interviews
When framing interviews in the context of a case study, “respondents are selected on the
basis of what they might know to help the investigator fill in pieces of a puzzle or confirm the
proper alignment of pieces already in place” (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 673). The
interviews in this study are defined by three parameters, and were semi-structured, individual,
and specialized (Garielian, Yang, & Spice, 2007). Semi-structured, one-on-one interviews are
often viewed as the most popular qualitative method, as they produce the most in-depth data
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(Alshenqeeti, 2014; Meyers, 2007). These types of interviews also provide a “holistic snapshot”
of the phenomenon and “enables interviewees to ‘speak in their own voice and express their own
thoughts and feelings’” (Alshenqeeti, 2014, p. 39). Although prior research on the topic of
disaster management for electric utilities has been conducted, the subject is extremely complex
and fraught with multiple variables; thus, it is important to allow for semi-structured interview
questions that allow experts to speak to the topic at hand (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). Semistructured interviews provide the opportunity for participants “to be the experts and to inform the
research”, and borrows from the anthropological style of research where the researcher is
“generally knowledgeable, but less knowledgeable than the respondent on the particular topic of
the interview” (Leech, 2002, p. 665) The use of open-ended questions also increases the response
validity of the interview, as they “provide a greater opportunity for respondents to organize their
answers within their own frameworks. This increases the validity of the responses and is best
of…exploratory and in-depth work” (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674). Some of the
questions utilized, such as those asking the participant to provide their own evaluative thoughts
on a topic, could also be a considered “grand tour question”, which prompts the participant to
give an in-depth response to a more focused question (Leech, 2002, p. 667). Arguably, some of
the open-ended questions employed, such as whether there has been a positive or negative
change in the utilities’ disaster response plans, could be considered a framed question, as the
researcher was looking for one of two answers, however it was necessary in order to keep the
interview aligned with the topic of research.
Although the use of semi-structured questions created time and labor costs in conducting
interviews and transcribing the responses, it also created more reliable and informative data that
aided in the evaluation of the utilities (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). The use of individual
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interviews also allows the interviewer to delve more deeply into the subject being discussed as
well as any other topic that arises during the interview, which creates more in-depth data
(DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). When conducting these interviews the researcher employed
a “checklist” by allowing the conversation to be guided by pre-determined questions (see
Appendix A) to ensure all relevant topics were covered while still allowing the development of
discussion around the topic (Alshenqeeti, 2014, p. 40). While following the prescribed interview
questions, based on the topics broached, the researcher asked questions out of order to allow for
a more natural flow of conversation and to develop rapport with the participant.
Data Collection
The researcher used the method of non-probability convenience sampling to obtain
collect data. This type of sampling utilizes specific characteristics to target a population, such as
easy accessibility, geographical proximity, availability at a given time, or the willingness to
participate” (Etikan, Musa, & Alkassim, 2015, p. 2; Rivera, 2018). The topic of this research
required the researcher to have access to individuals who work at NYSEG and National Grid, as
well as at other electric utility companies and the local and state levels of New York State
government. As determined by the researcher, the characteristics of the subject population were
adults over the age of 18 years old, with no restrictions of sex. To be included in the research,
subjects had to have professional involvement with and knowledge of emergency response
management in relation to public electric and gas utilities. The researcher required subjects to
currently be employed or have past employment at a public utility or governmental agency that
directly works with a utility. Position titles for these participants included but were not limited to
those in disaster response and management, electric emergency planning, and emergency
preparedness. No population groups were specifically excluded, as inclusion was contingent on
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the professional qualifications, and not demographics. No vulnerable subjects were included in
the research.
Due to the researcher’s current occupation, the researcher did not have direct access to
the targeted population, and thus relied on Glen Aichinger, the Director of Electric Emergency
Planning for National Grid, to provide contact information for relevant potential participants, as
well as provide a warm introduction to those individuals to assist in brokering an interview.
Despite the necessity of convenience sampling for the purpose of this research, the main
disadvantage of this type of sampling is the high likelihood of bias (Etikan et al., 2015). Mr.
Aichinger provided the researcher a list of 20 potential participants he believed to be the most
relevant resources for this project and sent each potential participant an initial email asking if
they would be willing to participate. As such, this research also used a purposive sampling
strategy (Rivera, 2018) that generated a potential sample of respondents that was initiated by the
Director of Electric Emergency Planning for National Grid. In doing so, Mr. Aichinger
unintentionally created bias within the participant population. Therefore, the researcher does not
assert that those interviewed are representative of all professionals in the emergency response
field, as related to utilities, however; any information provided by the participant can still
contribute to the literature.
Once the participant agreed, the researcher engaged in direct recruitment by sending an
introductory email to the participant explaining the parameters of the project, a copy of the
interview questions, and an informed consent form, which the researcher requested each
participant sign and scan back prior to the interview. The researcher then set-up an interview
time with the participant based on the participant’s ability. Almost all interviews were conducted
on the telephone, and one was submitted as a written response due to incompatible availability.
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Interviews ranged from approximately 20 minutes in length to just under two hours; the
researcher allowed for the participant to determine the length of time the interview lasted based
on availability and discussion. Of the 20 potential participants Mr. Aichinger provided, the
researcher successfully connected with and interviewed 11, including Mr. Aichinger himself.
These participants included employees of AVANDGRID, the parent company of NYSEG,
National Grid, the utilities Central Hudson, Toronto Hydro and PSEG Long Island, the Erie
County Department of Emergency Management, the New York State Public Service
Commission, the New York State Office of Emergency Management, and the Oswego County
Office of Emergency Management.
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Chapter IV: Data Analysis
With each interview, excluding the interview provided in written form, the researcher
utilized the app TapeACall, which recorded the phone conversation. Each participant was
assigned a number, based on the numerical order they were interviewed in, to keep their name
confidential. Following the conversation, the researcher transcribed the interview, with a focus of
creating an intelligent transcription, which omitted emotions such as laughter, half-sentences or
false starts, and any extraneous discussion that was not relevant to the interview. The researcher
edited the transcriptions to ensure clarity and conciseness of the responses. The researcher then
created a separate document and integrated the response of each participant with the
corresponding question in order to effectively compare responses and identify recurring themes.
On average, the participants had approximately 25 years’ experience in electric utility
disaster response each, and ranged from 12 years on the job to 36 years. Due to the wealth of
collective experience, the participants were able to provide a thorough history of the evolution of
disaster response and management, both generally in the field, as well as at National Grid and
NYSEG, as well as evaluate overall performance of these utilities and identify best practices in
the field. Common professional titles included Manager of Emergency Preparedness, Director of
Emergency Management, Planning, or Preparedness, Coordinator, and Utility Specialist.
In response to question two, whether National Grid and NYSEG have had a positive or
negative change in their practices, 10 participants stated that both utilities have had positive
changes, and one was uncomfortable answering the question. Two of the participants cited the
relationship National Grid and NYSEG have with other utilities and the willingness to share
emergency response plans, best practices, and procedures. Participant 2 stated that “even though
we’re all electric utilities, we don’t necessarily compete with each other because we don’t have
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the same customers”; therefore, utilities are able to share resources and help one another grow
and improve. Participant 1 explained that essentially, when one utility does well, all utilities do
well: “If you’re not successful, it’s likely going to open you up to additional regulation by the
regulator…so, they will openly tell you to copy [their plans] or willingly give you the
information they have so you can improve your response capability, because it’s better for the
industry as a whole.” Improvements in response capability decrease need for regulation, and
therefore help all utilities within the region. Four participants stated that the improvement
stemmed from customer engagement and enhanced communications. Participant 4 stated that
NYSEG has focused on maintaining lists of customers with special medical needs, and has
improved its engagement with these customers to ensure it has the most updated information so
that it may effectively plan its restoration efforts after a major storm. These lists include
customers on traditional life-support and life-sustaining equipment, as well as “health support”
customers and the elderly, blind, and disabled.
The remaining four participants also cited improved communication and engagement, but
on a corporate level. This improvement is due to, according to Participants 5, 8 and 10, a
professionalization of the emergency management approach and a buy-in from both those at the
corporate level and lower-level employees, as highlighted by increased emergency response
training and the adoption of the Incident Command System (ICS). According to Participant 8,
National Grid’s corporate leaders have taken a more proactive approach: “I think the biggest
improvements you’ve seen is a buy-in from the corporate level and the philosophy of ‘let’s not
wait until we see that there are 100 poles that have snapped, let’s have 100 poles ready to go’,
the idea of getting resources here prior to the storm hitting instead of trying to respond and roll in
resources after the fact.” Participant 5 shared that they helped National Grid “rewrite their
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emergency management response plan about 8 years ago…and what they’ve done is basically
memorialize what they’re going to do on paper, strengthen their outreach to the county
emergency managers, built relationships and explained their processes.” This has also led to
increased engagement with both local and state government officials, effective collaboration
during storms, and proactive actions taken by the utilities, such as pre-staging resources in
anticipation of storms and tree-trimming.
Question three asked participants how they feel that disaster response practices have
evolved over time, either in general or at their organization. Half of the participants highlighted
the adoption of ICS as the biggest change following hurricanes Sandy and Irene and Tropical
Storm Lee. Participant 8 noted this as an area of improvement: “…people understand how to
spell ICS, they understand the components of that and what the actual purpose is, and how that
helps us to manage these catastrophic events that are millions of dollars that collectively we need
to work our way through, not individually.” The participants expressed that the adoption of this
system and the subsequent formalization of emergency response methods not only have made
utilities more effective in their response, but also has taught the utilities the same language
emergency responders speak, which has led to an increased collaboration with government
agencies. Participant 4 stated “the best thing that ever happened was the utilities adapting the ICS
model. The fact that we use and speak the same the same disaster recovery level with ICS has
made all of the difference.” This can be seen not only during major storms, but also on “blue-sky
days”, as utilities attempt to foster better relationships with local agencies.
Participant 6 noted that in general, utilities have become less risk-adverse, which has
enabled them to effectively pre-plan and pre-stage prior to the storm, despite the potential
financial cost. Participants 8, 9, and 10 also stated that more utilities have become involved in
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mutual aid networks, and thus are able to more effectively respond to outages with an increased
number of crews. This has stemmed from a reduction in territorial behavior, not just by utilities,
but by counties as well; according to Participant 8, “there used to be a philosophy of, ‘this is our
city, we can handle it and don’t need any additional help’, and that hesitancy to work as a
community.” An example is the International Joint Commission, which, as stated by Participant
8, is a signed memorandum of understanding between Erie County, Niagara County, the City of
Buffalo, the City of Niagara Falls and the municipalities in Southern Ontario, which allows these
municipalities to share resources in the case of an emergency, and provides the opportunity for
response crews to quickly and easily cross the border between Canada and New York State.
Participants 3 and 7 also noted the changes in technology as major factors, as well as the
increased reliance on electricity from the public. Due to this, utilities now must manage customer
expectations and face pressure to restore power faster: “It’s really changed from a response
business to a planning business. You’re managing expectations, which is a challenge. People
expect the power restored in a certain amount of time, which sometimes in rural areas is not
practical.” According to Participant 3, one of the biggest changes “[they] have seen is the public,
by and large, is much less prepared in their homes and much less resilient to…an emergency or
disaster” than they would have been 20 or 30 years ago.
Question four asked the participants to explain the areas in which their organization’s
disaster response plans and procedures could be improved. All participants that are employed at
a utility stressed the importance of post-storm assessment and evaluation as a method to
consistently improve emergency response plans. Participant 2 stressed the idea that in the period
following the post-event critique, in terms of the actual implementation of a utility’s disaster
response plans, a utility has typically identified and is in the process of improving all issues that
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they are aware of, stating “after every event we have a critique and we look for ways to improve,
so hopefully we’ve made all the improvements that we know of.” However, Participant 2 also
noted that there is always still room for improvement in the acquisition of resources, technology,
and communication. Participant 1 noted that damage assessment methods could be improved
with the implementation of drone technology, while Participants 5, 6 and 7 emphasized
improving damage assessment practices utilizing a “whole community approach”, that integrated
local municipalities into the process through increased relationship-building, training, and
exercising together. Participant 8 noted the importance of both companies encouraging
“employees [to] take incident command courses, attend meetings that are not just specific to the
utility, but specific to the overall first response community and working closely with fire
departments, emergency managers, and police departments and developing those relationships
ahead of time”, which has been initiated by National Grid.
Participant 9 stated that these drills should be conducted during “blue sky days” to ensure
all parties are up-to-date on the process, and Participant 8 highlighted that when this is done,
municipalities and politicians will gain a better understanding of the process and can better
provide support to the utility and assist with managing customer expectations. In this way,
Participant 8 stated that politicians rely on utilities to deliver correct information: “…when it
comes to delivery…[a restoration] message…it’s a partnership, so if a utility is saying it will be
one time and politicians are saying that’s unacceptable, politicians don’t climb poles or replace
transformers and they don’t know the business, so it’s a balancing act to make sure that the
correct information is going out.” Participant 4 noted that NYSEG could improve by expanding
the automated metering (AIM) system in New York to improve damage assessment efforts.
Participant 6 also stated that due to the constant updates in technological capabilities, identifying
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estimated restoration times (ETRs) can always be improved through GIS systems. Lastly,
Participants 3 and 11 identified customer engagement, in terms of maintaining a registry of
special needs customers and sharing ETRs. Participant 11 suggested that all New York utilities
are behind on their customer communication practices, and could better engage customers
through the use of social media: “I think that the New York utilities are a little behind in taking it
seriously and understanding that there’s a huge customer base and that’s the way they’re going to
communicate, they’re not going to pick up the phone and they’re not going to deal with a call
center.” As all of the participants stressed, the change in social expectations of immediate
information have changed, and utilities need to focus on changing their response methods,
whether it be communicating ETRs, communicating with politicians, or communicating with the
public.
Question five asked the participants to describe the biggest challenges utilities face when
responding to emergencies. Out of the 11 participants, 10 mentioned the change in customer and
municipal expectations as one of the largest challenges faced, which was also one of the common
themes found in question three. Participant 2 shared a short story from their company, which
captures the common theme of changing customer expectations: “There’s folklore at our
company where a customer several years ago wrote us a postcard to let us know that his lights
were out and mailed it to us. Now, we get texts from customers within seconds of the lights
going out and they’re not very happy if their lights aren’t back on in a couple hours.” Participant
3 shared that during his experience in the 1998 Ice Storm in Saint Lawrence County, New York,
customers were out of power, on average, for 29 days. Despite being without power, while he
and his crews were outside residents’ homes restoring the lines, customers would offer them hot
meals they had cooked outside on their grill, or inside on the fire. Presently, Participant 3 argued
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“the public, by and large, is much less prepared in their homes and much less resilient to some
type of an emergency or disaster” due to the change in technology, and customers would be
unable to sustain themselves in the way that they previously could.
Participant 4 attributed some of the largest causes of this reliance to “raised expectations
from our customers – so many people are telecommuting, having small businesses, businesses
out of their homes, businesses that have sensitive electronic equipment, and people that have lifesupporting/sustaining medical equipment that relies on electricity. This equipment used to be in
the hospital but now it’s in homes.” Due to this, Participant 4 noted that utilities must be aware
of and constantly maintain rosters of this information. Participants 5 and 11 noted the unrealistic
expectations for restoration periods, which come from all levels, ranging from customers and
local municipalities to state entities such as the Public Service Commission and the Governor’s
Office. Participant 11 stated that “people expect restoration to occur immediately, they don’t
understand that sometimes it can take a while…I don’t know if it’s public awareness or it’s just
that expectations aren’t tempered…but there’s definitely been a shift in the past 3 years.” Often
elected officials do not fully understand the restoration process and attempt to pressure utilities
into restoring their constituencies first, despite the need and established plans to restore critical
facilities first, such as a hospital, police or fire station, or a college campus, as mandated by New
York State law. Participants also noted the increased regulation and pressure that comes from the
Public Service Commission. Participants 4 and 10 shared that oftentimes, snow is not typically a
cause of outages. Participant 10 stated that “the one thing we’re seeing more than ever is snow is
not really a big deal for us, but some people think it is.” An example presented was the 4-12
inches of snow the Buffalo region received in mid-March, which triggered four phone calls and
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three reports due to the Public Service Commission to explain the process National Grid
underwent to prepare for the storm.
Another important challenge noted by participants was safety, including not only safety
of the public, but safety of employees and contractors. Participant 7 stated that safety is a process
that has evolved over time, and now is a greater focus of companies, not just due to increased
regulation, but because of corporate responsibility as well. Participants also identified the
acquisition of resources as a challenge, despite participation in regional mutual assistance
networks. Participant 11 expressed that in the past, utilities often would not share resources
across state lines, which endangered the mutual assistance construct: “I think that there is a push
for utilities not to share resources and not cross state lines with some of those resources.”
However, in the past four years, the participant stated that there has been overall improvement in
getting resources across state lines and effectively communicating with the correct officials to
obtain the permission to do so. Participant 3 stated that depending on the location of the storm,
resources may be limited, especially if two utilities share service territory. Often, utilities may
fight over limited resources in an area, such as tree services, hotels, and restaurants to clear
debris and shelter and feed their crews. Utility territory can also be a challenge in New York
State specifically, according to Participant 5, due to the prevalence of home rule. The addition of
the layer of county government presents a challenge in resource coordination, as utilities have
added elected officials to report to, and often these officials “put unrealistic requirements on
utilities because they’re looking at it siloed”; instead of looking at the global impact of an
emergency to the state or region as a whole, officials are more concerned with reporting back to
their constituents than the additional damage outside of their area.
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The timing of the storm is also an important factor, as an unpredicted disaster provides
less time for utilities to pre-stage and obtain those resources in advance. Participant 3 questioned
“if you had a big storm or incident on Christmas Day, or the week between Christmas or New
Year’s, what is the availability of help? And if you have a state-wide storm then do you have the
availability of resources to be staged immediately to respond?” Often, dependent on the extent of
the damage, utilities may also be unable to begin restoration efforts until additional crews arrive,
which may be hindered if roads are closed, or the incident is regional or state-wide, and thus
crews need to be requested from across state or country lines. Lastly, Participants 3, 4 and 11
mentioned the issue of retirement with linemen and the difficulty in recruiting young people to
take their place. Participant 11 emphasized the incidence of a “brain drain” within the field and
the importance of bringing replacements on and training them before experienced linemen retire,
as to not lose the knowledge they possess.
Question six concerned the most common types of emergencies utilities contend with,
and the most common answer from participants was storms. Participant 1 stated that in terms of
regional storms, effecting Western New York and Ontario, Canada, wind events have
significantly increased, as well as the number of rain events that cause flooding, such as
thunderstorms in the summer months. Participants 3 and 5 noted that although flooding is the
most common emergency not only in New York state, but across the United States, it has little
impact on utilities when compared to severe winter weather. Participant 3 noted that “when
we’ve had some flooding over the last few years, I can’t think of any incidents where poles
washed out or that type of thing, so I really think its severe storms that are getting more frequent
and stronger.” One of the most damaging types of winter weather is an ice-storm, which can
have the most severe impact in early-to-mid fall, when leaves are still on trees. It was expressed
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that winter weather is more challenging to conduct restoration in, due to harsh temperature
conditions and limited visibility and mobility of the line crews. Participant 1 stated that they have
also seen an increase in tornadoes, which was reiterated by Participant 3. Participant 1 also noted
that overall, “storms have become a lot more frequent, more intense, and shortened in duration”,
which the majority of participants also corroborated. Participant 7 stated that in 2018,
AVANGRID dealt with 22 storms, which ranged from outages of 9,000 customers to 140,000
customers; 10-12 years ago, an average year would have six or seven storms, and it would have
been considered severe if 60,000 or 70,000 customers were out of power. Participant 3 clarified
that although there may be a high rate of car accidents that effect electric distribution, such as
cars running into and downing poles, these are isolated incidents, and cause significantly less
damage than a storm: “There may be a higher rate of car accidents that hit poles, but that’s not as
damaging and doesn’t have the same impact, and really doesn’t fall into the category of a
disaster or emergency.” Participant 7 verified this statement, describing car accidents as
“nuisance outages.” Despite this, Participant 8 identified these outages as a unique training
opportunity for utilities to prepare for larger storms, as well as a way for local responders to train
with the utility on these incidents.
Question seven asked participants to identify the most useful models and procedures
utilized by utilities in their emergency response practices. Participant 9 recognized mutual
assistance as the most useful model, which enables utilities to decrease restoration times and
address large-scale outages. Participant 10 noted that during the restoration process, the use of
the “switch before fix” method, where repair crews will switch the distribution to a back feed to
restore power to customers before fixing the broken infrastructure, has helped to reduce
restoration time. Participant 1 stated that although not necessarily a procedure or model, keeping
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technology updated, and consistently looking into new technology, is one of the most useful
things a utility can do. Participants 1 and 5 also noted GIS systems that can track in real-time
outages within service territories and automated call-out systems that can immediately request
linemen to report in for restoration efforts or for mutual assistance requests are essential to
reduce estimated restoration times. Other opportunities for drone technology to assist damage
assessment diagnostics and radar are also important tools that can enhance a utility’s response
time and ability to communicate with customers accurate restoration times. Participants 3 and 4
also mentioned the use of aerial equipment, such as “drones [or] LIDAR with helicopters or
fixed wing aircraft”, as well as the implementation of automated metering or AIM, which allows
utilities to identify exactly where an outage is without putting boots on the ground. Participant 2
expounded on the importance of damage assessment in relationship to providing both customers
and municipalities accurate information, and posited that a formal assessment process where
engineers and linemen in the field are able to input information on a tablet or iPad and
immediately update the emergency managers at the emergency operation center is also integral.
Other software such as outage prediction models, which utilize data from weather and
atmospheric conditions, as well as the interpretations of weather analysts are essential for storm
preparation. Participant 8 also indicated the importance of analyzing historical responses and
identifying opportunities for improvement, which may assist in mitigating a problem again in the
future, and the creation of a platform in which all emergency responders can access and interface
on. Participant 8 explained that Erie County uses a web-based program called Disaster Land,
which was developed by Buffalo Computer Graphics. This platform is an emergency
management tool that emergency responders can log onto and manage tickets for requested
resources, finances for response, and administrative tasks associated with the emergency. All
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towns, villages and cities in the county have access to it, which provides the opportunity for
rapid communication and shared resources before or during an event. According to Participant 8,
this software has provided “better situational awareness” by creating a global view of the region
and the events and incidents taking place. The fact that the program is web-based allows
personnel to access information anywhere and “assist with the overall recovery efforts”
remotely.
Participant 3 noted that while response actions are extremely important, preemptive
actions can help limit the damage sustained during a storm, and thus procedures such as tree
trimming, the removal of infected trees, and the replacement of aging transmission lines and
poles are critical. This also includes storm hardening, as mentioned by Participant 6, which
includes increasing the system’s resiliency through replacing old infrastructure with “taller,
stronger poles, shorter cross-hairs, tree-resistance wire, [and] raising sub-stations in low-lying
areas.” According to Participant 10, increasing resiliency by undergrounding wires is becoming
the standard in new-build neighborhoods, but there is still an overhead wire that feeds the
neighborhood. Participant 10 also noted that often, undergrounding wires is thought to be the
best solution, but “the cost is so high and often it’s not feasible.” Participant 1 agreed that
undergrounding can assist in hardening the system, but it can often be more challenging to work
with; with overhead systems, it is easier, faster, and more cost-effective to identify the problem,
but undergrounding does remove the wire from most of the elements, with the exception of
flooding.
Question eight asked participants to describe the chain of command utilized by their
organization for their emergency response operations. Seven of the eleven participants are
currently employed at a utility, and all stated that the chain of command that exists for
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emergency response operations is dictated by the ICS system, or a similar equivalent called IMS
in Canada, which has been incorporated into their organizational hierarchy with a few minor
changes to position titles. According to Participants 5 and 7, both National Grid and NYSEG are
trained to the ICS 300-level, which Participant 5 described as a “baccalaureate level study.”
Participant 2 noted that “utilities have been responding to emergencies since there have been
utilities, but using the ICS structure is relatively new to utilities compared to what it is to first
responders in the public sector.” Participants 1 and 2 also acknowledged NYSEG and National
Grid as leaders in the field in terms of implementation of ICS, and stated that their leadership
helped spur other utilities to adopt the model as well. Participant 2 also recognized that while
adopting the model may be an arduous process and at point challenging, establishing a formal
cycle of learning after each event that provides a critique and a “list of action items [to] improve”
has been extremely helpful in improving utilities’ responses. Participant 4 stated the importance
of the adoption of ICS as well, stating that the ability to speak the same language as other first
responders is instrument to their success.
Participant 10 stated that National Grid was the second utility in New York State to
incorporate ICS, and in doing so it was important to fit ICS into the company, rather than
restructure the company around ICS. Participant 1 affirmed this practice, expressing the
importance of integrating processes into the command structure that are unique to utilities, such
as the meter-to-cash process, and general business continuity operations. According to
Participant 4, NYSEG employs both an incident commander and an area commander: “The area
commander is used in New York and Maine, because [NYSEG has] multiple locations, barns and
divisions. At each division, which is spread across {NYSEG’s] service areas, [NYSEG has] an
incident command that will lead the event response at the local level. [NYSEG has] someone
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making decisions on a state-wide basis, as far as moving resources and managing the event, so
[they] have an area commander.” National Grid employs a similar model, as Participant 9 stated
in a follow-up conversation, however the local leader is called a branch jurisdictional
commander, and the state-level leader is a state incident commander. Despite the difference in
title, both perform the same roles under ICS. Participant 2 noted that most utilities in the
Northeast have adopted this structure, and the degree to which they have may vary depending on
the size of the organization; however, if they have adopted ICS, they have also adopted the
incident commander structure, which is utilized during restoration efforts. The remaining four
participants are employed at a state or county agency and therefore their role in emergency
response is either their primary role or part of their primary role, unlike a utility where most
employees have a secondary storm role. Participant 5 stated that municipalities and relevant state
agencies also have an EOC, and with the adoption of ICS as a standard practice, siloing between
agencies has disappeared and effective communication has significantly increased.
Question nine requested participants to evaluate NYSEG and National Grid’s historical
emergency response. Participant 11 stated that all utilities can continuously improve, but
National Grid typically does a good job, while NYSEG has significant room for improvement.
Participant 3 stated that National Grid has improved greatly, and part of the improvement has
stemmed from the Public Service Commission’s increased regulation: “I think over the last 10
years, they have improved greatly, and I think part of that is the PSC’s insistence upon the
utilities providing restoration plans and working to those plans – they can’t vary from those plans
without permission or being reprimanded.” Participant 3 also noted improvements to technology,
which helps utilities to “better isolate where things have gone wrong”, such as AIM systems.
Outside of physical technology and written plans, Participant 3 also recognized an internal
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change at National Grid, where the organization has embraced the ICS model and emergency
response as a necessary part of business. Participant 5 affirmed this, stating that “National Grid is
the standard for emergency response”, and the “emphasis of emergency response on a corporate
level seems to be stronger at National Grid.” Participant 9 noted that National Grid was
recognized with an Emergency Assistance and Emergency Recovery Award from Edison
Electric Institute for its restoration efforts from storms in late 2017 and the spring of 2018.
Participant 4, in term of NYSEG’s performance, attributed poor response to incorrect
weather forecasts, stating “we’re only as good as our weather forecast, and our weather forecasts
have been wrong repeatedly,” as well as an aging group of line workers and the increase in
retirement. The participant stated that NYSEG has improved in its resource acquisition, but the
increase in contract workers and improvements in technology have been a significant business
cost. This has been due to a shift in company structure, which has moved away from a peopledriven model to a focus on contracting out, where employees are less focused on the prosperity
of the company: “The newer model has people, but you also have contract workers you bring in
for construction, a more nomadic group of people who have less affinity for the company, so
when you’re in an event, you have to work harder to get those contract resources on site.”
Participant 5 also commented on NYSEG’s performance, stating that due to the constant
corporate turnover of different parent organizations, it has been put in multiple different
directions and given multiple different goals, so it’s had a slower start than National Grid, but “as
best as they’ve been allowed, NYSEG has really moved forward following the same model that
[National] Grid has created.” Participant 8 noted that both organizations are sometimes limited
by their corporate oversight, as “the corporate level tends to be hundreds if not thousands of
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miles away”, which sometimes limits the implementation of suggested changes and proposed
budgets.
Question ten asked participants to elaborate on the relationship between utilities and
governmental organizations as pertaining to the disaster response framework, as well as any
ways this relationship could be improved. As a means of comparison, the researcher discussed
with the participant from Toronto Hydro what the differences are in regulation between Canada
and the United States. Similarly, with states that do not have home rule, such as Massachusetts or
Vermont, there are fewer entities to report to and communicate with, such as the city and state, or
province in Canada. Participant 1 noted that utilities are still actively involved with the
municipalities which they operate in, and through the ICS structure, their “interface with the city
is through a liaison-type role.” According to Participant 1, the level of regulation and reporting
requirements for utilities are significantly less onerous than those in the United States, and there
are little to no fines when restoration times are not met or a utility does not pre-stage for an
event. However, Participant 1 believes this may change in the future as U.S. and Canadian
regulators discuss regulatory criteria: “Part of what [the Canadian government] is doing right
now is collecting data to determine what they want to regulate in Canada. A lot of customer
measures and key performance indicators are starting to be required by the regulator to report on
a monthly basis. This is more on the customer satisfaction side versus the emergency response
side right now.” As previously noted in the response to question two, due to the regional network
of utilities, Toronto Hydro and other Canadian utilities can continue to improve their responses
and potentially post-pone the onset of increased regulation.
In the United States, as mentioned, the relationship between utilities and municipalities
varies based on the level of government and number of municipal entities the utility is required
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to work with. In New York State, as Participant 2 stated, a utility’s “closest and first relationship
is…at the county level.” All participants mentioned the use of EOCs to some extent, and the
difficulty within the ICS structure of being required by municipalities to send a liaison.
According to the ICS model, utilities are required to send an agency representative to the EOC
with the ability to make decisions on behalf of the utility, including those pertaining to financials
and personnel. Participant 5 noted that “if you look at the processes coming out of FEMA…it
says in an emergency, agencies should send an agency representative to the emergency operation
center to answer questions. They’re supposed to come with man power and a specific amount of
money…all agencies are supposed to do this so that the emergency operation center at the county
level can make quality decisions”. However, according to Participant 5, utilities are unable to
send an agency representative of that nature, because within a utility, that would be a storm
director, and the storm director is needed at the utility’s EOC. Therefore, utilities have agreed to
send a liaison, but the individual is merely a representative, and has no decision-making
authority, instead, as Participant 5 stated, “they are simply a conduit back to the storm direct with
the agency representative to help allocate assets for the utility perform power restoration.” The
benefit of the presence of a liaison, as described by Participant 2, is the direct link it provides
between the municipality and the utility, which allows information to be seamlessly passed
between the two entities. According to Participant 5, home rule can make things difficult for
utilities, as “emergencies start local and end local under municipal law”, which can lead to
siloing and the implementation of unrealistic restoration time requirements. In order to mitigate
this issue, Participant 5 noted that National Grid, and other utilities as well, have created a
municipal call on a daily basis during an emergency, where municipal leaders can conference in
and obtain information relevant to their areas and ask questions if needed.
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If there is a state-wide emergency, there is also the possibility that a utility may need to
send a liaison to the EOC in Albany, but it is not an often occurrence. At the state level, utilities
also interact with the State Office of Emergency Management, the Public Service Commission,
and the Regional Offices of Emergency Management, of which there are five in New York State.
Overall, all participants stated that utilities have generally good relationships with governmental
organizations, and these relationships have improved over the years. Participant 5 stated that the
relationship is better when municipal officials understand the restoration process, which can be
enhanced through joint training exercises and daily municipal calls during emergencies, so “that
elected officials can get on [and] the utility can explain the damage and the restoration plans.”
Participants 3 and 7 also stated that relationship building with municipalities is essential during
“blue-sky days”, and the ability to create personal relationships with the county and state helps
everyone stay on the same page.
Lastly, participants were asked if there was anything additional they were able to add
about utilities and their emergency response management. Many participants did not have any
additional information to share, but those who did reiterated the information sharing between
utilities and the community they feel has been created between emergency managers at utilities.
Participant 1 stated that with the adoption of ICS, it is important to note the length of time it
takes to train all employees on the system, and that it has been a significant commitment for all
utilities to integrate.
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Chapter V: Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the emergency response plans and procedures
of National Grid and NYSEG. Using academic literature on electric emergency response and
best practices within the field, the researcher created a base-line with which to compare the
National Grid and NYSEG’s responses. The researcher then interviewed 11 professionals within
the electric emergency response field to gather feedback and opinions from those who work
directly with or within an electric utility. The researcher asked the participants questions
regarding the historical responses of NYSEG and National Grid, their relationship with other
utilities and governmental organizations, as well as areas for improvement to determine the
success of these utilities in practice. This information was utilized to identify potential places
within the utilities’ emergency response plans to improve and thus positively impact customers,
residents and municipalities within their service territories.
Recommendations for Improvement
As the participants shared, technological advancement is always occurring, and thus there
is always an opportunity for utilities to implement new technology to improve their restoration
times. Both National Grid and NYSEG could improve this by adopting drones and other aerial
equipment as common practice, although the necessity of this would be limited to severe weather
and most-likely only required when there are physical obstructions on roads. NYSEG needs to
complete the integration of AIM into their grid in New York State to remotely identify locations
out outages and decrease restoration time. Based on the interviews and the Public Service
Commission’s evaluation, NYSEG could also benefit from further involving itself in RMAG and
improving its response by acquiring additional crews outside of those provided by RG&E.
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Both utilities could further benefit from increase customer communication and
engagement. As Participant 11 stated, the utilities need to meet customers where they are, and
increase their presence on social media to provide updates on restoration times and effected
areas. They can also work to further improve their relationships with local governmental
agencies; the more these organizations collaborate and train together, the better each
organization’s understanding of the other’s response efforts and the processes in place will be.
As Participant 9 mentioned, there also can never be too much training during these blue-sky
days, and the better utility employees understand their secondary roles, the more effective their
responses will be. In terms of hardening the grid, both utilities are actively investing in programs
to update aging infrastructure. Despite the investment and possible complications that
undergrounding wires does pose, it is one of the few proven ways to effectively shield the grid
from ice and trees, and although flooding is one of the most common types of emergencies, it
also is one of the least damaging to the grid.
Limitations of the Study
The most obvious limitation of this study is the unintended bias of the selected
participants due to the researcher’s point of access to the data, as previously mentioned. Mr.
Aichinger’s identification of participants may have affected the information the researcher
received, and although the researcher attempted to gather a well-rounded cohort of participants to
gain a global perspective on the topic, the researcher was extremely limited in selection. The
sample size of the study was also limited in scope to only 11 participants, and the topic of
research was pertinent to only National Grid and NYSEG. Therefore, the data conclusions made
by this research may not be generalizable to other utilities. The best practices recommended, as
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elicited from the literature, were also restricted, as the academic literature available regarding
electric emergency response is not as extensive as in other facets of emergency response.
Future Research
The researcher poses that for future research on the topic, a larger and more diverse group
of participants should be interviewed. The researcher also suggests any future research utilize
focus groups so participants may build on others’ responses and provide a more in-depth
response on a topic than a normal interview may. This research tactic would also reduce time and
effort on the part of the researcher. Topics of future research should include methods for
improving joint training between utilities and first responders and further analysis of best
practices. Although this project was able to identify best practices and provide recommendations,
the literature and utilities would benefit from a more in-depth analysis of the costs and processes
associated with implemented some of these practices and models. Any areas of improvement to a
utility’s emergency response plan are unique to that utility, and while these areas may be similar
to that of another utility, any improvements made are limited by the utility’s financial means,
corporate investment in emergency response, training, and size. Depending on the location of the
utility, it may not have the same governmental oversight and regulation, and therefore may not
be as inclined to make said improvements. Due to the expressed nature of emergency response
among utilities, however, best practices are applicable to all utilities, and the nature of constant
evaluation and innovation in the field allows for utilities to learn from one another. Therefore,
any future research that focuses on best practices, needs assessments of municipalities, and
ability of utilities to make improvements would not only benefit the specific organizations and
regions identified, but would also be generalizable to the whole electric utility emergency
response community.
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Appendix A – Interview Questions
1. What is your professional title, and how long have you had experience in disaster
response, in relation to public utilities?
2. Throughout the time you have worked in this field, have you noticed a positive or
negative change in the disaster response methods utilized by NYSEG and National Grid?
Please explain. (Respondent should have the opportunity to discuss both their positive
and negative perspectives.)
3. How have disaster response practices in this field evolved over time? Either generally or
within your organization.
4. In what areas can your organization’s disaster response plans/procedures be improved?
5. What are the biggest challenges utilities face when responding to emergencies?
6. What are the most common types of emergencies that utilities must contend with?
7. What are the most useful models/procedures utilized in your experience, even if they are
not practiced at your organization?
8. Is there a set chain of command implemented in emergency response that exists outside
of your organization’s normal operations? If yes, what is the structure?
9. How would you evaluate your utility’s performance when responding to emergencies in
the past? Please provide specific examples.
10. What is your organization’s relationship with other utilities/governmental organizations
within the disaster response framework? In what ways do you think this relationship
could be improved?
11. Can you think of anything else you would like to mention about your organization’s
disaster response management system?
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Appendix B – Interview Transcriptions
Participant #1 Interview
Interview Date: March 4, 2019
Researcher thanked the participant for agreeing to participate in the interview. The researcher
then notified the participant that the interview would be recorded for the purpose of creating a
transcript, but none of the participant’s personal information would be included in the transcript,
aside from job title and organization.
R: We can go ahead and start with question one. What is your professional title and how long
have you had experience in the field of disaster management and response?
P: Currently I’m the General Manager at Power Systems Services at Toronto Hydro. What that
encompasses is I have three departments that report to me. One is Stations, one is the Emergency
Response Group and Reactive Response; so those are the guys that respond to an emergency on a
day-to-day basis and also do the repairs. And I also have the Metering and Street Lighting and
foreign-type of attachments group that report in to me as well. Prior to that, and that’s why I got
so heavily involved in emergency management, my previous position was the General
Management of Distribution Grid Operations and Emergency Management. So, I had the Control
Room Emergency Management Group as well. I’m the one that brought the emergency
management group into Toronto Hydro.
R: I know that obviously you don’t work at National Grid or NYSEG, and that is what these
questions are kind of oriented around. So, I suppose in general, have you noticed a positive or
negative change in the disaster response methods utilized by local utilities?
P: Yeah, so maybe just to revert to number one, you were asking about the years of experience.
I’ve been in operations for most of my career, so I’ve probably had 20 plus years of some kind of
involvement in responding to emergencies. Relatively recently, and it goes back to when we had
the ice storm back in 2013, which I don’t know in Buffalo if they had it to the same extent, but
we got walloped pretty good, and we were out of power for about ten days. We had a ten-day
event, and it largely was a tree event, not so much the ice or freezing rain but the weight of the
rain brought the tree branches down and took out our wires. So as a result of that, we had a report
commissioned at Toronto Hydro and we determined that it was 22 or 23 items that needed to be
actioned. And that was what I was charged with, was bringing those actions to be implemented
and bridge the gap in our emergency response. We did a decent job compared to our peers, but
there always…and that’s one thing you’re going to learn in this business…you’re never done and
there’s always room for improvement. One of the things was to create a department for grid
emergency management. In Toronto Hydro, we had some vestiges of ICS, but we didn’t really
follow it to the extent that you would expect when someone says they follow ICS. In Toronto it’s
actually called IMS, but basically, it’s the same as ICS. So, one of my challenges was to bring
ICS/IMS to bear at Toronto Hydro. We had never done mutual aid in our 100-year history, in the
sense that we had responded to others, but we had never brought people in to help us, and this
was the first time for us back in 2013 that we had to reach out to other people. It became
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apparent that we needed to build those relationships with other utilities, so that was when we first
made the application in 2014 to become a member of RMAG. That is how I got my experience
dealing with National Grid and NYSEG. So specific to that, Glen was one of the first people I
got to know. One thing you’ll find in the RMAG system, it’s unique in the fact that you’ll
encounter people that will actively put their hand out to offer help and share best practices. It’s
so predominant in the electric utility business, particularly in the U.S., because everybody wants
to make sure that everyone else is successful. If you’re not successful, it’s likely going to open
you up to additional regulation by the regulator. So, they will openly tell you to copy or willingly
give you the information they have so you can improve your response capability, because it’s
better for the industry as a whole. They’re very willing to help, give advice, and provide
resources. I like to phrase it this way: a smart person learns from their own mistakes, a wise
person learns from the mistakes of others, and being part of an organization like that allows you
to learn without having to go through all of the pain and suffering of going through the
experience.
R: Going back to the 2013 ice storm, you mentioned that mutual assistance was something you
actively pursued after it. What were some of the other lessons learned that you utilized and
implemented following the storm?
P: We didn’t have a formalized damage assessment process. We had a few local incident
command structures set up, and only a couple of days after the event did some of them decide to
go and assess the damage, but we didn’t have a formal process to do that so it was kind of ad
hoc. That was one of the recommendations – to put in place a formalized damage assessment
process. The other thing was communication is probably – how you communicate with your
customers, the quantity and the level of communication you provide, can make or break people’s
perception of how well you did. It might be even more important than the response to the storm
itself. You can do a crappy job of responding, but do a really good job of communicating, and
people will generally have a better overall feeling in terms of what your response was as opposed
to if you did a really good job responding but a really crappy job communicating. They will feel
that you didn’t do a good response because you didn’t communicate and you didn’t keep them
informed. Another recommendation was to improve our communication of ETRs – people want
to know when the power is going to come back on so they can plan their life. The worst thing
you can do is not keep them informed. The other major thing was to put in place an ICS
structure, and the rigors that go with that, like exercises and that kind of stuff. We basically built
all of that from scratch, and it took us about two years to get the system designed and to start
hiring the staff to populate the department. It still takes years after that to get everybody trained,
so we had to prioritize what areas we would train first. One of the processes was to get damage
assessment up and running and to identify who was going to do it, and then get the
communication processes in place. Since 2015 we have spent a lot of time training the command
and general command down, as well as some key areas like the resource planning unit and the
SAU, the situational awareness unit. We still haven’t completed the training down to the rankand-file levels outside of giving them a general overview of what ICS is so that they understand
how the organization works when you go into a storm-related mode, because you’re not
operating according to the normal utility hierarchy. When this happens, you go into the incident
command structure under an incident commander. I’ve taken the approach that we try to conform
as best we can to ICS, understanding that it came out of typical EMS like forestry, police,

71

ambulance and fire. There are some things when you are a utility that you have to build into your
process, like the meter-to-cash process, which normal EMS doesn’t have, from a business
continuity perspective, but you can cover them in a way that conforms with ICS. It’s important to
remain consistent with the titles too so when you have to interface with a mutual aid group or
police, fire and ambulance, the more you keep the terminology consistent, the easier it is for
everybody to understand what everybody else is saying and what their role is.
R: So, when you were dealing with the 2013 ice storm, and any incidents since then, what do you
think the biggest challenges have been when responding?
P: The big thing is getting your damage assessors out early and getting good information back so
that you have things you can action. Initially, when the event first happens, you obviously can’t
go out and do much until it is safe to do so. You’re generally responding to outages and making
things safe for the first 24-48 hours, so in our case we’ve taken the position that we’re going to
try and have a global ETR after the first 24 hours, which means we have to have our damage
assessors out there surveying and sending back good information about what the problems are
and what the extent or scope is so we can put packages of work together and get people working
on those things that need to be done. It’s important to know where they are, and obviously they
have to be prioritized. Pretty much all utilities prioritize in the same way – you try to get the
trunk feeders back in first and then the lateral feeders after because you want to get as many
customers back on as possible. The first 24 hours is a lot of chaos trying to put things into
routine, trying to get your structure up and running, and trying to put order to the chaos is
important. Communicating is also important – at that point in time you don’t have a lot of
information to report to customers, so one of the things we’ve tried to do is create so pre-canned
messages we can give out early in the storm. These are pretty common, and then provide more
detailed information later when we have a better idea of what the damage is and what the
timeline for restoration will be. The other thing really is getting to the point where you can have
everybody trained to be knowledgeable on what their secondary roles are – that was one of the
issues that came out of the 2013 ice storm. We had work to do but outside of some command
staff, we didn’t have a system in place where everybody had a secondary role…they weren’t
trained to it. Every time we had a significant event, although this storm was like a one-in-50-year
storm…in that case we were inventing everything from scratch, as opposed to something that is
ready and exercised, where you can pull off the shelf and everybody’s been trained on their role.
We didn’t have that, but we have that now. Another issue is having the systems in place where
you can get that information back. An important thing is keeping that technology up-to-date. Our
technology at the time was about seven generations out of date, which we have since upgraded to
the latest version of NMS. That is where you’re going to get a lot of information and put in a lot
of your information, which is going to appear in your outage map, which will give your
customers estimated times for restoration. Another important factor is changing the culture so
that crews will put that information on the call when they arrive so that then gets pushed out to
the customer base. Having systems where you don’t rely on supervisors to do manual call-outs.
We just invested in an automated call-out system so you can do thousands of calls within five
minutes, as opposed to having a supervisor sitting at a desk and it taking hours to get crews. This
helps us as well with our RMAG obligations – we’re asked whether we can provide crews. We
used to take four days sometimes to mobilize just by the time we found out who could respond,
got people to get their passports…we’ve shrunk that process to eight or nine hours, because the
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automatic call out system gets ahold of people that have signed up to respond to mutual aid in
minutes. We’re now able to tell our RMAG partners what we can offer up and when we put in a
number, we know we’re able to provide the bodies and know that we’re giving them a real
number. Keeping up the technology is really important, and there’s some great technology now
too, even with respect to damage assessment and drones…all kinds of new technologies that over
the next five years are going to drastically change the way in which we respond to emergencies.
R: Going off of that statement about technology, what are some new technologies that your
company is looking to implement in the future, or considering to improve the process?
P: Yeah, so I told you that we updated our outage management system last year. We just bought
the automated call out and operationalized that in July of last year, which increased productivity
and getting people actively immensely. We also use that to maintain our listing of secondary
roles and who’s in them so we can activate by role. There are some softwares out there, mostly in
the drone area, in terms of damage assessment applications, that will allow people to do damage
assessment in the field on a tablet that will send the information back into the control room to get
real-time updates as they’re being made. Largely in the drone area, especially around diagnosing
and using radar to see through trees and get into inaccessible places. We’re looking at upgrading
outage maps to give customers the ability to get better information and pull it right off the web.
The information would be fed from our outage management system. Those are the main things
we’re focusing on right now.
R: Okay, great. I know this isn’t necessarily a new technology, but is undergrounding wires
something that you are looking into doing more of?
P: There are pros and cons to that. From a hardening perspective, overhead systems are great
from the point of view that you can see where the problems are because they’re visible, but
they’re also susceptible to the elements. Undergrounds aren’t necessarily the savior either,
because they’re also prone to flooding. When you have an underground problem, it usually takes
longer to diagnose it and find it, as well as longer to repair it. You may have to locate it and dig it
up before you can do the repair, but they are less susceptible to things like hurricanes and wind
storms, but if you have flooding – I know one of your questions is what the most common types
of emergencies we deal with is, and I imagine it is very similar to what you experience in the
Buffalo area. We’re getting a lot more wind events like the one we had last weekend, and they’re
more severe. I don’t remember when I was younger having these types of hurricane-strength
winds for sustained bursts. We’ve had that twice this year at least, and the past few years we’ve
had multiple wind-type events. When we have rain storms now they’re not just a gentle rain,
they’re a microburst where they drop a lot of rain over a short period of time and cause flooding.
Primarily we get rain and flooding events in the spring, and even into July with these severe
thunderstorm events we get rolling through. Obviously, we get snow; that’s not such a big deal
until you get a wind event when leaves are still on the trees. That’s when you start getting a lot of
outages – the branches break or rub up against the wires. We don’t get too much hurricane
effects aside from rain and wind remnants. Ice storms are more prevalent, especially getting into
December of January, we get the threat of an ice storm coming through. Tornadoes, not so much
in the Toronto-area, but just North of us. In the Ottawa-area in November, they had three
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tornadoes touch-down, which took down one of their substations. The storms have become a lot
more frequent, more intense, and have shortened in duration.
R: I only have a couple more questions, we’ve touched on almost everything here. If you could
just explain more about your relationship between the utility and other first responders, such as
police and fire, and other governmental organizations within the disaster response framework.
P: In the States, you guys have little communities as part of your service territory, and utilities
tend to have liaisons that go and interface with the mayor or whoever is part of the local incident
command structure. We don’t have that same scenario here in Toronto – we only have one city
entity to deal with. We do participate within the city of Toronto with their Office of Emergency
Management – we’re on different working committees with them. I’m on one called TEMP-C,
which is the steering committee for disaster management, so I represent Toronto Hydro. They
have police, fire, ambulance, water, and whatever other services that make up the city on it.
Largely, our interface with the city is through a liaison-type role.
R: You mentioned earlier about regulations – what do the regulations on the electric industry
look like in Canada?
P: We have a regulator similar to what you folks have in the U.S., but our level of regulation is
not as intense as what you have. The government is starting to require more detail in reports from
major events, but it is nothing near as onerous as what utilities in the U.S. have to write for their
regulator. There are a lot of penalties associated in the U.S. if you don’t pre-stage, if you don’t
get enough resources, if you don’t restore within a particular amount of time – we don’t have that
level of regulation yet, but it’s coming…I expect that’s going to change as the regulators from
the U.S. and Canada talk more, especially our regulator as we’re right across the border from
New York. Our penalties aren’t the same as they have in the U.S. where they can fine up to a
million dollars a day if they don’t meet certain criteria. Part of what they’re doing right now is
collecting data to determine what they want to regulate in Canada. A lot of customer measures
and key performance indicators are starting to be required by the regulator to report on a monthly
basis. This is more on the customer satisfaction side versus the emergency response side right
now. We don’t have the same penalties – you’ll see in the U.S. they do a lot of pre-staging of
resources. A lot of governors in the U.S. will expect utilities to have people in place ahead of
time at a significant cost. If you do the prestaging and the event occurs you’re a hero; if you do
the prestaging and the event doesn’t occur, you’ve just accumulated a huge cost burden and
you’ll be under scrutiny because you just spent so much. So, in Canada we don’t have that type
of regulation, but they do regulate our rates.
R: My only other question would be if you have anything else you would like to mention about
your organization’s disaster response management system. I think we covered everything else.
P: I told you already about the technological advancements. The other big thing we’ve noticed is
the importance of training. Part of the reason we created our own department for emergency
management is that it’s a significant effort to create these workshops and the training needed to
keep people current. It’s not uncommon to spend almost a year developing functional exercises
and it’s a good process to do at least a functional exercise at least once a year and a bunch of
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workshops. Those are a significant time commitment, but if you don’t do them people get stale
and may not remember what to do. Another big issue is the aging of senior employees – by 2020
I think maybe 30 to 40 percent of our experienced people will be retiring, and so making sure
you’re spending the time within your organization developing the next level of people so that
they can step into roles like incident commander and section chief. It’s important to train them
while there are people that can be shadowed and train them, so they can be put in those roles and
feel comfortable. Keeping secondary roles up to date is also extremely important, because when
you’re hiring someone into a utility you’re not only hiring them for their primary role, but also
for their secondary. When they come in they have two roles; they have their normal day-to-day
job, and then they have their emergency role.
R: Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with me, I really appreciate it.
P: No problem, if you have any follow-up questions feel free to reach out, I would be happy to
help out.
R: Thank you. I think this was really a great interview and I learned a lot, so thank you again.
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Participant #2 Interview
Interview Date: March 6, 2019
Researcher thanked the participant for agreeing to participate in the interview. The researcher
then notified the participant that the interview would be recorded for the purpose of creating a
transcript, but none of the participant’s personal information would be included in the transcript,
aside from job title and organization.
R: If you’re alright with it, we’ll just go through the questions I sent over. It’s just more of a
checklist for me to make sure I hit all the topics I want, so if we get a little side-tracked that’s no
big deal at all.
P: Okay.
R: I’ll just start with the first one – if you could tell me your professional title, how long you
have had experience in disaster response, and just give me a little bit of background about what
your job entails.
P: Okay, well I’m in the process of transitioning to a new job, and Glen gave you my name
because of my previous job. I’m still keeping a large piece of what I was doing before; my
current title is Program Manager of Emergency Preparedness and Content Management. The title
I had previously was Manager of Team D Operation Services and Emergency Response. In the
job I previously had, I was responsible for our company’s emergency plans for both gas and
electric emergencies, as well as the preparation that our company does in advance, such as
getting contracts with various outside agencies that would help during emergencies,
implementing software programs that would help during emergencies, along with several other
things that were not necessarily related to emergency management. The information that is
pertinent to this conversation has to do with all the preparation that we would do in advance of
emergencies. In addition, I am the Deputy Incident Commander for a major electric emergency,
and I am the Incident Commander for a gas emergency.
R: In terms of the software programs, I’m going to jump around a little bit if that’s okay with
you, and the storm preparations, what do you think the most useful models and procedures that
are utilized within your company or outside of your organization are in terms of emergency
response.
P: Before I answer that, let me finish answering the first question because I realized you asked
how long have I been in disaster response. I started with emergency management in my title in
2010; I’ve been with my company for 30 years and just about all that time I’ve had just about
something to do with emergency response in some way, shape or form. Now, you wanted to
know about software and what type of programs that we have that are helpful, is that what you
said?
R: Yeah, so I guess to give you some context, within my literature review for my project I’ve
been looking at best practices that could be recommended to implement at NYSEG and National
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Grid. I’ve been looking at different types of predictor models, different types of GIS software, so
I guess I was wondering what kind of software or, in general, types of models and procedures
that you use to react to storms.
P: We recently had a project with the University of Albany to develop an outage prediction
model based on numerous weather conditions and atmospheric conditions. It is still in the
development stages, so it’s not something that we place full reliance on yet, but that combined
with the experience of the people that work at our company is how we interpret a weather
forecast will impact our system. In this case, I’m talking specifically about electric interruptions.
So, that’s one model we use. That’s obviously computer software, but we have other procedures
that are not computer software that we use for many different aspects of either preparing for or
responding to emergencies. Are you specifically interested in gas or electric or in general –
which are would you like me to focus on?
R: Electric, please.
P: Like many of the utilities you’ve been exposed to, we have procedures on how to assess the
damage that has occurred once a storm has come through, using people that are not typically
doing that type of activity on a daily basis. They might be engineers that know a lot about the
electric distribution system, and they may be designing on a daily basis or doing studies about
them, but during a storm they put on their work boots and their hard hats and go out and look and
see what occurred. The idea is to collect as much information about the condition of the system
as quickly as possible after an event so you can determine how many resources you need to bring
in from outside to help restore it. Also, so that you can give the public and other stakeholders, the
regulating bodies that affect us and the press and the municipal officials and the other emergency
management response people in our communities; they all want to know how long it is going to
take to restore the community to normal. Our customers obviously want to know when they’re
getting their lights back on too. Anything you can do to help predict how long that restoration
process is going to take is very beneficial, and it all starts with information. That information is
coming in in the form of a damage assessment and some of it is a very formal process where we
send these people out and they’re using an iPad or a tablet to collect the data and it’s coming
back in automatically. Our engineers look at it and make an assessment as to, we have x number
of broken poles so that is going to take us x number of days to restore the storm. That type of
calculation. It’s not an automatic process for us, it might be some utilities, but it’s not for us; it’s
based on previous experience – we know that if we want to restore something in 48 hours and we
have 50 broken poles, we’re going to have to bring in another 400 or 500 people to help us do it.
All those calculations are going on in the background as we’re collecting more and more data to
give us a more realistic picture of what we’re trying to restore. We’ve got that data collection
going on, which is one program we have. Another one is protection of the public from downed
wires, so we have a whole group of people going out there and setting us cones and flares and
marking tape to keep the public away from a potentially dangerous situation. There’s the actual
restoration of the power itself, so we have our linemen out there working to put the wires back
up again or at the very least moving them out of the road to allow traffic to pass. We’ve got
damage assessment going on, wire protectors out there, we’ve got linemen repairing the system,
and we’re also at the same time working to communicate with all the outside people that need
the information, whether it's through press releases or social media, or working with electric and
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municipal officials. We work with our regulators, the press, whether it’s print or broadcast media
too.
R: This is great, I have many questions I want to ask off of this and I’m trying to prioritize what I
want to ask first. My next question would be – you touched on your relationship with
municipalities and making sure that you have clear communication with them in regards to
restoring power. I was hoping you could expand a little bit on your relationship with
municipalities and how you work with them.
P: Sure, our closest and first relationship is probably at the county level. All the counties that we
operate in with Central Hudson – we have territory in 8 different counties, and there we have just
a town or two in 2 of those counties. So really, we deal closely with 6 of those counties. If the
county elects to open up an Emergency Operation Center, an EOC, typically they will request
Central Hudson to have a liaison at that facility. So, we will send a person out and actually have
them sitting there as long as they’re wanted there. That gives us a direct link from that county
back to Central Hudson, and it gives them somebody to talk to. The Central Hudson person that
is sitting there has a laptop that is connected into our system back at headquarters so they can
enter trouble orders just as if they were somebody in our contact center that is getting
information in. It’s a very direct connection. They also have phone connections with anyone they
need to get in touch with at the company – it’s a very solid connection. There are other
municipalities and parts of municipalities such as highway superintendents that need information
about roads being cleared; we would like that to be handled through the county level, but
sometimes it can’t be. We may have people at Central Hudson dealing directly with more local
or regional town or city highway superintendents, or something along those lines, to make sure
that we’re coordinating on getting roads cleared. At the state level, there is a state EOC in
Albany; some of the utilities have put people in that, but we’ve never had to. It’s always an
option. The state is also putting out regional centers that they have representatives in and
although we haven’t had anybody that we’ve had to staff in one of those yet, it’s likely that we
will in the future.
R: Great thank you. Going back to our previous conversation about models, you talked a lot
about previous experience and basing that on your responses moving forward. I was wondering
if there have been any storms in the past 7 years or so where you’ve had some really great
takeaways and lessons learned that you’ve implemented changes because of them.
P: One of the phases of the emergency management cycle, is when you have an event or
exercise, after it you do a review of the process and you critique how your organization did, both
in following the plan that’s been established, and in how effective the plan was in general. So,
over the last several years that I’ve been involved with this, after every major event we have a
critique. And after every critique, there’s always a list of action items that we want to improve.
Some of those have been more significant than others, such as the introduction of using an iPad
to collect data as opposed to sending somebody out with a paper map and a highlighter is one of
the more notable ones. We have something similar now for our people that go stand by downed
wires. We used to half-hazardly send somebody out when somebody was saying that there was a
really dangerous situation; now we have a much more formal process and a much larger group of
employees and contractors doing that, and we also have implemented using a tablet to go out and
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determine whether we send someone out in advance to say yeah, this is a wire we have to stand
by or, no, this is actually a telephone wire we have to stand by. It could also be that it’s an
electric wire but there are no connections visible that could hurt somebody, so we’re going to
tape it off, but we don’t need somebody standing here. So, we’ve improved both our damage
assessment process, and our wires down process with the introduction of technology.
R: I guess, moving forward, what plans and procedures or models you utilize be improved, and
how?
P: Well, like I said, after every event we have a critique and we look for ways to improve, so
hopefully we’ve made all the improvements that we know of. Nonetheless, we will definitely
have more improvements next time we have an exercise or drill. I think it’s fair to say that one of
the things that has gotten more attention recently is how the utilities, and I’m speaking in general
terms, respond to blocked roads. It’s kind of the utilities central focus to get the lights back on,
but you still have to balance the needs to make sure the roads are passable and emergency
vehicles can pass. I think the process of understanding where the roads are blocked and
responding to those in the most efficient way possible, is an area where we are looking for ways
that we can improve upon that process. During a large electrical event, the most scarce resource
is almost always trained linemen, the people that go out and fix the system. No utility has enough
employees that are trained to do that work that they can respond to a major event without getting
help from the outside, at least no utility in the Northeast where we have major storms; it may be
true in a place that has benign weather like the Southwest. In the Northeast, where there are
major hurricanes or Nor’easters, or even a violent thunderstorm, a lot of those situations require
the utility to bring in people from outside their company. Because that’s happened to many
different utilities at once, all the local linemen are fully occupied, so utilities have to go farther
and farther away to get help. One of the places we’re going is Canada. There are lots of linemen
in Canada, so if they’re not busy and can be put to work here, that’s a good thing for everybody.
One of the issues is trying to get the linemen across the border in an effective way without
causing a long delay. We’re constantly working with government agencies to make that process
occur more smoothly.
R: I actually spoke to someone from Toronto Hydro on Monday and he basically said the same
thing, that when responding for mutual assistance the response time for them used to be 48-72
hours to get people across the border because of the simple act of getting passports can be
difficult. My next question is, aside from response for mutual assistance and getting abled
bodies, what are some of the other biggest challenges you face when responding to emergencies?
P: Well, safety is always the number one challenge; the safety of the people working for Central
Hudson or contracting with Central Hudson, as well as safety of the public. Especially in the
early parts of a storm, you could be asking people or the public to work in dangerous
environmental conditions, thunderstorms, lightening, wind…safety always has to be top of mind.
I would say the continuous change of customer and community expectations, and I’ll give you a
very wide example. There’s folklore at our company where a customer several years ago wrote
us a postcard to let us know that his lights were out and mailed it to us. Now, we get texts from
customers within seconds of the lights going out and they’re not very happy if their lights aren’t
back on in a couple hours. So, expectations are continually changing, and not just with how short
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a period of time a customer will allow the lights to be off before they’re not happy, but also in
the amount of information they’re getting while the lights are off, as to when we estimate their
lights are going to be back on, and sometimes even what’s causing the outage, which to us
sometimes seems like it’s obvious because we’re very in tune to the weather, but there are some
customers that aren’t quite as in tune to the weather, so they’re asking why their lights are off.
The change in expectations from a customer standpoint and a regulator standpoint, as we are a
regulated monopoly. We constantly have regulators dealing with us during major events. There’s
ever increasing pressure we have to deal with. Like we already spoke about, getting enough help
in a timely manner; you can always get enough help, it’s just a matter of how quickly you can get
it. It’s become more and more frequent that utilities are bringing in help before the event even
occurs. Then the utility is doing a little gambling, saying that we either think, based on this
weather forecast, we’re going to have problems and we’re going to spend a lot of money to have
people in place just in case. The increased expectations are causing us to, I don’t want to say take
more risk, but take a greater financial risk to be sure we’re ready for a storm, so that’s a
challenge in itself.
R: Another question I have, going back to the cycle of learning from an event or exercise; I know
we talked about lessons learned and making changes in that way. In a more broad sense, I’ve
been reading a lot about increasing grid resiliency, so I was wondering if there are any plans for
the future to make changes to improve the grid structure, harden it, and make it more resilient in
that capacity, for example, by undergrounding wires.
P: There was a strong push after Hurricane Sandy to do a lot of that, but our company had started
the process before Sandy. For instance, one of the biggest things, from a construction standpoint,
changing the size and class of the wooden poles we use – poles are classified based on their
diameter versus height; we now use basically a fatter pole, almost all the time. We also use a
taller pole most of the time, because the farther you get away from trees, the more resilient your
system is. The beefier of a pole you use, the more impact it can take; if a tree branch does fall
against it, it will break the wire instead of the pole, and the wire is much easier and faster to
replace than replacing the whole pole. Basically, we changed the way we engineer the system.
There’s been other changes because of flooding from hurricanes where we’ve elevated certain
electrical substations to keep them out of flood range, so that’s some hardening we’ve done to
the system. We as a company have not done a lot of undergrounding of existing systems; as new
residential systems are built, they typically are undergrounded anyway, but the lines that lead to
those are not. It has a lot to do with the population density as to whether it makes financial sense
to underground things, but in general, because we’re in a more rural area than some other
utilities, we don’t do a lot of undergrounding.
R: Going back to the incident command structure we talked about a little bit earlier, could you
expand on your organization’s ICS?
P: I assume that because of what you’re studying, and because you’ve talked to other utilities,
you know about ICS, correct?
R: Yes, I do.
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P: Our plan is based on the ICS system. We have organizational charts that are very similar to a
standard ICS system, but, I think it’s fair to say that like any other utility in the Northeast, we do
deviate somewhat from the standard ICS model. We use a lot of the same terminology and
organizational structure, but we don’t use a lot of the reports that are discussed in ICS. But, we
do have a lot of the same types of reporting and information transfer that ICS talks about. As I
already mentioned, I’m a Deputy Incident Commander, so obviously we are using the incident
commander structure and we have the same staff level and all the levels below that are identical
to what you’d see in the FEMA setup.
R: I don’t know if you saw question two. It is more specific regarding NYSEG and National
Grid, so I don’t know if you have the ability to talk much about their models or your experience
working with them at all.
P: The utilities frequently discuss our plans with each other, so I am familiar with NYSEG or
AVANGRID and National Grid’s plans. They’re both considerably bigger than Central Hudson’s
plan due to their size. Our plan is a little more condensed and probably has fewer procedures.
Because we are a smaller utility, we have less challenges, even just by organizing things. We
have a meeting and have all of the relevant people in the meeting, but you can’t do that when
you’re spread throughout the state, most of the relevant individuals would probably be calling in,
so something like that would be different in our plan. The general procedures we use for damage
assessment and guarding wires and communicating with the public and our customers are similar
in nature. We frequently discuss them and take away little things that one utility is doing that
we’re not and say hey, I think I’m going to incorporate that into what we’re doing as well. If
you’re asking if I’ve seen improvements in their plans and procedures, I would say yes, I’ve seen
improvements in everyone’s at roughly the same speed because we do share information. Even
though we’re all electric utilities, we don’t necessarily compete with each other because we don’t
have the same customers. Unlike Ford and Chevy who are trying to get the same person to buy
their vehicle, we’re not trying to get the same person to buy our electric, so we’re able to share
our plans and procedures with each other.
R: I don’t think I really have anything else, unless there’s anything else that you can think of that
you’d like to mention?
P: No, I think that’s about it. I think in some ways, the public sector was using ICS before
utilities. Obviously if you know about ICS, you know it started out in the West with the
California firefighters – they realized communication within their organization was not what it
needed to be, so they developed what morphed into the Incident Command Structure that FEMA
developed and pushed out to all the public entities like firefighters, police departments, and all
those organizations, and now it’s been picked up by utilities as well. So, I will say that on that
side of things, utilities have been responding to emergencies since there have been utilities, but
using the ICS structure is relatively new to utilities compared to what it is to first responders in
the public sector.
R: So, with the adoption of ICS, do you think utilities have been more effective in their response
because of it, or do you think it has been a little bit of a difficult learning curve?
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P: I would say it hasn’t hurt, it was for our company, focused on some of the things that we
probably weren’t doing as well as we should have, and it wasn’t adopted all at once. Both
AVANGRID or NYSEG and National Grid probably jumped into it a little more quickly and
trained on it for their people, at least for National Grid, well before we did. Seeing them do it is
kind of what motivated us to put more emphasis on it. In general, I think it has helped us,
because part of that is getting into a very formal learning cycle after an event, which has
definitely helped us.
R: Okay well great. I think I’m all set, thank you so much for taking the time to speak with me, I
really appreciate it.
P: No problem, I wish you the best of luck.
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Participant #3 Interview
Interview Date: March 7, 2019
Researcher thanked the participant for agreeing to participate in the interview. The researcher
then notified the participant that the interview would be recorded for the purpose of creating a
transcript, but none of the participant’s personal information would be included in the transcript,
aside from job title and organization.
R: We can start with the first question – could you tell me your professional title and your
experience with disaster response in relationship to public utilities?
P: I am the Director of Emergency Management for Oswego County. I used to work for Niagara
Mohawk and I spent 17 years there, 5 of them were in nuclear power, where the nuclear plants
were part of my job related to emergency preparedness and response, radiation protection in
particular, if we had a major problem at the plant. When I went to corporate, emergency planning
was a secondary role to my primary role. After I left there I went to the State Office of
Emergency Management, and I was at headquarters in Albany for most of the time. I dealt with
utility-related incidents on a frequent basis because we were a state-wide agency. Collectively,
well over 25 years.
R: Wow, that’s great.
P: Along with my professional title, I’m also a certified emergency manager through the
International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM), and although there are now getting
to be a lot of us, many emergency managers are not certified.
R: How have disaster response practices evolved over time? I think it’s very unique that you can
speak to this from your experience with a private utility, your time at the state and with the
county, so if you wouldn’t mind expanding on both private and government changes.
P: Well, let’s take the government side first. If you Googled “Cold War”, you would learn about
a whole lot of things between the Americans and the Russians that unfortunately appear to be
recurring again. They were both huge nuclear powers and had the ability with a push of a button
to take each other essentially off the face of the Earth, and we both had that posture forever. In
the United States, they had what was called civil defense. The idea with civil defense was to get
the public to prepare for the onslaught of a nuclear war and to escape the dangers of a nuclear
attack and radiation exposure. Public preparedness was about storing non-perishable foods,
water, and many people built bomb shelters in their basements or backyards. History tends to
repeat itself, and there are some significant lessons there I’ll come back to. They had civil
defense, and it was community preparedness, but aimed at a single hazard or threat. Now, not
that it couldn’t help if you lived in Florida and you got hit by a hurricane and you had food
stored, but it was primarily about nuclear hazard. I grew up in that period and went through the
air raid drills in school, and today kids are doing drills about shootings and fire drills.
Preparedness between the community and the private sector, such as the utilities, were not at all
connected. There was no nexus there at all, and if the power went out, you got out your candles
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or flashlights. I grew up in Northeastern New York in a rural area, and electric reliability wasn’t
what it is today. So, people were generally better prepared in life and more resilient. People had
gardens and canned their vegetables, so there was food in the household, they weren’t living on
fast food with the mindset that you can run to the store 24/7. By nature, they had to plan to get to
the market just to live. One of the things I have seen change is the public, by and large, is much
less prepared in their homes and much less resilient to some type of an emergency or disaster.
When I was growing up, we had one black and white television that got two channels. If the
weather was really bad and we went outside with a wrench and turned the antenna, we might get
a third channel out of Maine. Today you turn on a tv, one of multiple in your house, if you’re not
streaming on your cellphone, laptop or tablet, and you can watch one of hundreds of channels,
movies 24/7, and we have all these other electrically powered devices on our homes. Today, if
the power goes out, everybody is scurrying to figure out what to do, figure out how to entertain
themselves, how they’re going to cook, etcetera. The need for power and the continuous delivery
of power, I believe is higher than we’ve ever seen it, and every day that we come out with
another electronic gadget, utility’s customers become more reliant on that power being there, so
when the power goes off they want it back on instantly. I just dealt with a county legislator not
long ago that lives in the city of Fulton, and his power was out for about 5 hours, and he
demanded that I ask National Grid to be able to provide him, as a county legislator, with a up-todate listing of what areas were out and exactly when they were going to come back on, because
he needed to be able to reach his constituents. I told him that couldn’t happen, and he asked what
made me the expert, and I told him 17 years in the utility industry, and that’s the kind of
expectation we get. He said that he has older people in his community and some of them need
electricity for their medical needs, and he was right and I understand that. There are greater
number of people using personal medical devices that need power, but often they don’t have a
batter backup, sometimes because it is prohibitively expensive for most people on fixed incomes,
but some just don’t think they need that or a small generator that would give them the power to
run their medical equipment. Or it’s a new thing, and they haven’t experienced the power outage
yet to realize it could be something they need. Our demographics have changed significantly in
the last 50 years of an increased number of elderly people with medical needs and people far less
resilient, particularly in the urban areas.
In 1998 National Grid had two big storms, back to back. In January they had the ’98 ice storm in
Northern New York, and on Labor Day they had a storm in Syracuse. I worked both of them and
I went to Saint Lawrence County in Northern New York, and line crews that came from Buffalo
were blown away that these people had everything coated with a couple inches of ice didn’t think
it was a big deal. They were out of power 29 days, some a little more, but they had food tucked
away and cooked on grills outside or with the fireplaces in their house, and they were coming
outside offering cooked meals to the line crews. On the other hand, take the summer time Labor
Day storm in urban, downtown Syracuse. It hit two areas, the poorest and the richest parts of
Syracuse. The poorest were out in the streets to keep cool, and they lived day-to-day for food, so
it wasn’t a big deal about food storage. 5 miles away in the richest part of town, we had
challenges with people asking what to do with their spoiled food, and people made more noise in
the rich areas about getting their power back on. My most memorable call was a dairy farmer in
Tully, which is South of Syracuse, and he had heard that the power was restored to a big chunk
of Syracuse University, and he said how stupid is that, I’ve got 300 cows that I can’t milk, and I
could lose these cows to infection, and they’re turning the power on at the university first –
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they’re just students. It was for several reasons, but here he’s equating his cows as his livelihood
and he didn’t want the cows to get sick, and figured they’re more important than rich students up
at SU having power. Yet, for the students living in dorms, they have nowhere to go, and they
need the power too. So, there’s always, when you look at restoration, a huge balance of
determining where to go first. And sometimes it’s purely technical to get the transmission up
before you do distribution, but at the same time sometimes you have to make some tough
decisions of which neighborhood you put back on first. Is it the residential neighborhood or is it
a group of dairy farmers that collectively have 5,000 cows that they’re now struggling to milk by
hand or they’re sharing portable generators so they can run their milking operation, but they have
no cooling capability so they have to throw all the milk away, which you now you have a
hazardous materials situation to deal with. The DEC doesn’t like it when you start dumping milk
on the ground, so there are a lot of hidden pieces here that they public doesn’t see. The ’98 ice
storm was a 29 day-long learning experience – we were hit with everything, between farmers and
cows and dumping milk, all those kinds of things, you’re not going to read about that in a
textbook and you start seeing it from a sociological point of view. Here are these people working
hard to make a living and the loss of power can take that away in a heartbeat. Other changes that
tie into this, we have a lot more technology and communication capabilities, so for example the
last storms we had here last week, I was in contact with my National Grid representatives, before
the storm, during the storm, and after the storm. Years ago, the company would send an agency
representative or a liaison in terms of the ICS, to the local emergency operations center. Now
they don’t have to – as long as they have our phone number and we have theirs, our customer
service rep was in the office, and a lot of the storm I was sitting at home with my laptop and two
cellphones. I could do everything there that 10 years ago, we would have had to have a bunch of
people sitting in my office to be able to talk to each other and communicate and now we can just
be wherever. That’s huge – I’ve got the local line supervisor on speed dial, and he can be on his
truck out in the field and give me the restoration schedule for specific areas in my county, and
we don’t have to wait for them to come in from the field every 4 hours to give a report, it’s
instantaneous. That helps a lot. If you lose the communication, you really go backwards.
R: Going off of that, could you talk more about the relationship between utilities and
governmental organizations, at the county level and state level?
P: My relationship with my utility is very good. Now, why do I saw that? Well, as you know I
spent 17 years there and my customer service rep and his boss, and his boss’s boss, are all people
I used to work with and they know me and they know that I know the system. That puts me at a
significant advantage compared to some of my colleagues in other counties that don’t have that
level of understanding of how it all works, or how to get ahold of people. Our relationship is
great, and when a storm is coming, in the last couple of years, the relationship with the utility has
gotten even stronger, and they’re more proactive in reaching out to say that they’re monitoring
things and we want to partner with you, and at the same time they are far more open to learning
from us. We had a situation in the fall and the local customer rep gave me one weather report,
and it was out of Binghamton, and I said that was great, but our weather report comes out of
Buffalo. If you’re looking at the Buffalo map and it looks like everything out of the county line,
it’s important to look at the other weather station covering it. No one had ever clued him in that
the 12 counties he covers is covered by two different weather stations – Binghamton and
Buffalo. 5 years ago, if I had offered that information, it wouldn’t have been as well received.
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Now they pay a lot more attention to the local emergency managers because we know our
community, we know our people, we know our vulnerabilities better than what shows up on a
state hazard or vulnerability analysis, and that’s valuable to them because we can offer them
advice in their response and restoration efforts. The other piece, however, is that a lot of their
increased response is because they’re forced to do it and held accountable by the Public Service
Commission. There have been some bad storms within the last 7-8 years where some of the
utilities didn’t do well, including National Grid and NYSEG, and they more than got their hand
slapped by the PSC. The PSC, through their tariffs, made them come up with plans to be able to
do restoration within certain timeframes, considering the amount of damage. The PSC is holding
their feet to the fire on that, whereas before they might bring in some contractors or some mutual
aid assistance, which obviously comes at a significant financial cost, assuming its available. For
example, for the storm last week, they brought in 3,500 crews, and that’s a lot of people to pay
on overtime, a lot of vehicles, food, and hotel rooms, but as soon as any outages occurred, they
were right on top of it and they had things fixed almost immediately. The PSC told them a
number of years ago, and there are a couple reports on it, that it doesn’t matter what it costs, they
have an obligation to the community to keep the power on. In 2002, Niagara Mohawk sold out to
National Grid, and one of the first things National Grid cut, and that’s how I wound up not there
anymore, was emergency preparedness. A lot of work we had done to build that capability, all of
a sudden went out the door completely. They had some bad results and got their hands more than
slapped by the PSC, and all of a sudden, they had to scramble to come full circle, the
communities and counties were complaining. I was working for the state at the time and we were
asked to come in and do some higher-level ICS training for senior level managers at National
Grid across New York and New England. A discrepancy was found where the state and county
governments were doing their storm planning first thing in the morning, and the utilities were
doing it at 10:00 at night when the linemen came back in, so there was an information
miscommunication and no one was on the same page. The utilities were coming in at 7:00 in the
morning saying they needed local support on certain areas, and the local plan was to focus on
other areas, so everyone was scrambling to help everyone else. We wound up putting together a
document stating what the locals and utilities could expect from each other on support for
planning and coordination. That was put together about 7-8 years ago, and luckily, we learned
that our planning cycles were about 9 hours out of sync with each other, and now things are
working much smoother. The locals also wanted a liaison or agency rep from the utility that can
make decisions, and that would be someone with the capabilities and experience in the field, and
even though that’s what the official incident command system dictates, for your utilities, that
can’t happen because they need those people in the field or the utility’s own incident command
center. The utilities agreed to provide a representative with a direct line of communication back
to the utility instead, so if the municipality tells them what they want or need, they know who to
call, but they’re not in a position to make decisions. Through continued training and working
together, public and private, to work to solve some of these issues, it’s gotten a whole lot
smoother and easier, and the companies are spending the money because they know if they
don’t, they’re going to be fined and penalized by the PSC.
R: You were talking a lot about the Incident Command System, so could you tell me more about
the most useful models and procedures that can be utilized by utilities for effective response and
restoration? With my literature review, I’ve been looking a lot at best practices for utilities to

86

implement, so things such as GIS models, predictor models, hardening the grid, things like that.
So, anything along those lines in terms of effective response and preemptive action.
P: I can’t speak to the preemptive hardening because I’m not privy to those plans. Back in 1998,
I remember asking the question, because at the time NIMO (Niagara Mohawk) had to replace
hundreds of transmission lines and poles, and someone had said some of it was only 25-30 years
old, so I asked how long it was supposed to last, and they said on average about 75 years. There
are towers in Eastern New York probably much older than that, and they’re actually fashioned
out of windmill towers, which are some of the original towers. So, taking that 75-year lifespan,
15 years ago National Grid and some of the other utilities were told by the PSC to go out and
upgrade their system. A lot of the system was near the end of its intended lifecycle, so if a big
storm hit they were at a high risk of being damaged. My observation in my current job, the last
10 years, when there have been outages, they’re much shorter and they’re much more capable of
shutting power off to the damaged poles and bringing power to your house from another
direction while they fix the damaged wires. I think rebuilding and infrastructure renewal has
helped tremendously. Utilities are even proactive in addressing concerns with things such as treeburrowing beetles, where they will identify infected trees that are at risk of falling and damaging
wires. They will then hire tree cutters and provide people notices letting them know they are
offering this service for free, and go in and removed the infected trees to prevent outages. In total
they cut down half a million trees, and think of how expensive that is for the company to do. Part
of the challenge isn’t just preemptive work on how to prevent hacking into the grid, or a squirrel
jumping between the lines on a hot day and causing a whole-city disruption, and although that is
a concern, other factors such as bugs burrowing into trees is also something utilities need to be
aware of. The U.S.’s electrical grid is extremely fragile and aging, and the more electronics we
load onto it, the more fragile it’s getting in many respects. The utility company has to be a lot
more creative in looking at weird stuff that might take them down, and there are lots of hidden
things that can upset the apple cart. The question is how do you describe disaster for a utility
company – is it the cost of taking down a half a million trees, is it something that results in a
huge financial hit, is it 100,000 customers out of power for a prolonged period of time? If you
look in the risk management literature and how they define a disaster, versus how the PSC or
utility might define disaster, there may be some significant differences.
R: Going back to the challenges that you mentioned and being more creative, what do you feel
are some of the greatest challenges utilities and governmental organizations face when
responding to emergencies, in relation to outages?
P: One is cost. Money is always a huge factor, but taking that aside, the timing of the storm of
the incident is an important consideration. If you had a big storm or incident on Christmas Day,
or the week between Christmas or New Year’s, what is the availability of help? And if you have
a state-wide storm, then do you have the availability of resources to be staged immediately to
respond. In adjoining areas between utilities, everyone is fighting over resources, and those are
finite. This goes for tree services, hotels, restaurants, really everything. And how long did we
know the storm was coming, did the utility have time to pre-stage and acquire these resources?
And what about mutual aid, can we get more crews there, how long will it take for the crews to
get there, in some cases can they cross borders to get to you? Often you can’t do anything in
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terms of restoration until additional crews can get there. So, timing is important, and so is the
size of the incident – is it local, regional, or state-wide? Also, is it urban or rural?
R: Where do you think the disaster response plans and procedures, for both utilities and for
governmental organizations, can be improved?
P: For both, maintaining an accurate registry of people with special needs, typically medical
requirements such as those on oxygen, dialysis, etcetera. The biggest challenge is that people
don’t typically self-identify as special needs and won’t contact the government or utility to
register themselves, and typically doctors don’t tell their patients to do this either. Second
challenge is getting the resources utilities need and the balance of cost for restoration. If you
were to draw a triangle, one of the points would be cost, another would be time, and the third
would be quality/productivity. Utilities often are forced to pick one or two of these when
responding and restoring, but you can’t have all three. My point is that the customer wants it fast,
the company is trying to save or at least control cost, and the PSC and municipalities want
quality and less time spent. So, the question is how much can we spend, how long do we have or
can we take, and that’s sometimes written in the utility’s response plans. And sometimes the PSC
can say, if you don’t get the power on within 48 hours, you’re required by law to provide dry ice
to the public, which is an additional cost.
R: What are some of the most common emergencies utilities contend with?
P: I would say storms in general. I don’t have the data to know what the impacts are for National
Grid or NYSEG, but floods are the number one disaster, not only across New York state, but
throughout the United States. I would have to believe, you would find that severe summer storms
and severe winter storms, thunderstorms and tornadoes are the most impactful. 25 years ago,
tornadoes were extremely uncommon and were not something we really thought about, but now
they’re getting to be more commonplace, more frequent, and far more severe. Whether you
believe in global warming or not, we have climate change, and in New York our weather patterns
have changed and across the United States as well. We’re having more frequent storms and
they’re much more severe, whether its summer or winter, that’s the real big challenge. From my
perspective, it’s the storms that have the biggest impact and cause the most difficulties. When
we’ve had some flooding over the last few years, I can’t think of any incidents where poles
washed out or that type of thing, so I really think its severe storms that are getting more frequent
and stronger. And there may be a higher rate of car accidents that hit poles, but that’s not as
damaging and doesn’t have the same impact, and really doesn’t fall into the category of a
disaster or emergency.
R: The last question is if you could touch on, and I know you’ve been removed from the utility
for a while now, but from your own perspective could you evaluate the performance of NYSEG
and National Grid?
P: I can’t talk about NYSEG because I don’t have any interaction with them, but I can tell you
about National Grid from both a professional perspective and as a customer. I think over the last
10 years, they have improved greatly, and I think part of that is the PSC’s insistence upon the
utilities providing restoration plans and working to those plans – they can’t vary from those plans
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without permission or being reprimanded. Secondly, I think technology, where they can better
isolate where things have gone wrong helps, and that probably is across the board with all
utilities. I think part of it also has to do with the change in corporate governance. When National
Grid came in and took over Niagara Mohawk, National Grid had a very different business model
as to what types of capabilities and staffing they intended to keep. I can tell you first hand,
because I was there when we went through the transition, there were a lot of changes they made
in terms of emergency management and preparedness that ended up needing to be reversed 5
years down the road, as mandated by the PSC. I think they’re embracing emergency
preparedness as a necessary part of doing business now. There’s a better response to the
community, and emergency management has really been embraced by everyone in the
organization, from customer service to HR to communications. My customer rep contacts me
before something happens, let me know what they’re doing, and ask for my input, and they’ve
made an investment in emergency preparedness, which will pay off or probably has already.
R: Great, well that’s really everything, so unless you have anything else to add, I think I’m all
set.
P: I’m good.
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Participant #4 Interview
Interview Date: March 8, 2019
Researcher thanked the participant for agreeing to participate in the interview. The researcher
then notified the participant that the interview would be recorded for the purpose of creating a
transcript, but none of the participant’s personal information would be included in the transcript,
aside from job title and organization.
R: If you could tell me about your title, your experience in the disaster response field, and a little
bit about the relationship between AVANGRID and NYSEG.
P: Oh sure. My title is Director of Emergency Preparedness for AVANGRID Network, which is
the parent company of NYSEG, RG&E, Central Maine Power, and United Luminating, among
other companies. So, that’s the official title, and my responsibilities are in all of those areas. I’m
based in New York and I came from NYSEG. Each of our members, if they’ve grown up in the
utility industry, has most likely come from one of our subsidiaries. How NYSEG blends with the
rest of the company is basically that NYSEG is one of the four. NYSEG and RG&E are closely
aligned operationally and for emergency response. Central Maine Power is somewhat more
aligned with United Luminating, simply because of geography. For all of the areas we’ve strived
to integrate and do things both from a construction standpoint and a response standpoint as
similarly as we can, as long as it meets the needs of whatever regulatory and legal requirements,
or customer needs exist. In some cases, the customer needs in New Haven, Connecticut are going
to be different than the customer needs in Long Lake and Plattsburg, New York. It’s really trying
to balance that. My responsibilities are that whenever there is a significant in any of the
companies, I’m engaged in some sort of way. If it’s a New York event, I’m always a “boots-onthe-ground” person in some fashion.
R: In your time in the field, have you noticed a positive or negative change in the disaster
response methods utilized by NYSEG and National Grid?
P: I’ve seen more of a positive change in terms of engagement. I think our employees are getting
more engaged in emergency response, but I will say that there’s also some exhaustion that’s
coming with it. From 2013-2016, we really didn’t have repeated extreme storms like we do now,
that engage either from a preparedness or response standpoint, the numbers of people that have
had to be engaged at all of our companies recently. We had a record setting storm in May in
2017 with 467,000 customers without power. We’ve had four significant storms in New York
just in the last two years, so that on top of a lot of prep. A little before 10:00am I actually have to
get off this call because we have a weather call to prepare for this weekend. I don’t think it’s
going to be major but we have to prepare, so it’s constant. Today is my day off but I’m still
leaning in because that’s what we do. I’ve seen a tremendous amount of engagement, I’ve seen
raised expectations from our customers – so many people are telecommuting, having small
businesses, businesses out of their homes, businesses that have sensitive electronic equipment,
and people that have life-supporting/sustaining medical equipment that relies on electricity. This
equipment used to be in the hospital but now it’s in homes, and now a dependence from the
standpoint of our phones, our computers, our tablets. There’s a dependency on uninterrupted
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electric service that’s constant, and a media cycle that’s constant. We get a lot of attention these
days.
R: I want to jump ahead to question number five – what the biggest challenges utilities face are.
P: That was really it.
R: Right, exactly, so customers and keeping up-to-date with records of people that have special
needs in their homes – how do you deal with that?
P: We do it differently at each company based on our regulations. Probably the most extreme
version is in New York, where customers are asked to verify if they use certain equipment that’s
life-sustaining. They verify with a doctor and the doctor then sends us the verification letter. We
enroll them in a life-support equipment customer program; their account gets flagged with that,
and during an event we advise the customer have a plan to get themselves through the first 24
hours. We verify twice a year if they still need to be in this program, because if you’ve got that
type of situation, your first thought when that changes is probably not to contact your utility.
When we’re in an event, and we think the event will last more than 24 hours, we will make
positive contact with that customer. We call them, which is a person calling a person. We need to
make that positive contact every 24 hours, and if we don’t reach them by phone, we will dispatch
someone to their home. So, that’s the most aggressive work we do to manage that situation. We
partner with sometimes municipal officials to help us with that outreach. It sounds pretty cut and
dry, but when you have an outage that may occur at 11:00 at night and you can’t reach that
customer, or you have an outage that occurs at maybe 3:00 in the afternoon and you can’t reach
that customer, and 24 hours is going to loom quickly, do you send somebody to look on a door at
11:00 or 12:00 at night? That could be frightening; or do you call somebody at 11:00 or 12:00 at
night that uses life sustaining equipment, and you get them out of bed and possibly have them
injure themselves getting to the phone. There are all these things you have to think through, it’s
not cut and dry. We do the same thing with critical facilities with an outage that goes over 48
hours. Any facility in New York that meets the criteria as a critical facility, like a dialysis
facility, a hospital, a police or fire station…even a college campus or a school, we have contact
with them and are reaching out to them. If it goes beyond 24 hours for those life-sustaining
people, we’re asking them to relocate, and we’ll be working with emergencies services to get
them relocated, or make sure they continue to sustain whatever equipment they have with an
extended outage. We keep that contact going every day of that longer-term event. There’s a
bunch of people that don’t fit that criteria but we still keep an eye on; they’re called “health
support” customers. Elderly, blind and disabled is a utility term – you may hear “EBD”, and
those are people that everyone in the household identifies in that category. We also track them
and reach out to them during events. Lastly, we reach out to all of these customers prior to a
significant event to tell them to get ready.
R: In your response to that question, you mentioned partnering with municipal officials. Could
you expand a little more on the relationship between utilities and governmental organizations?
P: It’s on multiple levels – I interact with our state public service commission and the state office
of emergency management, as well as the regional offices of emergency management. Myself
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and my team will work with those people. In Maine it’s the Maine Emergency Management
Agency and in Connecticut it’s the Department of Homeland Security for the State of
Connecticut, so we reach out to those people at that level as well and work with the regulator and
the state on issues like border crossings of crews with New York Customs, or if the National
Guard is going to be made available for an event, or when we need to move resources and the
roads are closed and we need waivers. We’ll work with them during an event on those types of
things, and we work outside of an event to talk through issues like how to put as much in place in
the blue sky so we know each other and our responsibilities when the skies are not blue so we
can work quickly together. We have people in our organization that work at the county level and
we try to do as much as we can with the county emergency management agencies because of
home rule in New York state. It’s different in other states because everything works through the
state emergency management agency. We still work through the county, but things are run
through that state agency. In New York, the county is king and everybody’s going to do things
through the county. Some exceptions are downstate in our service area that’s in Westchester –
things are at the town level, which can be really challenging because you’ve got all of these
fiefdoms. A county-level tends to be better from my perspective, and the state-level tends to be
better because you have all these critical facilities. If I’m working with the county and I have 300
critical facilities in the county, I may not be able to resolve things for all 300 at once; the county
may be able to help me prioritize who to get online first. But, if I’m working with 17 and I have
300 critical facilities that are spread out through those 17 towns, they’re all going to have their
list of who to restore first and I’ll have too much work for the resources I have on hand.
R: Could you tell me a little bit about disaster response practices have evolved over time, in your
experience?
P: The best thing that ever happened was the utilities adapting the ICS model. The fact that we
use and speak the same disaster recovery level with ICS has made all of the difference. There are
some utilities that still don’t use it, but they are few and far between. When I see them at
conferences and events, I always advocate for the adoption of it, because you need the structure
and need to speak the same language. I have people from across my business who have a role
that’s very different than their regular job, and it’s through having that system that it becomes
possible for us to become successful.
R: Could you expand a little more on the ICS structure at AVANGRID and NYSEG?
P: We use both an incident command and an area commander. The area commander is used in
New York and Maine, because we have multiple locations, barns and divisions. At each division,
which is spread across our service areas, we have an incident commander that will lead the event
response at a local level. We need to have someone making decisions on a state-wide basis, as
far as moving resources and managing the event, so we have an area commander. The one thing
that’s different than what you might hear, is that we have our own EOCs and we will place a
liaison in the county, regional, or state EOC. That person we’re placing there is not an incident
commander, and that’s a little different than the expectations that the county and state have for
us. Our incident commander needs to be in our own EOC; we wouldn’t want them to remote in.
More and more have adapted to that at the county level, but every once in a while, we’ll get
someone asking for our commander there, but that doesn’t work.
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R: Where do you think your disaster response plans and procedures could be improved? It
doesn’t just have to be the typical ICS structure, this could also be in terms of resiliency within
the grid and different types of technology such as GIS systems or predictor models being
implemented.
P: For us, we don’t have AIM in all of our locations. I have AIM, which is automated metering
infrastructure in Maine and in Connecticut, so when there are outages, I can look in Maine and
actually send signals out to the meters in the homes and businesses to see what’s getting a signal,
which is helpful in damage assessment. In New York I’m blind; the only way I can get that
information is through some automated equipment, and some patrollers, either drones, LIDAR
with helicopter fixed wing aircraft, which has to be able to fly, or people in cars. The poles aren’t
always on the side of the road – they’re in the fields, in the forests, so that assessment is so
important and takes so much time. Anything I can do to build more intelligence in automation in
our infrastructure makes a difference, and that’s why our company has instituted a resiliency
program that’s mostly focused in New York, because that’s where we have the least automation.
It’s a $2.5 billion investment over the next 10 years, and we have been identifying areas across
our service territory to implement advanced technologies, rebuild infrastructure, resiliency
efforts…all of that. You can’t do enough of it, and our utility industry in New York and New
England is an aging infrastructure, which can create a challenge.
R: If you could give me your own evaluation of NYSEG and National Grid’s performance the
past 7 years or so when responding to emergencies, as well as lessons learned from some of the
bigger storms?
P: We’re only as good as our weather forecast, and our weather forecasts have been wrong
repeatedly. It’s not the fault of the forecasters, but we’re only going to be as good as what we
have in the forecast, and as a result we have had to lean in with more resources than ever before.
We have an aging group of first responders for utility line workers, and it takes quite a bit of time
to get new people trained and back, ready and in the system to be able to do what they need to
do. I would say we’ve gotten better at getting resources, but getting resources has become harder
over the last few years. It’s required the companies to spend a lot more money because they’re
not necessarily resources you have on site. In the past, you had more native workers who were
there, but you didn’t have other business expenses and technologies, so it was a very peopledriven organization, because the way you fixed and built things was people. The newer model
has people, but you also have contract workers you bring in for construction, a more nomadic
group of people who have less affinity for the company, so when you’re in an event, you have to
work harder to get those contract resources on-site. I think we’ve gotten better at making sure
we’re maintaining those resources and getting them on-site, but it’s become much more
expensive.
R: My last question is if you could tell me a little bit about the most common types of
emergencies you have to deal with.
P: It’s storms. The normal is the ice storms, the wind storms, and in the summer, thunderstorms.
Lately, it’s been mostly wind. What we do see a lot more of…we used to have a lot of snow, if
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you remember back in 2014, we had the 7 feet of snow – that’s not a utility emergency. It’s when
it turns to ice, and it’s a wintry mix, that’s when it’s an issue, and it’s become more common.
R: Yeah, that’s been a common theme with everyone I’ve spoken with, that storms are becoming
more frequent and more intense.
P: Yeah, and the only other thing I’d say is that we talked about customer and municipal
expectations. If I had to rate our company’s response over the last two years, we can always do
better than that – it’s always a challenge area. There are always people that need information,
and the way I describe it is in the past, you had a big team of people, and you only needed a few
storm performers and people to follow them. Now you have a smaller team of people, and
everyone needs to be on their A-game. Our external entities are county emergency management
officials, county officials, town officials, state officials – all of those people are using social
media to speak to their constituencies and they need information from us, and we have to
constantly feed that bear and keep it going. In the past, that wasn’t a concern…the last ten years,
we’ve gone to a 24-7 news cycle with social media and we need to do a better job of providing
information and messages to keep that going.
R: Thank you so much for all of this information.
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Participant #5 Interview
Interview Date: March 8, 2019
Researcher thanked the participant for agreeing to participate in the interview. The researcher
then notified the participant that the interview would be recorded for the purpose of creating a
transcript, but none of the participant’s personal information would be included in the transcript,
aside from job title and organization.
R: If you could tell me about your professional title and your experience with disaster response.
P: My professional title is – I am a Regional Coordinator with the Division of Homeland
Security and Emergency Services in the Office of Emergency Management. I have been there
about 12 years, and before that I put 23 years in the New York International Guard. I retired as
an E7 Master Sergeant and Deputy Chief of the Emergency Services Department, basically the
fire department. Before that, or concurrent with that, I put 17 years in with the Niagara Falls Fire
Department, and left as the Fire Chief and Director of Emergency Management, so two hats
there.
R: Going into the second question, if you could tell me about the changes in the disaster response
methods utilized by NYSEG and National Grid over the last 7 to 12 years.
P: Well, I think, what I’ve noticed, is that they’ve actually professionalized their entire
emergency management approach. I’ve worked very closely with both agencies, but closest with
National Grid. I helped them rewrite their emergency management response plan about 8 years
ago, and it was before Sandy, Lee and Irene, and what they’ve done is basically memorialize
what they’re going to do on paper, strengthen their outreach to the county emergency managers,
built relationships and explain their processes. If you look at the processes coming out of FEMA,
specifically the Incident Command System 300-level, which is a baccalaureate level study, it
says in an emergency, agencies should send an agency representative to the emergency operation
center to answer questions. They’re supposed to come with man power and a specific amount of
money, whatever they’re allocated – they’re supposed to come with a checkbook and the ability
to field personnel. When you look at that training from FEMA, they say all agencies are
supposed to do this so that the emergency operation center at the county level can make quality
decisions. Well, in our rewriting of National Grid’s emergency response plan, we found a glitch
– no utility can send an agency representative to the county EOC because that’s the storm
director. That person is running the storm for the utility, and it’s the same for NYSEG, RG&E,
any utility, what they do is they send a liaison, and that liaison is not coming with any money or
man power; they’re simply a conduit back to the storm director with the agency representative to
help allocate assets for the utility perform power restoration. It’s a glitch in training and there’s
no remedy to that right now, but we did write a white paper to it and sent it to FEMA for
consideration. It was an interesting discovery and I say that because when Sandy hit, the Long
Island Power Authority (LIPA) had such a hard time getting their collective mindset around the
damage done to Long Island that they no longer exist. The governor dissolved them – NIPA,
New York Power Authority still exists, but the Long Island Power Authority just couldn’t get
their minds around this problem and the governor formed the Moreland Commission to look into
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why utilities were having such difficulty responding to this. National Grid actually won some
awards and got some accolade for their plan because they were very much in tune with how the
state and counties respond and their estimated times of restoration were accurate and we can
build planning assumptions off of them, whereas LIPA would say 3 weeks and National Grid
ordered for 4 weeks. As you know with Sandy, it took months, so when they finally came out
and said they weren’t repairing, they were replacing the utility’s infrastructure the size of the
county of England, everyone understood and the planning assumptions changed. However, the
damage had already been done and it was just a poor response overall. But again, Grid did very
well and was able to send people, they had people to give and lend toward that response effort.
Grid has done a good job over the last few years implementing the “whole community approach”
to emergency management, power being a very important piece. The most importance piece
would be getting the roads open.
R: I have multiple things coming off of that – first, going off of what you were saying regarding
the relationship between utilities and governmental organizations, could you explain more about
the relationship within the framework? I know you discussed sending a utility liaison to the
EOC, but what else does the relationship entail?
P: The liaison is basically just a conduit back to headquarters, or whatever geographic division
you’re dealing with, and that person would communicate the needs of the county directly to the
storm director or the assistant.
R: In your personal experience, do you feel that the home rule in New York state with counties
and towns complicates the relationship with utilities and makes things more challenging?
P: Yes, I would agree with that. Massachusetts got rid of their county government, so there is no
longer a county government layer – you go directly from the town to the state, and Vermont is
similar. What it does is, for the utilities, makes it a little easy because they plug into the state and
only have to propagate one relationship. As you mentioned, in New York state we have home
rule, so these emergencies start local and end local under municipal law, which means the head
official is the end all be all. Sometimes they put unrealistic requirements on utilities because
they’re looking at it siloed. All they care about is their village or their municipality. Whereas, say
in Vermont and Massachusetts where you don’t have that layer of county government, they’re
taking a more global approach to everything. There are priority restoration lists out there, so if
you have a hospital or even a general store in the middle of nowhere, it might be a piece of
critical infrastructure or a key resource in a municipality because it’s the only place to buy
groceries, get prescriptions, cash a check, or it has some services that are not easily found there.
They’ll put that store on the priority restoration list and the village mayor will ask when that will
be restored while the utility is busy trying to get 4 hospitals restored somewhere else. A lot of the
problems that I’ve seen overtime, regardless if you’re in a home rule or non-home rule state, the
majority of the elected officials don’t have any idea how the utility system works, so they feel
someone could just go upstream, fix the substation, and restore power, when that’s not how it
works. You have to look at the entire grid, the entire damage to the system, and sometimes you
can restore something, and then take it again offline to restore something else to avoid
overloading the system – they just don’t have that understanding. The other piece we found,
which we included in the white paper, relative to the agency rep/liaison issue, in a home rule
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state, and really anywhere, you get a fire chief that will say there’s a downed wire going across a
street and is blocking access to a hospital. They’ll even sometimes see a crew and commandeer
them to fix it, which is absolutely detrimental to the overall restoration timeframe and process
that’s taking place because they have a limited number of immediate responders, and they
already have their priority 1s and 2s they’re trying to get back online. It can really cripple the
restoration process, and we in emergency management in New York have been trying to use
those as learning points, so first responders will understand that if you need something done, you
have to call it in for them to put it in their plan. They’ll build something like keeping certain
streets open into their plan. Otherwise, something happening like that will need to be a “make
safe” because the “emergency” is myopic – they’re only looking at a smaller picture. The crew
they pulled may have been critical in restoring half a million people, but are instead addressing
one downed wire and instead they’re looking at one small tactical aspect of a major emergency.
So, there have been some tension issues that we’ve been trying to act as an intermediary between
the first response community and the utility and help champion that so the restoration process
isn’t impeded. Utilities have done some great outreach on this too, especially National Grid,
NYSEG, and Con Edison. They’ve been educating the first response community as to how their
system works and how easily it can be degraded if a local asset is repurposed without the storm
director’s knowledge, approval and planning.
R: So, you’ve been talking a lot about the challenges as well – are there any other types of
challenges that utilities or the Office of Emergency Management faces when responding to
emergencies and disasters?
P: Unrealistic restoration periods. They do have to deal with the Public Service Commission, and
sometimes the elected officials push for restoration of their individual towns. If you look at Erie
County, there are over 30 municipalities and it can be difficult to negotiate. So, what they’ve
done is that they have a municipal call at the same time every day that the elected officials can
get on, where the utility can explain the damage and their restoration plans. They’re also very
good at putting community relations people at the EOCs, in addition to their liaison, who is just
their communication conduit. They may have a community relations person, a VP, come out and
attend a planning meeting or a briefing to a chief elected official to keep them informed as to
what is going on, because they have a constituency they’re accountable to, because if they don’t
know what’s going on, people will lose faith in their government. From an emergency
management perspective, we’re in the middle. When you look at our mission, they sometimes
coin the phrase that we’re the eyes and ears of the governor, which can be good and bad. Most of
the state agencies in New York state answer through the Office of Emergency Management in an
emergency. The major exception is the State Police, but we work hand-in-hand with the State
Police and have State Police lieutenants imbedded with us and assigned to our office, so we have
a very good working relationship. Sometimes the emergency is so big and complicated, it takes a
few days to unravel, and there are unrealistic expectations in today’s world. People can be very
demanding and don’t want their way of life interrupted for very long. That being said, I will say,
in general, if you explain it to the residents, they get it and are good about it. You just have to get
ahead of it, and that’s where the utilities have really learned their lesson/are learning their lesson
to get that information out. We get elected officials that are constantly changing, so there is a
constant learning curve that you can never get ahead of and stay ahead of. If you get one person
that says something bad on social media, that can also be harmful and is what you have to
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answer to. So that on top of older executives within these agencies that are used to doing things
the old way, the hierarchy needs to understand this and needs to embrace the “whole community
approach”. In some cases, I would say National Grid is doing a phenomenal job, and NYSEG is
improving and has learned from experience, paid some fines, and gotten better.
R: In your opinion, how do you think these challenges could be resolved, or at least the lines of
communication could be improved?
P: Relationship-building, training, exercising together, sitting on each other’s committees to
update and or rewrite emergency response plans, so that we have a flavor of the “whole
community approach”. It’s not just police, fire and EMS; nontraditional first responders such as
the department of public works, roads, highways, and utilities, need to be involved.
Communicating with hospitals, assisted living centers and nursing homes, because they have
specific problems that need to be threaded into the whole community emergency response plan,
which again, would absolutely encompass the utility as well. If you have a 1,000-piece puzzle
and ask you to put it together but don’t tell you what the picture is, you can do it, but it’ll take
you a long time. If I show you what the model is supposed to look like, the minute you go offtrack you’ll recognize it. That’s one of the serious challenges we’re facing – each emergency is
different, so knowing what the recovery picture is supposed to look like, you’re able to better
understand when the process goes off the rails. That’s a huge challenge – what is the emergency
response, restoration and recovery supposed to look like with everyone on the same page. All
state agencies, all utilities, all involved organizations – more of the community is coming online
with the ICS system and getting trained so that we all speak the same language, can manage the
emergency by objectives, and when the objectives aren’t being met at even the smallest level, if
everyone knows the game plan, they can see what needs to be fixed quicker and at a lower level,
which will in turn take less resources and effort to right the ship. Getting everyone to work off an
incident action plan, which is an operational period plan, which is check on every 12 hours
usually.
R: So, you mentioned introducing the model and making sure everyone is on the same page –
what, in your opinion, do you think are the most useful models and procedures utilized. This can
be outside of the ICS structure. We can talk about things such as resiliency in the grid, hardening
it, and different predictor and GIS models.
P: They’ve really come a long way with their GIS mapping – you can get online and see where
the problems are. It plays huge into planning assumptions for recovery, restoration, rescue, and
mitigation later on. I can’t really speak to hardening to their systems because it’s outside of my
purview, which is a matter between the utility and the Public Service Commission. I will tell you
that the Commissioner of the Division Homeland Security and Emergency Services is the chair
of the DPC, the Disaster Preparedness Commission, and the Public Service Commission sits on
that, so we have input, but at a way higher pay-grade than mine.
R: Switching gears a little bit, can you give me some background on how the disaster response
practices have evolved over time?
P: Yeah, actually I can tell you that almost every municipality today has an EOC, which an
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information collection point. Agencies also have EOCs, but they are called a Department
Operational Center or a Regional Operational Center. All the information goes to these different
centers and they communicate with each other – information is power and information sharing is
critical. Siloing has really disappeared. I think that’s one of the biggest things when everyone is
on the same page with ICS.
R: I’m not sure how comfortable you are with answering this, but would you be able to evaluate,
just in general, NYSEG and National Grid’s performance and talk about some big lessons
learned from past storms.
P: Absolutely. Again, this is all public knowledge because it’s already happened and the PSC has
already published reports on it. I believe that National Grid is the standard for emergency
response, at least in my region. I deal with mostly RG&E, NYSEG, and National Grid, and of
those three, the emphasis of emergency response on a corporate level seems to be stronger at
National Grid. When I helped rewrite their plans, we went to every division in New York state
and we talked and interacted with the North American President of National Grid. We invited all
of our OEM representatives from different regions to meeting in Albany, all of the divisional and
regional people, including the president, from National Grid, and all of the emergency managers
of various counties. This was really forward thinking when we did this 10 years ago – the tension
issues were put on the table and discussed and integrated into the planning models. I’m not
saying that all of the problems were fixed, but if you could identify what the problem is, you may
not be able to solve it immediately, but you can address it eventually. From that aspect, Grid has
been a leader and are a little ahead of the curve. NYSEG is moving forward, but I’m not as
familiar with the corporate infrastructure because they’ve been bought so many times and there’s
been so much corporate turnover, which has put them in different directions and given them
different goals. They started down the same path and have worked with Grid, even though
they’re rival companies, not really when it comes to safety. So, as best as they’ve been allowed,
NYSEG has really moved forward following the same model that Grid has created.
R: My last question would be if could talk about the most common types of emergencies that you
have to deal with in relation to utilities.
P: Well, the number one emergency we deal with in New York state is flooding, and that does
have an impact on utilities to some degree. I would have to say that high wind storms, ice storm,
winter storms, that type of thing, are the most impactful. With summer storms you don’t get the
same damage, and with the winter it can be difficult to just walk somewhere. Supporting the
utilities in the field is something we’ve done that’s been very difficult. Making sure that they’re
restringing wires in the middle of nowhere, that our medical response is sufficient to cover the
type of injuries they’re going to sustain working out of a bucket. Usually when they’re doing that
type of work, the 911 system and the roads are compromised, which is something we’ve gotten
good at supporting, especially following Hurricane Sandy – we had a lot of lessons learned that
we applied when they were doing power restoration during the 2014 snowstorm in Western New
York – I think it’s called Knife? They were doing massive restoration during that and both the
county and the state emergency management offices were very engaged in making sure that their
operations would go as safely as possible and knew they would be supported in case they got
injured and needed access to roads. It’s a burden on the economy while it’s a blessing as well,
because they suck up every hotel room, every rental car, every local tree service, so we help
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them in those areas. There are also other responders that need to come into the area, and if
there’s no place for them to sleep, it’s a huge piece there.
R: That’s all I have, we really covered everything on my list, so unless there’s anything else
you’d like to mention, I’m all set.
P: If you have any follow-up questions, feel free to give me a call.
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Participant #6 Interview
Interview Date: March 12, 2019
Researcher thanked the participant for agreeing to participate in the interview. The researcher
then notified the participant that the interview would be recorded for the purpose of creating a
transcript, but none of the participant’s personal information would be included in the transcript,
aside from job title and organization.
R: We can get started with the first question – could you please tell me what your professional
title is, how long you’ve had experience in the disaster response field, and a bit about what you
do?
P: Okay, so I am Manager of Emergency Preparedness at PSEG Long Island. I’ve held this role
for just over 5 years, since we became PSEG Long Island. Prior to that I was an employee with
National Grid. During the transition I was put into this new role; I did have some exposure to
emergency preparedness for a couple years prior to the transition, but it was more of a general
support role. It did involve some of the post-Sandy reports and assessments and things along
those lines, so the last year or so with National Grid I did have my hands in that aspect of it.
Right now, I manage the EP Team, which is one of the functions I manage here. This group of
folks is responsible for putting together our emergency response plan, we are responsible for
identifying all of our employee’s secondary storm role, so we do all of the notifications around
the storms roles and make sure folks get the proper training each year. We also get involved with
all of the regulatory reporting, which comes out of my group, with EPS in relation to emergency
preparedness. We do all of the relationship building with the local emergency response
organizations, the state, the county and the Red Cross – whoever it is on Long Island that fulfills
a primary function we have. We also do a lot of work with our external affairs folks, going out
and making presentations on storm preparedness to the public. As part of my team I have the
outage management system; they’re a group of folks that report to me that are responsible for the
company’s OMS. The maintain that system, implement any upgrades, provide any of the training
around that – really, they are the subject matter experts relative to managing the outage
management system. We have one person for each of the four divisions we have across Long
Island, so that supports the EP function as well.
R: It sounds like you have a lot of really good experience, so I’m excited to hear more about all
of it. Concerning question 10, you mentioned that you work directly with local governments,
including the state and the county, so could you tell me more about these relationships and
maybe any ways it may differ from what you experienced at National Grid?
P: I think, from when I came from National Grid to here, and I’m not sure, they may have picked
up some similar practices now, but we’re very engaged with not only the county and the state
and the New York City OECs and OEMs, we have expanded the relationship around dealing
with some of the municipalities at a lower level. In the past we may have had a set group of folks
that staffed the EOCs, as I said the county, state, and city EOCs during a storm, but now we’ve
built that group so we have about 25 or 30 folks, and we’ll have them assigned to work directly
to work with some of the smaller towns and villages, so in addition to serving the higher levels,

101

we do have folks that are specifically assigned to assigned to work with the smaller
municipalities. Some of the things that we do that is maybe a little bit different, we have folks
that have blue sky roles that may be part of our External Affairs group and they are responsible
for having that relationship with elected officials, but when we get to storm mode that grows and
then they have many more folks at their disposal to work with those groups and provide them the
information flow back and forth or maybe even man a local EOC if one is open outside of the
normal-type stuff. We have built some tools that enable us to have regular communication,
we’ve created a municipal portal that we grant access to these various municipalities where they
have the ability to go in and view outages, specific to their particular area. They can input data
relative to critical facility outages in their area, and they can also drop a pin on a map to indicate
areas where there are wires or tree debris where we have to go out and deenergize the wires and
clear the debris from the road, so it’s a different tool that we do provide to them that provides
them some additional access to us. It can help to arrange priorities in terms of restorations to see
what’s more critical to them during a storm event. The other thing we do that may be a little
different than other organizations is that we pull folks out of our restoration area and assign them
to work directly with municipalities on make-safe-to-clear areas, so if there are trees down or
facilities with our wires entangled with them, we set aside a portion of our workforce that will
respond directly to requests from municipalities to make it safe so they can clear the debris and
then even in a larger storm, we’ll go as far as to assign these folks directly to the municipalities
and allow them to direct them where to go to do this type of work.
R: That’s different than what I’ve heard so it’s great that you guys do that. You mentioned the
internal chain of response; could you tell me a little more about the chain of command within
PSEG?
P: We operate under an Incident Command System, so we have the typical functions you would
expect to see in that system, from Incident Commander down. I play the role of the planning
section chief during a storm, but we have as I said, the things you would expect; we have an
operations group, a PIO, communications liaisons, 8 normal branches of ICS, which is how we
structure ourselves during emergency events.
R: Could you tell me about the models and procedures utilized at PSEG and National Grid, and
what some of the best practices are? It doesn’t have to be typical ICS, it could also be hardening
the grid in terms of resiliency, the implementation of GIS models, things like that.
P: I’ll start off with the storm hardening since you brought it up – that’s a key aspect of what we
do. I’m not sure if you’re familiar with the relationship, but I work for PSEG Long Island, and
prior to that it was National Grid, but we have the contract to run the T&D system for Long
Island Power Authority, they’re the asset owner on Long Island, and National Grid used to have
the contract. LIPA, as the asset owner, they’re a state agency and so they have access to FEMA
grants. Post-Sandy they were awarded $750 million to do storm hardening, so over the last 5
years or so we’ve had a very aggressive storm hardening program, really to increase the
resiliency of the system, so it’s taller, stronger poles, shorter cross-hairs, tree-resistant wire,
raising sub-stations in low-lying areas, that type of stuff. So, we do see some positive benefits
from all of the infrastructure improvements we’ve been making. In most of the storms we’re
seeing fewer outages. As part of that grant we’re doing a lot of work on adding additional
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sectionalizing units to our T&D system, which allows us to then minimize the number of
customers that are affected when we do see an outage. The combination of that is one key
component of our overall approach in improving our storm responses. In addition to that, we’ve
had a big focus post-National Grid on the communications end. We know that was one of the
biggest challenges during Sandy here on Long Island, so that’s one of the things that LIPA and
National Grid got beat up a bit on by the elected officials, the press and such, just about the
communication. We’ve done a whole lot over the past 5 years, just focusing on the way we
communicate with customers before, during and after storms, so that runs the gambit from
technology to a much more prevalent use of social media. We’ve updated our OMS systems so
we have a very strong focus on providing accurate ETRs and timely updates and things along
those lines. A lot of it has been a big focus on what we do in terms of the frequency of
communications, the timely-ness, the accuracy of what we’re getting out, and we’ve seen a lot of
positive response from elected officials and the media in terms of what we’ve been able to do to
shore up our communications, which I think has paid as big a dividend or more as the storm
hardening.
R: In talking about areas where you’ve had lessons learned and improved your response, where
do you think other areas of improvement are?
P: We constantly learn and one area of improvement, which we’ve had a strong focus is, is on
the whole damage assessment and getting the information back from the field in a more timely
manner. Historically we’ve had a paper-driven process and had to have a lot of folks on the
ground capturing that damage assessment information on paper, which would have to be
transported back, get translated, and it was just a long, drawn-out process. Over the last year or
so we’ve built a mobile application so we have a platform that we can download to any device,
which replicates the paper process, and actually makes an electronic process, so as folks come to
our system to assist, whether it’s line resources that need repair or damage assessors that are
contract employees – even our own employees that don’t typically do this work, we have the
ability to assign work via this mobile platform and people are able to get status updates from
accepting the work to being on site, they can change estimated times of restoration while they’re
on site, but more importantly it allows them to capture that damage assessment so they can stand
in front of a pole and it will automatically download all of the asset data from the GIS platform,
and they can complete any of the necessary forms electronically and it’ll automatically be sent
back to us in the office, and then we’re able to add that to the outage ticket so we go out to do
repairs we have that information. We just kicked that off late last year and have been rolling it
out in the field. A big challenge is getting everyone trained on that and using it consistently, so
we have a continued focus there. Clearly the other big area of focus is around ETR, so as I said
before we’ve done a lot to change the culture within the utility to get folks to understand the
importance of providing timely information around ETRs, and it’s been a good process and
people are coming along. A lot of the training has been targeted at folks in the field and teaching
them why it is necessary to provide good information and consistently update that information so
that we can then readily communicate that out to customers. I think we’ve made some good
progress and there’s more to do in that area, but certainly as I said it’s an area for us to focus on
moving forward.

103

R: You mentioned that adopting the mobile platform has been a bit of a challenge; could you
expand on some of the other types of challenges you face when responding to emergencies?
P: The biggest challenge I think we face is access to resources, access to additional linemen to
help. I guess it stems from a change in the environment, so everybody is less risk-adverse so
folks are asking for resources earlier, others are holding onto resources longer, so it’s a challenge
of getting people here to work, and there’s only a set number of linemen available within a
reasonable distance to report. The other big challenge is the regulatory scrutiny. They’re much
more involved now in terms of asking questions, trying to drive decisions and a lot of times, it’s
just an added layer that makes it that much more difficult. Sometimes they don’t bring any value
to the equation but it’s a necessity to hand hold these folks and get on calls with them. Clearly,
that’s out there and as I said they seem to have their hands in and every time they get a weather
report that looks like we’ll get wind or rain we’re on the phone with them and they’re asking
questions and I really think the challenge is they don’t have a good feel of what affects us and
what we’re doing and it ends up being more of a nuisance than anything else. Other challenges
continue to be, from the scrutiny perspective, are elected officials, the media, the constant news
focus, and as I said, we all learned from Sandy that if you don’t focus on that part of the
business, it can really come back to bite you. Customer expectations have grown and they expect
the same kind of services from utilities you get from somewhere like Amazon, so it all comes
back to finding ways to keep up with customers are accustomed to.
R: I know that you mentioned the transition from National Grid to PSEG, so I was wondering if
you could talk a little bit about the response methods utilized by National Grid and any positive
or negative changes you have seen.
P: When we were National Grid, the biggest change that came about on Long Island was when
we transitioned over to PSEG Long Island. We lost access to a lot of resources; National Grid
had the electric and gas business, as well as a fairly large shared services function, so we used to
have access to 5,000 employees during a storm, and when we transitioned to PSEG Long Island
National Grid obviously kept the gas business and some of the shared services so we lost about
60 percent of the resources we had access to, so that was a big change and challenge. Some of
the biggest changes we’ve made in response have been driven by the fewer employees we have
access to, so that’s caused us to take a better look at changes in technology, it’s caused us to
revamp our procedures and processes just to acknowledge that we have fewer people to do this.
Since National Grid, and since a lot of the aftermath of Sandy and Irene, it’s been a focus of
improving customer communications and hardening the system. I think we’re in a much better
spot than we were 6 or 7 years ago under National Grid, and I don’t blame National Grid, it was
a different model and time, but out of necessity we’ve done a lot to improve our response and
protect the brand image.
R: I only have a couple more questions – could you give me general overview of how you feel
disaster response practices have evolved over time? It doesn’t have to be at PSEG or National
Grid, just an overall sense of it.
P: I think the overall, and I may be repeating certain things, but I think the overall evolution of
the response has been one across the industry. Like I said, there are things that are driving it and
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a lot of it stems back from customer expectations, the media and politicians, but it’s becoming
less and less risk-adverse. This includes doing things to plan and start securing resources, really
focusing within the business to make sure you’re prepared when the storm hits, because
everyone knows the challenges and expectations and the backlash and penalties. Utilities are
taking a much stronger focus on being prepared for storms, and some of that is to align with
expectations. As I’ve said everything around communications and what we do to better position
ourselves to communicate with customers and meet their needs. A lot of focus on technology,
whether it’s a mobile app or upgrades to OMS systems or looking at drone technology; how do
you build new technology into systems to increase efficiency, especially when you’re dealing
with fewer resources. I mentioned storm hardening, that’s a key aspect of this. Anything you can
do to prevent or minimize the number of outages, clearly that helps you in the long run because
that’s fewer cases you have to respond to. And the last thing we focus on is relationship building
with local municipalities and emergency response organizations, and I really push my group to
be out there and be active during those blue-sky times to really forge those relationships. I think
it buys you something, not only from the perspective of knowing each other’s businesses, but
you get a little more support because they have a face with a name and such. I think that’s proven
to be a big help for us and I see more and more of the other utilities trying to build those
relationships.
R: The last thing I have is if you could me a little about the most common types of emergencies
you’ve had to deal with?
P: From my perspective it’s storms. Whether it’s the bigger storms or even some of the smaller
nor’easters where we get one hundred thousand customers out, it’s being prepared, and taking
the right steps up front so we’re able to effectively respond. It’s securing resources, whether it’s
focusing on how we’re going to communicate ETRs, but it comes down to storms.
R: Is there anything else you’d like to mention?
P: I think I’ve covered most of it. I would expect some consistency from the other emergency
management people you’re talking with, but if you have any other questions you can let me
know. I spend a lot of time with the other people who hold this job title in New York, so there’s
a lot of sharing of best practices and really, we’re all fighting the same battle so it’s a tight-knit
community so it makes us all better in the long-run. It’s nice to have a group of folks that support
one-another, especially across 5 different companies.
Participant #7 Interview
Interview Date: March 12, 2019
Researcher thanked the participant for agreeing to participate in the interview. The researcher
then notified the participant that the interview would be recorded for the purpose of creating a
transcript, but none of the participant’s personal information would be included in the transcript,
aside from job title and organization.
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R: If you’re ready, we can go ahead and get started. If we could start with the first question –
could you please tell me what your professional title is, how long you’ve had experience with
disaster response, and a little bit about what you do?
P: Sure. My current position is the Manager of Emergency Preparedness at AVANGRID and my
prime responsibility is Central Maine Power. I have shared responsibilities in Connecticut and
New York. I’ve been in this position for a little over three years, and prior to that I served as the
Fire Chief, Emergency Management Director and Homeland Security Director for the city of
South Portland Maine and I was there for 28 years.
R: Could you tell me a bit of what you do on a daily basis as the Manager of Emergency
Preparedness?
P: Daily is planning, training, outreach, a lot of outreach, obviously planning for the next
weather event. In the last three years, since I’ve been here, we’ve had about 30 or 40 weather
events, so it’s been very busy. Today I’m doing a T&D report, which is a follow-up on a storm
we had February 4, 5, and 6. I do a lot of documenting for regulators on what we’ve done for
past events, and then mixing in the outreach because the key to our success is outreach. I’m
always at meetings, either with the county director or with other EMA professionals.
R: You referenced your success and outreaching being a key part of that. Would you be able to
evaluate AVANGRID’s performance when responding to emergencies, maybe talk about some
of the biggest lessons learned?
P: I had the benefit of working with Central Maine Power on the other side when I was the Fire
Chief and EMA Director before I came here. We’ve seen a big change in the public’s
expectations in emergency management and I would say the success – we had a huge storm in
October of 2017 which crippled us. We had over 400,000 customers out of 600,000 out and the
success that we’ve had in the last 18 months building on that and lessons learned is what the
public expects. The big one is road openings, wires down, making safe, and communication. We
really need to communicate better and we’ve done better with that in the last year. We’ve
worked really hard on it and that’s the direction that I think all emergency managers need to go.
You have to tell the public what you’re doing – they expect, in the social media age, accurate,
timely information and we have to provide that.
R: Are there any other areas that you feel like AVANGRID’s disaster response plans and
procedures could be improved? This could be off of your experience as a fire chief as well.
P: Again, we’re working hard and trying to improve our relationships with our county
emergency managers. In some areas of the country you deal with the local level, but in Maine we
have 300 small communities so we choose to deal with the counties. We have 14 counties in the
state we deal with and I think we still have room there to get better; we’ve done better, but you
want a face to a name, you don’t just want an email address, and that’s what we have to work on,
is getting out, and participating. In 2019, we want to participate in their trainings, we need to
train with those county EMA groups and not just be there when there’s a storm. Getting involved
with their training so we’re all on the same page.
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R: Could you tell me more about the relationship between AVANGRID and local municipalities
within the context of disaster response?
P: In Maine there’s a state-wide mutual aid agreement that was developed 10-12 years ago. What
that agreement states is communities in the state, when an event or problem gets bigger than they
can handle at their level, such as a forest fire – when the fire gets too big, they go and get mutual
aid and they go through county emergency managers. That has opened the door for Central Main
Power to jump in at the county level to integrate. We’ve set up a new public liaison team, so we
would actually put one of our employees into their emergency management center to be the eyes
and ears for us on the ground, so if there’s an issue in one of our counties, and I’ll use York
county in Southern Maine as an example, then we’ll get that information right out of them. Our
employee will push it to where it needs to go, whether that’s a road opening issue or if they want
to know what our plan is tomorrow, or we have 60 broken poles, or whatever, they’ll push it in
that direction.
R: So, could you tell me about the biggest challenges you face in responding to emergencies?
This could be from your time as fire chief or at AVANGRID, or maybe how the two overlap.
P: The biggest challenge is obviously balancing. The communities expect you to give them an
instant answer, which sometimes is impossible. In the fire department, no community can afford
to have a fire fighter in everybody’s home every night, so there are smoke detectors and we’ve
gotten better with technology and having sprinkler systems to put fires out. In the utility world
we’re doing the same thing by having AIM systems so we can see where the outages are to
respond. There are a lot of rumors you get out on social media where someone could say
“Central Maine Power ran out of poles”, and we struggle with that because a lot of comments are
not true and it takes time to answer them all, so we have a social media group, and you never
would have thought of having that 15 years ago. The fire departments are the same way. All of
this instant news is creating challenges that everybody is adapting to, but it does create a
microscope – you’re living in a bubble and you have to tell everyone how you’re preparing and
responding. It used to be you had a storm, the wires fell down and you responded and now
they’re expecting you to prepare and plan prior to the storm and you have to share that
information with them. We’re getting better at it but it’s a challenge.
R: Going off of your reference to automated metering, are there any other useful models and
procedures utilized? This doesn’t necessarily have to be in terms of regular response, but it can
be in hardening the grid, the ICS, things like that.
P: We run under the FEMA incident command structure so we have everyone in our area
command and incident command trained up to ICS 300. We run an incident command system all
the time and it’s shown great benefits. We use an active logistics section, our planning section,
which I’m the chief of, we’ve implemented a lot of modeling. We look at information from past
storms to determine what to expect and respond accordingly, and obviously it’s dependent on the
weather forecast. Again, the weather forecasts aren’t always accurate but you go on the
information you have. We look at three weather forecasts every day, so we head down that path
and we try to document and tell a story, and then afterwards you make adjustments to the plan
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and go from there. It’s an active business and it changes every day, which makes it kind of
exciting.
R: Could you talk about how disaster response practices have evolved over time?
P: Yeah, that’s a very easy one. When I started in the fire department, I was 20 years old and the
fire chief ran everything out of his pickup truck. We grew up on a farm and the fire chief was the
local guy you called and said you had a problem and could come and give you the answer. Fire
departments, and now utilities, have automated a lot of things and we’ve started to manage
incidents, not just respond to them. We manage, plan, and then respond, and the other thing that
I’m proud of in the utility business, is that we try and act in a reasonable, safe manner. Safety is
everything. Yes, it may take us another hour to get your lights turned on, but if we can do it in a
safe manner that’s what we have to do. The safety culture has been great. Everybody is
concerned about cost, but when we’re in a big restoration effort, cost isn’t the primary concern,
safety is. It’s really changed from a response business to a planning business. You’re managing
expectations, which is a challenge. People expect the power restored in a certain amount of time,
which sometimes in rural areas is not practical. We struggle with that, as does every utility. In
Maine we have islands, and sometimes I’m unable to get to those islands in a quick manner to
restore power. So, we have to do it in a safe, effective way, be honest with our customers and tell
them “you are not going to get your power in this number of hours”. We can’t set expectations
too high, we have to be honest with them. You have to have a good communication branch, you
have to have logistics to support those utility workers with food and lodging and equipment,
which is a big package now, where it used to be run out of a pickup truck. Now we’re running it
out of an EOC that’s staffed 24 hours a day, so it’s come a long way.
R: I really only have one more question – we talked a little about the models and procedures, and
I mentioned hardening the grid. Is there any plan that you know of to pursue something like that,
such as undergrounding wires?
P: We have a new department we just created called Resiliency. It was partially due to some of
the response from the storms and damage, so we have started this division. We’re going to spend
around $9 billion over few years on resiliency in our 4 companies to harden the grid, which
includes substation work, bigger poles, underground work, some generation to back up some
small, rural communities – we’ll put in some generators to buy them 2 or 3 days of power. That’s
a huge part of where we’re going in the next 5 or 10 years.
R: Could you elaborate on the most common types of emergencies that utilities have to face?
P: There’s the small – we look at everything in class. Utilities on a daily basis are faced with cars
striking utility poles, which cause a lot of nuisance outages. The biggest issue is shifting of
weather, where we’re getting more storms. The storm report I’m working on right now, which
was 2 weeks ago, we had 52,000 customers out over 3 days. They did a nice job doing
restoration, but the public’s expectation is that they want a response in a reasonable amount of
time. We had 22 storms in 2018, which is a lot, which is a range from 9,000 customers out up to
140,000, so it’s a big variety. We do a pretty good job of tracking all the storms and we keep
data on those about 15 years back on storms. Just 10 or 12 years ago was just 6 or 7 storms a
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year, some are really small and you may have one 60,000 or 70,000 outage storms, but when you
get up to around 20 you more than double how many you have to respond to. The costs are high
and the crews are tired. It used to be that you’d get thunderstorms and maybe one ice storm in the
winter, but in the fall of this year we had 5 storms over 6 weeks in October. Your employees get
tired and that’s another challenge. Finding young kids that want to get in the business is a big
challenge, kids don’t really seem to want to go into the trades like they used to. The biggest
challenge we’re all facing, and New York is worse than Maine, is the political involvement.
Politicians are trying to get into operations. Politicians set the budget, but when they stand there
trying to tell you how to run outages, it creates a lot of problems and violates the incident
management system. It’s a nation-wide issue.
R: That seems to be the opinion of the majority of the people I’ve spoken with as well.
P: I’m going to the legislature today to discuss some things with them and I love it – the day after
the storm definitely come talk to me about the issues, but during the heat of battle you have to let
the linemen do their jobs.
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Participant #8 Interview
Interview Date: March 18, 2019
Researcher thanked the participant for agreeing to participate in the interview. The researcher
then notified the participant that the interview would be recorded for the purpose of creating a
transcript, but none of the participant’s personal information would be included in the transcript,
aside from job title and organization.
R: We can go ahead into the first question – I want to get through this as quickly as possible for
you. Could you please tell me your professional title, what your experience in disaster response
is, and give me a little about what you do on a daily basis.
P: Sure. I’m the Commissioner of Erie County’s Department of Homeland Security and
Emergency Services. On a day-to-day basis I oversee three divisions of the department;
Homeland Security and Emergency Services which would be fire safety, EMS, and the disaster
preparedness division. I oversee on a daily basis the functionality of each of those divisions.
R: Could you tell me about the internal command structure that you have and how you manage
emergencies and disasters?
P: The command structure would be the commissioner and then all county department designees
as first deputy. There are three deputy commissioners that oversee each of the divisions, so if you
were doing an organizational chart you would have the commissioner, and directly under that
you would have the three divisions led by the deputy commissioners themselves. New York
State is a home rule state, so for the purposes of emergency management, all disasters are local,
so the way that we manage our disasters, a local community, town, village, or city would be a
subset…for example, Flight 3407, the plane that crashed in Clarence Center, the management
style, the way that it works is the towns and villages have certain resources, so many
ambulances, so many police officers, so many utility workers, so many whatever of would be
used. When they exhaust those, they go to their mutual aid agreements, so they go to their local
towns or villages, and when those start to get exhausted, they go up to the county level to help
coordinate resources that are coming in from areas within the county, outside the county, around
the state, or even outside New York state and around the country. So, we’re coordinating efforts
based on need, but because the county also has certain resources that need to be taken care of,
such as roads, parks, buildings, we also have operational functionality during the course of the
disasters. When there’s a major disaster, we active the emergency operations center, my deputy
commissioners are part of that EOC activation, and then we bring the appropriate agencies in to
help facilitate the rapid recovery.
R: In getting more specific, could you talk about your relationship with NYSEG and National
Grid and how you co-manage and respond to disasters?
P: Absolutely. People ask all the time as the storm is approaching or when we’re in the middle of
a catastrophic event, what are you doing now or how are you getting ready to respond to this, and
as the utilities as well as the different agencies will tell you, it’s a 365 day a year planning
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process, building relationships, making contacts, and preparing, so you’re not just preparing
something because of a weather prediction, you hopefully are prepared for those types of things
because you’re working on building those relationships. So in the area of utilities, National Grid,
NYSEG, we work directly with them because obviously no one in Emergency Services climbs
utility poles and repairs transformers, but also because of the residual impacts of not having
power, such as people of needs have to have generators and oxygen and dialysis, so we work
together to get a heads up and real time information with regards to how long it will take to
restore power. We work with them to figure out what some of the solutions might be, how to
distribute dry ice, whether or not we need to open up shelters because power is going to be out
for an extended period of time because it’s extremely warm or cold outside. It’s a wellorchestrated relationship; they do their things to try and get power restored as quickly as possible
and we do ours to try and have that synergy there so if they tell us it’s going to be an extended
period of time, there are a lot of things that need to fall into place with that. So, we take a look at
their plans, we work closely together. Primarily when it comes to disasters, transparency is the
number one thing, so we try and have transparency and the only way that happens is if you have
a trusting relationship with all of your partners and they realize that everybody is just trying to do
their best and get the proper information. You may be telling people during disasters things they
don’t want to hear, but the worst thing you could do is tell them things they do want to hear just
because they want to hear it. We work together to manage expectations about the duration of the
incident.
R: Could you tell me a little about any changes you’ve seen in the disaster response models
utilized by NYSG and National Grid overtime and kind of evaluate their responses?
P: I think part of the things I’ve seen in regards to their response, we’ve always had great
working relationships on the local level. I think on the corporate level, and these days things on
the corporate level tend to be hundreds if not thousands of miles away, they don’t know Western
New York from Western USA. So, I think what happens is when suggestions, budgets, and
things like that are put together, not having a situation awareness of the terrain and the
challenges for utilities and emergency responders, highway workers and things like that,
sometimes it’s hard to visual at corporate headquarters that we need to spend a couple million
dollars to trim back trees, invest in the infrastructure of putting in new poles or maybe going
underground. I think there’s a lot of different things that play into that whole process that not so
much on the local level, because we’ve had great working relationships. I’m sure suggestions for
improvements have been made, but when it comes to the bottom line that doesn’t translate at the
corporate level. I think the biggest improvements you’ve seen is a buy-in from the corporate
level and the philosophy of “let’s not wait until we see that there are 100 poles that are snapped,
let’s have 100 poles ready to go”, the idea of getting resources here prior to the storm hitting
instead of trying to respond and role in resources after the fact. I think the willingness on the
locals and now the willingness and encouragement from the corporate level to take a look at the
emergency and what’s required of the response, including letting employees take incident
command courses, attend meetings that are not just specific to the utility, but specific to the
overall first response community and working closely with fire departments, emergency
managers, and police departments and developing those relationships ahead of time. So, there’s
been quite the improvement on the corporate level to allow the locals to do what they’ve wanted
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to do all along. Unfortunately, they’ve been led in that direction, in some cases because of
catastrophic events like Superstorm Sandy or some other major disasters.
R: You mentioned some improvements that have been suggested. Do you have any you know of
top of mind where these utilities could improve in their disaster response models and methods?
P: Well, I think some of the things that have happened, I can give you an example for. We had a
wind event a couple of years ago, and some of the improvements that happened as suggestions
following that were clearing trees away from lines, investing money to make sure if branches are
going to come down, they’re not going to come down and automatically knock power out to
5,000 or 10,000 people, and then you have to wait until the wind dies down to have restoration,
so tree clearing, coming in and having tree crews. Some of the other suggestions were assigning
utility crews to taskforces where you might have, during catastrophic events, crews that’ll go out
where you may have a utility crew, law enforcement, fire agencies so if something happens
along the way that requires first aid or a utility to deenergize a line and render safe, you have
those people there so you’re not making 6 phone calls to accomplish 4 or 5 different things, you
have everyone right there. You’ll sweep through an area and make sure everyone is okay, no one
needs EMS, there aren’t any fire hazards, if roads need to be blocked utilities can render safe or
in some cases repair. So, I think some of the major improvements have been integrating the
utilities and embedding them with the first response community, with emergency managers.
Some improvements with reporting outages too, estimated time of restoration; again, it’s critical
for people to understand that if they’re going to be out of power for 24 hours, don’t tell them it’ll
only be out for 10 hours. It’s real time assessments, real time evaluations, real restoration times
that make all the difference. People are very understanding, and they have a threshold of about 3
or 4 days. Those are the types of improvements, and we work with utilities to try and come up
with formulas and methods. And when it comes to delivering that message too it’s a partnership,
so if a utility is saying it will be one time and politicians are saying that’s unacceptable,
politicians don’t climb utility poles or replace transformers and they don’t know that business, so
it’s a balancing act to make sure that the correct information is going out and everyone is
pushing that correct information.
R: Could you tell me a little about the biggest challenges that you and utilities face when
responding to emergencies, and maybe some of the most common types of emergencies you deal
with?
P: I would say the most common types of emergencies that first responders respond to, and I’m
also a volunteer fire fighter and a task chief of the fire department, so the most common types are
a car striking a utility pole or a tree naturally falling over and taking out a utility line. Those are
the most common failures of a line or system. But, it’s those types of incidents that, when you
have a major wind storm or another type of major incident, that are actually the types of things
that help you prepare and learn to respond to that, and learn that a line is deenergized, how do
you make sure as a first responder that gets accomplished.
R: Could you touch on some of the biggest challenges that you face when responding to
emergencies as well?
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P: I would say the biggest challenges we run into are situational awareness, the magnitude of the
incident itself. We tend to unfortunately, because of the number of towns and villages and
emergency responders, needless to say if the power is out in your community, you have an issue
in your community, that’s your bad day. But if its regionally a bad day, getting snap assessments
with regard to how many people it’s going to impact, is it state-wide; so, the biggest challenge is
getting our arms around the magnitude of the disaster itself or the incident itself, because that’s
what leads us to request additional help, or in some cases, sending the help back. So, if utilities
are saying we’re going to get a bad storm, and they’re spending millions of dollars to bring crews
in from all over, and then it turns out that there’s not that much going on, it’s an economic
impact. You have a quick assessment and determine there’s no need to have the crews there, you
demobilize them. So, I would say a quick assessment of needs to determine how many resources
you’ll need, and that also plays into how rapidly you can demobilize and save millions of dollars
in the case of utilities, and in the case of first responders, you can then reassign them back to
their day-to-day operations. So, I would say the single biggest challenge would be the actual
overall assessment of how impactful the event or incident was and then followed by that, the
communication of that and the actual recovery process itself.
R: I only have two more questions for you. The first one is, in your experience, how have
disaster response practices evolved over time? This can be at the Department of Homeland
Security or in general.
P: In general, the way that disaster response has improved and evolved is that we’ve, in many
cases, eliminated the territorial behavior where there used to be a philosophy of, this is our city,
we can handle it and don’t need any additional help, and that hesitancy to work as a community.
We’ve seen tremendous improvement in areas of communication, collaborative efforts, mutual
aid agreements, memorandums of understanding, and shared services. The boundary between
two towns is nothing more than an imaginary line, and access to resources critical to you solving
your problem shouldn’t be hindered because of an imaginary line. Communications have
improved so that more people are communicating with one another, as well as that collaborative
effort. Before we would have meetings of emergency managers and one community wouldn’t
show up or feel that they needed to be involved. Now there’s a lot more collaboration, everyone
understands that we might be a separate town or village or county, but we’re all counties within a
states and states within a union, so that’s where your help is going to come. Other improvements
have been because of the IJC, which is the International Joint Commission, which is essentially a
document signed between Erie County, Niagara County, the City of Buffalo, the City of Niagara
Falls, and all of the municipalities in the Southern Ontario side of the border, so in the event that
something catastrophic happens over in Southern Ontario, Fort Erie for example, or something
catastrophic happens in Erie County, it allows crews to come across the border quickly to assist.
So, say something happens in Fort Erie, rather than wait for a hazmat team to come regionally, or
a back-up team to come as far away as Toronto, you now have that document that allows those
hazmat teams from Buffalo or Erie County to cross over the bridge and assist them as well. I
would say the areas of most improvement, people understand how to spell ICS, they understand
the components of that and what the actual purpose is, and how that helps us to manage these
catastrophic events that are millions of dollars that collectively we need to work our way
through, not individually. I assume you’re a resident of Erie County; you know how we can have
one area that gets 6 and a half or 7 feet of snow, and a few miles away the sun is shining and the
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grass is green. If you don’t have preexisting agreements or the willingness to work with the other
towns and villages, your help can be a couple miles away, and without that you’re digging
yourself out.
R: The last question I have for you is, in your opinion, what do you think the most useful models
and procedures utilized in disaster management? This can be specific for utilities, such as
increasing the resiliency of the grid or implementing an ICS structure.
P: I think what’s most critical in any business with public safety and emergency management in
general is keeping one eye on the present, looking toward the future with regard to emerging
technology and improving protecting services, whether it’s from a cyber-attack or mother nature.
At the same time, you have to look at the past, which is historical responses, which we do after
action reports for. We don’t look at these reports to pat ourselves on the back and see what we
did well, you look at those so they’re the launch pad for future achievements. I would say what’s
absolutely critical is focusing on the past, present and future. You might assign someone to do an
analysis on your response to a power outage or our response to a plane crash. Things to keep in
mind are what would have allowed us to mitigate that problem quicker, or save more lives or
restore the power quicker. You take those suggestions, and you’re still dealing with your day-today bread and butter type things, but at the same time you need to start putting groups together
and focus on what you could improve on, like having certain people in the EOC, or having a
program that linked all the emergency managers in Erie County so we have a better situational
awareness. So those are the types of things that over the years have evolved. On the county level
we have a system that’s called Disaster Land, so we can manage emergency management
situations, events, special events too, it’s not always about mother nature or terrorist attacks,
there are stadium events, events that take place like art festivals, the Erie County Fair, those
types of things that you can manage using this software. It’s a web-based emergency
management tool, everything from finance and admin, all the way down to tickets for resources
that are requested. You look at that and how we can better coordinate, so the evolution was to do
so electronically, so we developed that and now it’s a system that’s used around the world.
Buffalo Computer Graphics, right here in Erie County, was the developer of that, and it’s one of
many different platforms people can use but it’s gained a lot of popularity. We developed that
and offer it to every town, village and city, so if they want to create an event or have an incident
only impacting their community, or we want a more global view of what’s going on, we assign
an incident number and they can log in, manage their own incident, and request resources. It’s a
matter of saying what could we do better and turning it in to something positive. In this case, it’s
a computerized web-based system where even if I’m 2,000 miles away I can log in and still assist
with the overall recovery efforts. Another example would be the post-storm, where you see all
those gates on the 219 and thruway in different areas on the entrance ramps. Those were a direct
result of people saying that we can’t have fire departments out with their $500,000 pieces of
apparatus shutting down road ways, but instead there are mechanical devices that can do that. It
started with a few gates, and then with teamwork between the county, state and local
governments, it went to barricades given to fire departments to put up to shut the roads down, to
now gates on almost all those roads. It’s a process of shutting down the road, how we can
improve on that, going to barricades and ultimately the state funding for those gates, which
ultimately is a collaborative effort because when they say we’re shutting down the 219 and we
need all the gates shut, there are the towns and villages along the routes there, as well as county
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and state employees that can stop, have a key and can open a lock on that and shut down that
particular highway entrance. It’s that coordination effort to determine who’s making the
decision, and then once the decision is made, who can do it and how do you implement it. These
are the little things that will ultimately save lives because we’ve taken things we can improve on
and actually improved on them.
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Participant #9 Interview
Interview Date: March 18, 2019
Researcher thanked the participant for agreeing to participate in the interview and researcher
notified the participant that the interview would be recorded for the purpose of creating a
transcript, but none of the participant’s personal information would be included in the transcript,
aside from job title and organization, via email. The participant provided all responses in written
form.
1. What is your professional title, and how long have you had experience in disaster
response, in relation to public utilities?
Manager, Resource Coordination – I have been with the company for 30 years and have
played various roles in relation to disaster/storm response over my career. My latest role (for
approximately 15 years) is working with my team “behind the scenes” in logistics. My team
is responsible for securing lodging for all contractor and mutual aid resources traveling to
assist with a restoration event and we must also provide lodging for National Grid crews who
might be coming from other areas of NYS or New England to provide mutual aid.
2. Throughout the time you have worked in this field, have you noticed a positive or
negative change in the disaster response methods utilized by NYSEG and National Grid?
Please explain. (Respondent should have the opportunity to discuss both their positive
and negative perspectives.)
As for National Grid I have noticed that over the years there is much more scrutiny on how
long it takes to restore power to our customers (the accuracy of our ETR’s – estimated time
of restoration are reviewed closely by the PSC). Depending on the magnitude of the storm
and the number of outages involved the reporting to the PSC becomes more frequent.
Additionally, over the years the expectation for communicating and working closely with
state, county and local emergency response officials has increased considerably.
3. How have disaster response practices in this field evolved over time? Either generally or
within your organization.
I have noticed over time that we do a much better job in preparing for an upcoming storm.
Additionally, we seem to secure more restoration crews than ever before. For the latest wind
event we had at the end of February we also utilized resources from a company who did
damage assessment (seems to be new for us). These additional resources were able to
identify issues in the field, which were causing the outages, more quickly resulting in faster
restoration times. With every storm event we have review calls to identify best practices or
pinpoint areas of improvement. As a result, the storms seem to have a more “organized”
feel.
4. In what areas can your organization’s disaster response plans/procedures be improved?
We do have storm drills on “blue sky days”, but I feel they could be even more frequent.
Because everyone’s job duties generally change during a storm event if you don’t practice
your roles it’s easy to forget how involved things can be.
5. What are the biggest challenges utilities face when responding to emergencies?
Safety. People take for granted that they have heat, air conditioning and lights but very few
people realize what a dangerous occupation a power lineman is (especially during a storm
event). We want to restore power as quickly and as efficiently as possible, but safety cannot
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be overlooked. Another challenge is dealing with the public – good communication is
paramount, so our customers know what to expect and how long they may be without power.
6. What are the most common types of emergencies that utilities must contend with?
Weather events. After that brown-out and black-out situations due to an overloaded system
(generally in the summer during increased energy use due to air conditioning).
7. What are the most useful models/procedures utilized in your experience, even if they are
not practiced at your organization?
The use of the mutual assistance program where we receive assistance from other utilities
and contractors with restoration workers and equipment.
8. Is there a set chain of command implemented in emergency response that exists outside
of your organization’s normal operations? If yes, what is the structure?
I work in Electric Operations – the reporting structure during a storm is generally the same as
it is during normal operations.
9. How would you evaluate your utility’s performance when responding to emergencies in
the past? Please provide specific examples.
We continue to learn from and improve with every passing restoration event. National Grid
received an Emergency Assistance and Emergency Recovery Award from EEI for restoration
efforts across the US for storms that impacted our territory late 2017 and spring 2018.
10. What is your organization’s relationship with other utilities/governmental organizations
within the disaster response framework? In what ways do you think this relationship
could be improved?
National Grid’s US Director of Electric Emergency Planning, Glen Aichinger, has worked
diligently over the past several years to improve National Grid’s relationship with other
utilities and governmental organizations. He works tirelessly and has gained the trust and
respect of all the agencies and organizations he works with.
11. Can you think of anything else you would like to mention about your organization’s
disaster response management system?
No.
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Participant #10 Interview
Interview Date: March 22, 2019
Researcher thanked the participant for agreeing to participate in the interview. The researcher
then notified the participant that the interview would be recorded for the purpose of creating a
transcript, but none of the participant’s personal information would be included in the transcript,
aside from job title and organization.
R: The first question is, what is your professional title and how long have you had experience in
the field of disaster management and response?
P: Official title here at National Grid is Director of Electric Emergency Planning. That covers
New York, Massachusetts and Rhode Island.
R: Can you give me a bit of background about what you do?
P: My responsibilities are largely for the electric business, relative to all of our emergency
planning procedures, which are our emergency response plans for electric, for which we have
three, one for each state. Our job is largely around emergency plan compliance, which
encompasses everything from all of the plan maintenance, which essentially keeps our plans and
our company compliant with all of the legislation and laws that govern the emergency planning
and response duties of the utilities. It also includes annual training, annual exercises and also our
involvement with mutual assistance, both regionally and nationally. I’ve been in this position for
about 10 years, and I’ve worked for Niagara Mohawk/National Grid for 28 years, half of that
was on the customer side, and the other part that wasn’t emergency planning was in operations.
R: The next question is, throughout the time you have worked in this field, have you noticed a
positive or negative change in the disaster response methods utilized by NYSEG and National
Grid?
P: I think that the change is positive, because there’s a very deliberate focus on emergency
planning and emergency response, which has largely been brought about over the years due to a
lot of the regulatory changes that have influenced the utility emergency planning and response
piece to the business. When you look at it and say, what positives? We’ve put a lot more
structure into our emergency plans, we’ve streamlined them, we’ve consolidated them, we’ve
standardized them, so I think that’s all good because the plans before had the potential to be
different in every division. We have 3 divisions in our New York State operation, and now we
have a single plan for all of New York, which is structured and put together the same way as the
plans are in the other two states. They’ve been standardized, streamlined, we have a lot of really
good procedures in place that govern our updates and review process, so I think in that regard
we’ve gotten better at what we do because of the scrutiny and the changes from the state
regulatory authorities down to the utilities taking advantage of a lot more tools that are available
to us to improve what we do. I’ll say the combination of regulatory influence and doing what is
probably considered the right thing to do to improve response. Technology has gotten better, we
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have better communication tools and I think a lot of the changes have come from communication
and coordination beyond just the changes on the operating side.
R: Are you able to speak on any changes that have happened at NYSEG at all?
P: I will say that the changes we’ve gone through…in New York there are five or six utilities.
You have National Grid, NYSG, Central Hudson, Orange & Rockland and Con Edison – you
could either look at them as one or two utilities, and PSEG Long Island. So, whenever there is a
significant regulatory change, like what we saw coming out of Sandy, all of the utilities in New
York had to implement the same recommendations in their emergency response plans. A lot of
the things that have happened since 2012, all of the New York utilities have gone through
together and are supposed to have a similar approach to many of these items. I will say that while
we’re in concept charged with doing a lot of the things the same, every utility has the ability to
put together their own way of doing it. From what I know of NYSEG they do a lot of the things
the same, we have the same charter, but I’m not really sure…can’t speak much further beyond
that in terms of how or what they do.
R: Okay, that’s totally fine. I think that’s plenty. So, talking about regulations, could you tell me
more about National Grid’s relationship with other governmental organizations at the county
level, city level, and state level, and what ways you think this relationship could be improved.
P: I think at the county level and below, our relationships are all very good. We were very
proactive in meeting with them on a regular basis. In fact, our emergency response plan has a
requirement that we meet with the county emergency managers, the county sheriff, state police,
OEM, and fire coordinators at least annually prior to June 1. We meet with a big group of people
at the county level and below every year, and we go over a scripted, standardized agenda where
it brings us into the point where we go over things every year together, we attend each other’s
exercises. We pretty much have gotten to know them and have really good relationships with
them. I can’t say that’s the same across the board for other utilities in terms of how well they’ve
done there. When you start moving up into the state, while I think we have a very good
relationship with the state and other agencies like the State Department of Public Service which
is the PSC and they’re out regulatory agency, then we have the OEM, the State Department of
Emergency Management which is tied to state Homeland Security. We know people and work
very closely with people at OEMDHS, and I think we have a very good relationship with them.
The next level down are the regional operation centers, which report up through OEMDHS, and
that’s something that’s new within the last 6 months. We’ve gotten to know some of the regional
coordinators for that and feel we have a pretty good relationship there. On the OEM side, all of
the regions across New York state we do have a pretty good relationship with them as well. I’ve
gotten to know the guys in Region V, the Finger Lakes and Western New York. We have a good
relationship but any type of regulatory or political relationship you have to be careful with
because it’s not a typical business relationship. We may get along well, but as soon as pressures
start to increase from the governor’s office, things can go off the rails pretty quick because their
allegiance to their hierarchy and sometimes politics doesn’t match well with logic or business.
We have to be very careful with what we do with these relationships. It’s not a typical business
relationship, it’s very professional, guarded and cautious.
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R: Switching gears a little, can you tell me more about National Grid’s ICS structure?
P: Sure. So, National Grid, from what I understand, because I was involved with bringing the
Incident Command System to National Grid, back around 2013-2014. I believe we were the
second utility in New York State to incorporate the ICS model within our organizational
structure. So, what we get to incorporate that into our plan is, we actually worked very closely
with the State OEM and the county emergency managers, primarily Erie County, to take a look
at our current organizational structure and look at the ICS structure. The way we morphed over
to ICS was we didn’t want to fit the company into ICS, we wanted to fit ICS into the company.
The last thing we wanted to do was change the way we operate to fit an organizational model we
would only using during storms. It was actually quite simple because the structure we had here at
National Grid, aside from just the names of some of the titles and where we fell in a makeshift
organizational chart, it all transitioned very smoothly from a functional perspective. We did have
to make a couple minor adjustments, one of which was how the liaison function works with the
external parties, so when we worked with the state on developing this, it started off where they
were expecting some of our higher-level decision-makers to go into their EOCs. That was a big
sticking point…
R: That’s what I’ve heard from a lot of people as well.
P: They think we’ll pull one of our directors, like our Overhead Electrical Director, who is in
charge of all of the decision making and strategic decisions here in our storm response. The way
I see it works from the state perspective is that he’s the one who should go to their EOC, and we
find that that absolutely can’t happen. At the end of the day, working very closely of the state,
they made us aware of a position called the liaison, which is a function where we put someone in
the county EOCs who’s a direct link back to our company and can coordinate issues and go back
and forth, leaving our decision makers here who can run our storm operations. The liaison has
grown to include the regional operation center for the state. That was one of the bigger
challenges. The other was some of the planning – it’s not exactly like a government planning
session, but we kind of do something similar. Aside from a few little tweaks, we were able to fit
our organization under the ICS model’s guiding principles and it has worked very well.
R: You talked about the liaison function and that being a challenge. Could you provide me
examples of other challenges you’ve faced when responding to emergencies?
P: Some of the other challenges, we’ve continued to address them. This is something I think
we’ve gotten better with as well, but downed wires and 911 response, which has been a focus of
the state as well. We’ve gone from years ago just managing wires down and 911, now we have
as part of the state requirements, a timeframe in which we have to respond to 911 calls in order
to comply with the law. We’ve also changed our strategy to go from our downed wire
organization to now we’re bringing in contracted wire guards to get them out ahead of some of
the calls to relieve police and fire from sitting on our wires and get everything covered to protect
the public. Some of the other things that we’ve had some challenges with are communication;
this has gone off the charts, so that’s probably the biggest thing that’s changed over the years is
how we communicate with our customers and external agencies like the PSC, the counties, the
governor’s office. The use of social media has changed, and trying to keep all of the channels of
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communication available, understood, and controlled. The continuity of messaging can make or
break a storm. There are so many ways to get information out and we look to control it to avoid
bad messaging. It goes out on a 4-hour cycle as part of the reporting process we have with the
state, but that’s become the basis for our regular communication. From there, we add the bits and
pieces of it along the way, but it’s all maintained so no one goes off on their own.
R: Switching gears again, could you tell me in general how disaster response practices over time
have changed? This could be at National Grid or overall.
P: We’ve moved from more of a response mindset to a preparation mindset, and I can see that it
very significantly on the mutual assistance side. I think that involves how staffing is in place –
every company has had to cut employees, shift resources, and change strategy, so National Grid
has a contracting strategy as well as our own internal workforce. Years ago, we’d wait to see
what happened in a storm before we went out and got more resources, and this was everybody in
the industry. Now one of the things you see is, when you get a forecast of a storm of any
significance, companies are grabbing resources ahead of the event and prestaging, in some cases
with enormous amounts of manpower and equipment. That’s changing the dynamics of the
mutual assistance world, and has really changed the way utilities respond to forecasted major
events, most notably during hurricane season, nor’easters, that type of stuff. Communication like
we’ve talked about quite a bit, has evolved and changed dramatically, to where it’s really all
about setting and managing expectations. Customers now think power should be restored
instantly. Little do they know, sometimes we don’t even know the power is out because they
have to call us to let us know it’s out, and it’s not as easy as flipping as switch. There could be 50
poles down on the ground that take 4 days to fix. It’s really the world of instant gratification,
sometimes that doesn’t work when it comes to the way the utility response is. It’s still a very
simple infrastructure when you think about it – it’s wood poles on the ground and wires on the
top. Not everything is underground and some people think we should put everything
underground, but the cost is so high and often it’s not feasible. The biggest changes are
managing expectations, communication, coordination, mutual assistance, and the scrutiny of
everything around emergency response has gone off the charts. From simple outages now, we get
a notice from the governor’s office stating that they’re going to investigate, we actually got one
today about a transmission outage that happened two weeks ago that took out 15,000 customers
for 45 minutes. There’s an investigation launched into that outage, and that never would have
happened 10 years ago, more or less we wouldn’t have even talked about it, but the sensitivity is
so high and it’s really forced the utilities to be really in tune with what’s going on so many
fronts.
R: You mentioned undergrounding, and one of the biggest things I’ve been working on in this
paper is looking at areas of best practices and improvement, so in your opinion what do you
think are some of the most useful models and procedures utilized to prepare for emergencies and
harden the grid that National Grid may not necessarily be doing, just in general?
P: I think in general, it all comes down to financial impact because a lot of this is very expensive,
things like automated metering, distributive automation, feeder and infrastructure hardening,
putting bigger poles in, putting stronger components and equipment in, flood mitigation, making
sure we’re not building substations in flood plains, and where we do have equipment in areas,
making sure we have the ability to protect it. There’s a balance there across the board, with all of
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our construction for new residential, most of it is underground but there is an overhead feed to
the neighborhood, so I think the balance is there where I think it’s appropriate and cost effective,
but some of those other things with distributive automation gives you more ability to control the
system remotely. One of our practices is cut and clear and switch before fix, so in mitigation you
can cut the broken pieces of the system out, and then switch the system around to back feed or
find another source to restore a lot of customers, even before you start replacing poles and wires.
The more automated equipment that’s out there, the more options you have in doing stuff like
that. With things like feeder hardening, you have to get the money to do things like that, which
all comes through rate cases. That has been a proven strategy that has helped us over the years.
Our infrastructure and asset replacement plan is very significant and I think it shows when 10
years ago you’d get a 45 mile an hour wind and we’d be in trouble, but now we’re getting 55 to
60 mile per hour winds and we’re getting through pretty good.
R: So, could you tell me a little about how you feel that National Grid has performed in the past
10 years when responding to emergencies and what lessons learned and areas of improvement
have been implemented because of the response efforts?
P: I think National Grid has performed fairly well. There’s always room for improvement and
we’re only as good as our last storm, so that’s always something we have the back of our minds.
The unique thing about emergency planning, preparedness and response is that every storm is
different and no matter what storm we face, it’ll be different than any other. There are always
different challenges we see. One of the things National Grid has done is that we’re constantly in
a mode of continuously improvement. We look to things that didn’t go well and we try to find a
solution to make it work better next time. Part of that is inherent to our plan, we do have some
certain requirements to do that on some of the more significant events, but I think we’re always
looking to improvement opportunities. Some people won’t admit it, but a lot of it comes from the
structure we put in place in the emergency response plans that link back to NIMS and ICS in that
it’s very organized, structured and orderly and you couple that with all of the scrutiny, focus,
requirements and laws and you can very easily start to build procedures and policies that address
all that. We practice it and we train on it and we give a lot of practice at it because everyone with
that higher level of scrutiny, the bar is moving every year and we get more interest in what
would have been a non-event. This weekend we had 4 inches of snow, in some areas maybe a
foot, but we had 4 phone calls and 3 reports due to the PSC this week to explain what we did to
get ready for it. Those are some of the things we’ve done and I think we’ve done a good job but I
think it’s come from everybody working together to work toward the common good of the item
we’re trying to improve. I think we have a pretty good relationship with our employees on the
representative side and the management side, who all seem to take this stuff seriously. Even
within National Grid there are different levels of where this goes. I can use a perfect example
with my experience in all three states, and maybe it’s because New York has been doing this a
lot longer than the other states under the National Grid umbrella, but I can speak to a group of
peers above or below me and, say we need to do something or I ask for something, it’s pretty
much usually done. You go to some of the other areas and that’s not the case, and I don’t know if
it’s a matter of working relationships or culture, but it’s something that’s getting better over time
and is better in some places than others.
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R: Really the last question I have for you is if you could tell me about the most common types of
emergencies that you deal with.
P: Most common are severe weather events, no question. It’s cyclical in terms of what type of
events and when. When I heard we were in for a mild winter, that was the worst news, because
we were going to be hovering right around that 25-35 degree range all winter and 29 degrees is
the worst temperature in the world because if it rains, it’s ice, and that’s the worst type of storm.
We had 2 or 3 of those scares this year. And then you get all of the high winds and now we’re
moving into thunderstorm season, and then hurricane season and it seems to cycle. The one thing
we’re seeing more than ever is snow is not really a big deal for us, but some people think it is.
When we get 10 inches of dry, powdery snow we get calls from the governor’s office, do press
conferences, and preparations for something that’s totally uneventful. Like “Snowvember” of
2014, we got 7 or 8 feet of snow in 2 days, and had hardly any electrical issues. But we had the
Commissioner of Public Service in our office wondering what we were doing.
R: Well, unless you have anything else you’d like to add, that’s everything I need.
P: Good questions.
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Participant #11 Interview
Interview Date: April 5, 2019
Researcher thanked the participant for agreeing to participate in the interview. The researcher
then notified the participant that the interview would be recorded for the purpose of creating a
transcript, but none of the participant’s personal information would be included in the transcript,
aside from job title and organization.
R: We can start with the first question – could you tell me what your professional title is, how
long you’ve had experience in disaster response, and a little bit about what you do?
P: Sure. So, my title is Utility Engineering Specialist III. I work in electric distribution systems
and I have been at the Public Service Commission for 14 years working in this part of the
department for 6 years.
R: So, on a daily basis, what do you do?
P: On a daily basis I work on a variety of different electric distribution issues for the department.
I have more recently been working on a project on the intersection of electric distribution and the
telecommunication industry, so I’ve been spending most of my time on that for a year and a half.
If we have any sort of outage event, then I work on the outage issues, any sort of emergency
issue, that trumps my daily responsibilities. I also work on supporting our agency’s role with
Homeland Security and State Emergency Management.
R: Could you tell me about any changes, positive or negative, in National Grid’s disaster
response methods over the past 10 years or so?
P: I think their crew levels are down but their management has gotten better in terms of
communication. It seems as those they rely more heavily on contractors, but in terms of
community outreach and working with local officials, that’s gotten stronger. They also
completely redid their emergency plans a couple years ago, and that was a positive improvement
as well.
R: Could you tell me, in general, how you feel disaster response practices have evolved over
time? This could be at the Public Service Commission, in terms of utilities, a little bit of both?
P: I think that expectations have gotten, frankly a little ridiculous. People expect restoration to
occur immediately, they don’t understand that sometimes it can take a while and I think that
expectation has trickled down from the governor’s office, so there is, I don’t know if it’s public
awareness or it’s just that expectations aren’t tempered, or what exactly is going on, but there’s
definitely been a shift in the past 3 years.
R: It’s interesting you say that because almost everyone I’ve spoken to has the same feelings on
this so you’re definitely not alone, but it’s interesting to see that coming from the inside in terms
of regulation.
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P: Absolutely. If you’re going to have 75 mile per hour winds, you’re going to have power
outages. It depends on the direction the wind blows and if the ground is wet, it depends if there
are leaves on the trees, there are a lot of different factors and it’s like common sense has gone out
the window. There’s this misinformation that certain technology can fix everything, but the
bottom line is that if you have 80 mile per hour winds, it doesn’t matter what type of technology
you’re using. Depending on environmental conditions, those poles might come down, so that’s
been something that’s been tough to deal with.
R: In terms of effective and efficient response, where do you think utilities could improve their
disaster response plans and procedures?
P: Definitely customer communication and customer engagement. I think that the New York
utilities are behind and some of the best practices out there in the county can be found close to
us. Their social media presence can be improved and the way they interact with their rate payers.
DTE is a utility out of Detroit and they do a pretty good job of communicating and taking their
social media users seriously. I think that the New York utilities are a little behind in taking it
seriously and understanding that there’s a huge customer base and that’s the way they’re going to
communicate, they’re not going to pick up the phone and they’re not going to deal with a call
center. I think that is definitely an area ripe for improvement. I think damage assessment is still
an area where we’re lacking, and I think that another area is the issue of retirement. There’s a lot
of retirement and training the next generation of, not necessarily emergency managers, but
people that can understand how the work packages are created and how the different pieces all fit
together. I think that it’s been hard for the utilities to hold onto personnel and replace – there’s
been a huge brain drain with retirements.
R: What would you say are some of the biggest challenges utilities face when responding to
emergencies, as well as some of the most common types of emergencies they deal with?
P: I think proper damage assessment and getting enough crews through NAMAG or whatever
they’re getting their contractor resources from or agreements they have in place. Managing all of
those outside resources once they actually arrive and start responding to outages.
R: What do you think the most common types of outages are?
P: Wind.
R: Great. So, going back a little to areas of improvement, what do you think are the most useful
models and best practices utilized by utilities? This could be across the county with the utility
discussed from Detroit, just some areas where they could consider implementing these models.
P: I would say, DTE does a great job with their customer engagement during emergencies. In
terms of ramping up, I think the whole getting outside crews in, we have a problem here in the
Northeast, but I’m not sure who does a better job of that, maybe Georgia Power.
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R: Could you expand on, you said we have trouble here in the Northeast with mutual aid, could
you tell me a little about that?
P: I think that there is a push for utilities not to share resources and not cross state lines with
some of those resources, and so it appears as that in recent years, New Jersey and New York
want to make sure their state has enough resources and so I think that gets dangerous because if
everyone’s playing well in the sandbox, then the whole construct of the NAMAG process isn’t
going to work. I think that’s a concern. There have been some improvements in terms of crossing
state lines and getting the right information with states of emergency and permission for certain
vehicles to travel on certain roads, and that kind of thing, there’s been an improvement in the
past 4 years or so.
R: If you’re not comfortable answering this next question that’s fine, but could you evaluate
National Grid and NYSEG’s performance when responding to emergencies in the past?
P: National Grid, in general they do a pretty good job, but they’re not perfect. There are some
that are consistently awful, and that would be NYSEG and RG&E.
R: The last one I have is if you could tell me a little about the Public Service Commission’s
relationship with utilities and how you work together or how the PSC regulates them.
P: In terms of how we regulate them, we look at their operations and their financials. They’re
required to be an open book, and in general that relationship works fairly well. Most of the
electric utilities understand that they need to provide certain types of information and they’re
open to sharing that information, and they’re legally required to do so in most cases. With some
other industries, that’s not as apparent, such as the telecommunications which are under light
regulation. The electric utilities are under heavier regulations, and so that really isn’t a challenge,
I think the challenge is that there are so many competing interests, so there’s a desire to make
sure that the power is back on immediately after there’s an outage event. At the same time, we’re
trying to move towards smart grid and different modern technologies, and there’s also a push to
bring wireless and broadband to everyone in the state, and all of these things cost money. I think
that’s the hardest part, is trying to figure out how to do all of that, move into the 21st century
while making sure that rates are just and reasonable. In terms of how we regulate, I work with a
lot of engineers and we like to solve problems, so with certain issues we try to work together to
solve these problems, and try to be cognizant of all the different competing financial implications
of policies.
R: That’s really everything I have, so unless there’s anything else you’d like to add I can let you
go.
P: No, I think that’s it.
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